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Abstract
The Korean government, like many others in less
developed countries, uses numerous carrots and sticks to
influence the location choices of manufacturing firms. We
develop an analytical model for comparing the economic
efficiencies of alternative subsidy schemes, allowing for
both input price subsidies and subsidies through public
infrastructure investment.
To implement the model we estimate restricted translog
cost functions for nine Korean manufacturing industries.
Simulations based on these econometric estimates and others
drawn from the literature enable us to compare loan
7-arantee plans, land price subsidies, wage bill subsidies,
and infrastructure delivery schemes.
We find that the credit rationing policies of the
Korean governmenlt (macro policies not set with industrial
location in mind), make the most common and most popular
location subsidy mechanism, loan guarantees, the most
efficient as well.. However, we further find that if the
Korean government alters its credit rationing policies,
location subsidy plans that lower the price of capital to
firms (as the guarantees do) would become the least
efficient mechanism for inducing firms to move. Finally, we
find that wage bill subsidies, which are not much used by
the Korean government, are more efficient than the land
price subsidies which are frequently granted, but that the
empirical evidence regarding infrastructure investments is
inadequate to form firm Judgements about their relative
merit.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
South Korean economic policy gives much attention to
industrial location. The rationales for this concern are
numerous: the proximity of the capital city, Seoul, to the
North Korean border makes industry around the capital
particularly vulnerable; congestioin and pollution in Seoul
lead some to think the city is too densely configured; and
regional disparities in living standards frequently raise
questions about the appropriateness of the Seoul region's
economic dominance. But even more striking than the many
reasons offered for government intervention in industrial
location decisions is the variety and number of devices the
government uses to influence locational choices. Mandates,
prohibitions, tax breaks, loan guarantees, grants, land price
reductions, promises of public infrastructure investments,
wage bill subsidies, all are found in the grab bag of carrots
and sticks used by the national government in its efforts to
alter the spatial outcomes of the freely working market
places.
In a random surveyI of 141 Seoul. region establishments
that had moved, eleven different government programs were
cited as having affected the firms' location decisions. One
cannot help but ask both whether some of these policies are
1. The World Bank7 eoul National University Project Survey of500 manufacturing establishments, of which 141 had moved
within the Seoul region.
2better than others, and under what circumstances one policy is
preferable to another.
Most radically, one might ask whether the Korean
government should try to influence location decisions at all.
Unfortunately, there is no carefully articulated conceptual
framework for analyzing the full effects of industrial
location policies; moreover, a perusal of the theoretical
literatures on industrial spatial choice and on optimal city
sizes suggests that an appropriate framework would be quite
cumbersome and would yield little in the way of analytical
insights. Henderson (1980) finds that models of optimal city
size are very sensitive to small changes in households' tastes
and firms' technologies; consequently estimates of what
cities should look like will be quite unreliable given the
state of the art of estimating tastes and technologies.
In any event, policy makers should be cautioned that
location policies may not be able to much alter the spatial
configurations of cities in market oriented economies.
Despite the large number of relatively generous schemes
offered by the Korean government, most intraregional moves by
Seoul firms are conducted without involvment in government
programs. Indeed, in the 1981 Korean national survev of
manufacturing firms, 74 percent of the firms that had moved
reported they
3had done so primarily for operational reasons; only 12
percent reported that they had moved primarily in response to
government subsidies or relocation mandates.
If extensive location policies such as those found in
Korea have only marginal impacts on the location decisions of
firms, one must expect that governments, without virtually
abandoning free market mechanisms, cannot greatly alter the
spatial configurations of their manufacturing sectors.
Potentially more fruitful than asking whether to move a
firm from A to B, is to ask "How should we move a firm from A
to B?I This is in fact the question a policy maker Is more
likely to pose to economists. Ought government subsidize the
interest rates paid by a firm if it moves, or ought government
offer subsidize land prices instead? And when is a subsidy on
wages to be preferred to a public investment in sewerage or
roads? In Korea, and throughout the developing world,
industrial location is a politically charged issue, and
politicians are unlikely to turn over to technicians any
decision but the how of it.
But the how of it can still be economically important.
Simulations reported below show that subsidizing interest
rates enough to induce a firm to relocate can sometimes be
twice as costly as subsidizing the price of land to the level
which to induces the same relocation decision! But this gets
us ahead of ourselves. Before we can evaluate or appreciate
the results of such simulations, we need to work our way
4through the theoretical and empirical exercises that underlie
them. This is the task of the coming chapters.
- -
-
-I
5CHAPTER II
A Framework for Analysis 2
Successful industrial location policies induce a firm
that would have chosen one location, A, to choose some other
location, B, which the government prefers. The government
policy must overcome any cost or profit advantage site A
enjoys. The essential economic question is "How costly is it
for government to achieve a switch in the relative
profitability of site B vis-a-vis site A?" Or, in choosing
among alternative policies, the question becomes "Which
politically feasible policy most cheaply overcomes site A's
advantage?"
Many economists' likely first response to these questions
is to argue that a simple cash payment to the firm, one just
large enough to offset site A's advantage, is the most
efficient, (i.e., least costly) policy. However, there is a
certain naivete in this response. The political process often
restricts the policies available to government; cash payments
by government to private firms for cooperating. in government
policies is one type of plan that is frequently politically
unacceptable. Even when direct payments are no fi completely
out of the question, their political costs may outweigh their
economic advantages.
2. The framework presented here was first developed in "Here,
There, Where" A Strategy for Evaluating Industrial Relocation
Policies in Korea" by Michael Murray, World Bank Report No.
UDD-6 Project No. RPO 672-58.
6The argument in favor of cash grants is that they leave
the firm, once it has moved to B, with its incentives intact
to produce its output as cheaply as possible at site B. Many
other policies do not share this virtue.
1. Location Distortion
All policies that induce the firm to locate at B
"distort" the location outcomes of the free market. And such
distortions are not costless. The firm had reasons for
initially preferring site A; either revenues would be less at
site B (so consumers place less value on the firm's product at
B), or costs would be higher at site B (so that more of
society's resources are absorbed in producing the firm's
output if the firm locates at B). In either case, the decline
in profits in going from A to B reflects a real social cost of
locating at B rather than A; this social cost we refer to as
a "location distortion" caused by a policy that causes the
firm to locate at B rather than A.
Countering this social cost of using site B are the
social benefits of having the firm at B rather than at A, the
benefits (reduced congestion, greater national security, or
whatever) which motivated the government policy in the first
place. A fundamenatal criterion for good policies is that
these social benefits outweigh the social costs.
The costs of relocation may either be borne by government
or be imposed on the firm. For example, if" site A is $100
more profitable than site B, a lump sum government subsidy of,
say, $150 to the firm will induce the firm to relocate, but
the firm might also locate at B if the government prohibited
it from choosing site A. In both cases, there is a social
cost of $100 entailed by the move, but that cost is borne by
government in the former case and by the firm in the latter
case.
Notice that in the subsidy case, treasury costs exceed
the social costs by $50. In such a case the subsidy scheme
has two components; one is a relocation grant of $100
compensating the firm for its lost profits, and the other a
pure transfer of $50 from the treasury to the firm. Knowing
the profitability of the two sites permits one to assess what
part of a given relocation subsidy is needed to bring about
the change in location and what part is a pure transfer to the
recipient.
The profitability differences between locations can arise
from differences in output or input prices, from location
specific tax liabilities, and from differences in the
quantities of fixed inputs (public or private) available at
each site. Further, these differences may arise from
differences in transportation costs to knd from markets, from
comparative advantages of the locations. themselves, from
immobile private investments made in the past, or from past
government decisions to invest in social overhead capital.
Because the differences between sites have specific
roots, governments frequently respond with specific policies
tailor-made to overcome the locational differences. This in
part accounts for the plethora of relocation policies used by
8many governments. Some industrial location policies offer
transportation subsidies to reduce the disadvantage of remote
locations. Some policies subsidize the wage payments to labor
to offset higher labor costs in less developed regions.
Others subsidize capital costs to compensate for a lack of
capital already in place. Still other policies offer to
increase the public provision of goods or services to close
the gap between more and less developed locations.
2. Production Distortion
These specific compensatory policies (and others like
them) differ from the prohibition or cash subsidy policies
described above. They not only induce the firm to-choose B
rather than A, but they also alter either relative factor
prices or relative input availabilities at site B.
Consequently, these policies may also distort the production
decisions of the firm after it does locate at B.
A firm prohibited from locating at A will choose the
cheapest possible way to produce its output at B. On the
premise that market prices reflect marginal social costs, this
implies that the firm will minimize the social cost of
producing its output3 . However, if the government location
policy alters factor prices from their market levels, the
bundle of inputs chosen by the firm to minimize its own
outlays will no longer minimize the social cost of production;,
3. The market prices paid for inputs by the firm reflect
only the private cost of those inputs. However, if there are
no externalties in the use of the inputs, and no market
imperfections such as monopoly power in the sale of the
inputs, then the private costs mirror the social costs of the
inputs.
9the difference between the lowest cost at which production at
B could be achieved, and the cost of the resources actually
chosen by the firm given government policies, is what we refer
to as the "production distortion" caused by the policies. Any
such "production distortion" will increase the total social
cost of the location policy beyond the cost of the "location
distortion" already discussed.
For illustration, consider a firm whose output would be
the same at B as at A, so that differences in profit
opportunities arise from differences in costs. The firm would
choose a particular bundle of inputs, X0 , if it were to
operate at B and face market prices, P m for inputs.B'
However, if input prices paid by the firm were altered by the
location policy, the firm would choose a different bundle of
inputs, XS, (for example, a wage subsidy to the firm would
induce the firm to use more labor and less of some other
inputs). The true value of the resources used by the firm
under the subsidy scheme would be
n m s
m -l
i.e., their cost reckoned at market prices. But the output
could have been produced for as little as
n
n p m X 0
i-Bi il
i.e., the costs the firm would have incurred had it faced
market prices. Consequently, the social cost of the
10
production distortion would be the differences between these
two sums.
3. Comparing Policies
In general, the social benefits government envisions rrom
an altered spatial pattern of industrial activity must be
balanced against both components of the cost of relocation,
the "location distortion" and the "production distortion."
However, when comparing two policy devices that would achieve
the same reordering of industrial location, the production
distortion becomes the only relevant consideration since the
location distortions are identical. Below, primary attention
ffocuses on the production distortion aspect of relocation
policies because it is the production distortions that will
determine the answer to a policy maker's query, "Should I
undertake policy X or policy Y to get firms to locate at B
rather than A?"
Location distortions do not, however, drop out of the
picture altogether. Each potentially successful subsidy
policy must provide a firm with enough benefits to overcome
site B's cost disadvantage; it is the location distortion
that will determine this threshold level for each policy
option. A policy maker can't simply ask, "Which is cheaper,
to subsidize capital purchases ten cents on the dollar or land
purchases ffifteen cents on the dollar?" If ten cents on the
dollar for capital purchases won't make the firm move, it is
irrelevant that this policy would be cheaper. And if fifteen
cents on the dollar for land purchases is more costly because
it is overly generous--ten cents would suffice to induce the
firm to move--then we still don't know which is better,
subsidizing capital or subsidizing land. The relevant
question is "Which is cheaper, a price subsidy on capital that
just overcomes the cost advantage of A, or a price subsidy on
land that just overcomes the cost advantage of A?"
Price subsidies are not the only tools used by the Korean
government. The relevant question may also take the form
"Which is cheaper, a price subsidy on capital that just
overcomes the cost advantage of A, or social infrastructure
investments at B that just overcome the cost advantage of A?"
Subsidizing factor prices or spending government monies
on plant or infrastructure are succinct phrases that actually
apply to many of the industrial location policies found in
Korea. A review of several of these policies will serve to
illustrate how one might analyze specific policies.
(1) Investment tax credit for new plant and equipment at
the new location. This policy is in essence a reduction in
the price of capital goods. Its effect will be to increase
the use of these inputs relative to labor and other inputs.
It will confer greater benefits on. firms which use more
capital and on firms which find it easier to substitute
capital for other inputs.
Analyzing the social cost of this investment tax credit
thus entails two steps. First, the differences in
profitability between the old and new site must be computed to
ascertain the "location distortion" induced by the policy.
12
Second, the production distortion resulting from an
inappropriate Lnput mix must also be calculated; this
requires comparing the true value of inputs chosen by the firm
with the value of the inputs which would be chosen iJf te firm
were not confronted with an artificially low price of capital.
(2) Relocation Assistance Funds provided in proportion
to the value of the plant at the previous location. Since
these grants are independent of factor usage at the new
location, they induce no "production distortion." Obviously
these grants confer greater benefits on firms whose usage of
capital is greater than others, but to the extent that the
firm's plant is immobile, these greater benefits accompany
greater opportunity cost in abandoning the old site.
Analyzing the social cost of this measure only requires a
calculation of the location distortion of effect.
(3) Capital gains tax exemption on the properties (plant
and land) disposed of at the previous location. Again there
is no production distortion induced since the grant is
independent of factor choices at the new location.
Consequently the primary question is whether the treasury cost
much exceeds the minimum cost required to induce the firm to
move.
Notice that capital gains are likely to be only loosely
tied to the immobility of the firm. Consequently, unlike the
relocation assistance funds, these exemptions are unlikely to
offer greater benefits to firms for whom moving is more
costly. Indeed, firms w4ith immobile, specialized capital are
13
likely to suffer capital losses in abandoning their former
site (unless, of course, they simply sell to someone else who
will engage in the same specialized activity, thereby largely
thwarting the intent of the policy.) Consequently, this
measure is likely to confer the largest benefits on those who
need it least, and the smallest benefits on those who need it
most.
(14) Income tax exemptions for individuals whose entire
family relocates with the firm. This measure effectively
lowers the wage rate which must be paid by the firm, since it
at least partially compensates the employees for relocating
with the firm. The measure raises several possible scenarios.
First, it is possible that some workers will refuse to
relocate and will change jobs. They may judge that the
prevailing wage in the new location, even when untaxed,, is too
low to compensate them for switching locations.
Second, it is possible that some workers will relocate
with their employer and accept a wage at or below the
prevailing wage in the new location. These workers may judge
that the tax break makes the new location better than the old.
If the workers must keep with the same employer to receive the
tax break, then the employer need only pay them the minimum
necessary to induce them to move; if the workers need only
relocate to receive the tax break, then the employer will have
to pay them the prevailing local wage.
In the latter case, this subsidy has no "industrial
location effects" as such, it is a labor force location
14
policy. In the former case, the wage savings accruing to the
firm are an industrial relocation incentive, as such. If the
firm hires local workers as well as relocated workers (of a
particular type), then the marginal wage faced by the firm is
the local wage, and there is no '"production distortion"; ir
the firm uses only relocated labor, then the marginal wage is
less than the local wage, and there are production
distortions.
A third possibility is that workers will neither relocate
nor change Jobs, thus foregoing the tax break. This outcome
requires that the wage paid by the rirm at the new site
compensates the workers for any added commutation costs. This
could come about in one of three ways. First, the labor force
at the new site may already be drawn from the current locale
or this rirm's workers, so the market wage at the now location
is already high enough to compensate for the needed travel.
Second, the firm's relocation from the old site may lower the
wage at that site enough so the wage at the new site is now
attractive enough to induce workers to commute from the old
site to the new. And third, the firm's relocation to the new
site raises the local wage at that site enough to compensate
for the added travel, but moving is still not attractive. The
assumption that the firm's location decision alters market
wages complicates the analysis considerably, since one then
has to treat input prices as non-parametric. In the absence
or strong evidence to the contrary, it seems reasonable to
treat each rirm as small relative to the entire market.
15
However, extending the analysis later to account for some
degree of factor price responsiveness is not to be discarded
until more definitive empirical evidence is available.
It should be noted that the income tax is itself an
intervention in the market place, and that therefore the
market wage may not equal the marginal social cost of labor.
This measurement issue lies beyond the scope of the present
analysis.
(5) Exemption of local property taxes at the new
location. This measure lowers the prices of land and
improvement vis-a-vis other inputs. It can be expected to
distort both location and production. As with the income tax,
one must ask about possible divergences between market and
social marginal costs induced by the taxes in the first place.
(6) 500 percent tax penalty for those who construct new
plants or expand existing facilities in predesignated
restricted areas. To the extent that this policy induces
firms to locate elsewhere, it incurs only location
distortions, since it doesn't alter factor prices at the new
location, and the burden of the cost falls on the firm as
foregone profits. However, to the extent that the policy
fails, and firms either do not produce output which would have
been produced, or continue to build or expand in the penalized
area, there will be production distortions. Whether the
distortions occur in the form of reduced output or altered
inputs will depend on how the assortment of income, property
16
and registration tax penalties cumulatively influence factor
prices.
(7) Loan guarantees for construction at the new site.
This policy lowers the price of capital and thereby induces
both location and production distortions. Its effects are
similar to those of the investment tax credit.
(8) Special housing and consumer loans for employees of
the relocated establishments. These have effects akin to
those of the income tax break for households, although if they
require distortions in the consumer's desired consumption
patterns they may not benefit the consumer dollar for dollar.
(9) Local Industrial Development All of the above
measures amount to cash grants or input price subsidies to the
firms0 An alternative set of mechanisms are provided for in
Korea under the Local Industrial Development Law of 1969.
Under this law local industrial districts can be designated
and are then the targets of several government supports.
Government will pay for replotting the land, for road
construction and for the development of an industrial water
supply system. Further, land may be granted by the government
to the developer. The provision of such services can lower
the costs of firms and thereby enhance the attractiveness of
one site vis-a-vis another. As indicated above, and detailed
below, such in-kind subsidies to firms do not pose any special
analytical problem. The gravest difficulty is empirical. It
is very difficult to develop suitable measures of the
availability and quality of public services and social
17
overhead capital provided to firms by government.
Consequently, our empirical assessments or the worth of such
ventures are only suggestive.
In closing this section, I draw attention to a
fundarmental conceptual problem which is highlighted above in
the analysis of several of the specific Korean location
policies. The analysis of social cost given here assesses the
cost of moving a given firm from site A to site B. However,
the true concern of the planner is not th:Ls firm per se, but
rather employment, or a general type of economic activity, or
a specific technological process (say one that pollutes).
Without a clear sense of what it is that planners w-ish to move
from site A to site B, it is difficult to completely assess
any policy. For example, the capital gains tax exemption plan
noted above is likely to draw firms which rely heavily on
capital rather than labor. If employment relocation is the
goal of the policy, then this measure will appeal least to
some of the firms planners would most wish1 to move. Our
empirical analysis of alternative input subsidies should
differentiate among industries to see if the heterogeneity of
technologies across industries is sufficient to require
heterogeneity in optimal industrial location policy as well.
4. Economic Principles
Several important economic theorems offer qualitative
guidance in assessing alternative location policies. A brief
summary of these theorems here will prepare us well for the
quantitative examination of alternative policies in the coming
18
chapters. (Proofs of these theorems, and several
generalizations of them, are contained in Appendix A.)
The first theorem says that if a policy maKer is limited
to subsidizing the price of a single input to induce the firm
to choose B over A, then it will minimize soci al cost vO
subsidize an input which (a) is used extensively bv the firm
and (b) is a poor substitute for other inputs. The latter
condition ensures that lowering the price of this input will
not much change the use of other inputs from what it would
otherwise be. The former condition ensures that the price of
the subsidized good will not have to be lowered much to confer
a subsidy large enough to counter site A's profit a-dvantage.
To illustrate these points, consider two firms that
currently use very different amounts of land, but would add
equal increments to the land they use if the price of land
were to drop $100 per acre. To grant the same total subsidy
payment to both the firms would require offering a larger
price (per acre) break to the firm which uses less land, and
therefore that firm would increase its use of land more than
the other, thereby incurring a larger distortion in factor
usage.
Alternatively, consider two firms with the same initial
land use, but one of whom is more sensitive to changes in the
price of land. The more sensitive firm will alter its factor
usage more when the price of land is changed, and will
therefore incur a greater distortion from optimal factor
usage.
19
The second theorem says that if a policy maker is limited
to increasing the provision of one public input (e.g., public
transportation) then it will minimize social cost to increase
the provision of an input which (a) the firm would be willing
to pay much for and (b) is a good substitute for other inputs.
The former condition ensures that not much of the publicly
provided good need be offered to counter the profit advantage
of site A. The intuition underlying the latter condition is
that it would be pointless for government to spend its money
purchasing inputs for the firm if the firm were not going to
reduce its expenditures, hence the desirability of providing
good substitutes for the firm's inputs.
A corollary to the second theorem is that if the publicly
provided input is valued more at the margin than its marginal
social cost of production, then provision of that public input
will enhance, not lower, economic efficiency. If government
can provide at a cost of ten dollars an input the firm values
at twenty dollars (but cannot provide for itself), then there
is a clear net social gain from government's incurring the ten
dollar cost.
The notion that providing increases in publicly provided
services might lower social costs has an analog among price
mechanisms as well. If market input prices do not equal the
marginal social costs of those inputs, the firms' market
behavior will not minimize social costs of production.
Consequently, there is room for lowering social costs by
altering input prices with taxes or subsidies; government can
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use its policies to ensure that the firm faces marginal social
costs of Its inputs instead of marginal market costs, and can
thereby induce the firm to minimize social costs while
maximizing private profits with taxes or subsidies.
A third theorem which follows from one and two is that if
two sites A and B differ in some one factor price, or some one
publicly provided input, it may be better to subsidize a
different factor's price or augment the provision of another
service rather than to close the gap between the two sites.
For example, if high skill labor is more expensive at
site B, it may be less socially costly to bring the firm to B
by subsidizing unskilled labor at B than by subsidizing
skilled labor. The determinants of the choice would be those
given above: which kind of labor is less substitutable for
other inputs and which is used more extensively.
Again for example: if roads from site B to the port city
are far poorer than f rom site A to the port city, it might be
a less socially costly way to bring the firm to B to allow
that difference to remain and subsidize the price of high
skill labor in site B, rather than simply improve the roads
from B to the port city. The determination rests on rates of
substitution, the level of skilled labor utilization, and the
value of better roads to the firm. This example illustrates
the fact that theorem three is in an important sense just a
generalization of theorems one and two.
This third theorem is a weaker but more general version
of the economist's usual sermon. Generally (but see the
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corollary above) economists argue that pure cash transfers (or
mandates or prohibitions) are the least costly way to achieve
a policy goal. Theorem three highlights that when those kinds
of "first best" solutions are not politically feasible,
"second best" solutions should be sought with care.
Taken together, these three theorems provide the
theoretical underpinning needed to interpret the simulation
results reported in chapter IV; they also focus our attention
on key relationships to be examined in the empirical work of
chapter III.
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CHAPTER III
The Econometric Model
1. Introduction
The theorems described at the end of Chapter II identify
the important economic parameters for assessing alternative
subsidy schemes: the share of costs borne by each variable
input ("factor shares"), the marginal value to the firm of
each fixed input ("shadow prices"), and the substitutability
of each factor for others ("elasticities of substitution").
We use the 1978 Korean census of manufacturing and the
World Bank/Seoul National University Project Survey of
manufacturing firms in the Seoul region to estimate the
structures of technology for nine industrial categories based
on two digit standard industrial codes (SIC's). By examining
the factor choices of Korean firms as they face differing
factor prices and differing quantities of fixed factors, we
are able to estimate the elasticities of substitution among
the various factors. Observation of variatLons in firms'
costs across differing levels of fixed factors also permits us
to estimate the shadow values of such inputs. Moreover, the
surveys afford direct observations on the factor shares for
several variable inputs.
These data are particularly rich in affording a look at
the role of land prices in the cost structure of manufacturing
firms. Few previous studies of manufacturing costs for any
country have given land much attention.
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It is important to keep in mind that ours is not an
econometric exercise for its own sake. The shape and
direction of the econometric investigations are dictated by
the needs of our simulation model which evaluates alternative
location subsidies. The available data are, in many respects,
far from ideal, and one may be quite skeptical of any specific
numbers obtained. However, in the context of a simulation
model, in which sensitivity analyses are quite easy to
conduct, it can often suffice to use econometric tools to
obtain plausible "base" cases from which simulation analyses
can begin.
If rough econometric work can put one in the right range
for parameter values, simulations can then indicate either
that further econometric sophistication is uncalled for --
more precision is not likely to alter the lessons from the
exercise -- or that particular parameters are of especial
importance and that further econometric efforts to pin down
those parameters would be quite worthwhile. Where possible,
we compare our econometric results with the findings of other
studies of manufacturing, including studies for other
developing countries and studies for the United States, using
the survey reported in Reedy (1985).
2. The Model
An industry's technology is revealed in the production
activities and in the cost structures of firms. By examining
the relationship between output and inputs ("the production
function") one can uncover the substitutability of factors and
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infer firms' optimal choices of inputs. Alternatively, by
observing how firms' costs and factor choices vary with input
prices, output, and levels of fixed inputs ("the cost
function"), one can uncover the firms optimal choices of
inputs and infer the substitutability of factors.
The cost function of the firm affords elegant derivations
of the key economic theorems reported in chapter II. It also
affords straightforward computations of the costs of
alternative subsidy schemes. For these reasons we choose to
rely on cost function specification in our empirical work.
Most generally, the cost function of the firm can be
written as a function of the level of output and the prices of
inputs. When some inputs are taken to be fixed, i.e., not
determined by the firm, the function is referred to as a
"restricted cost function," and the quantities of the fixed
inputs are added to the variable list. Since we wish to
assess the role of publicly provided inputs in the production
process, we use restricted cost functions for the Korean
industries.
Theoretical exercises, such as proving the theorems of
chapter II, can use a very general specification of the
restricted cost functio7-, But for application, a concrete
algebraic specification is required. Such a specification
must be general enough to permit desc. iption of a wide variety
of technological relationshlips. For example, the famous Cobb-
Douglas functional form adapted to the restricted cost
function problem yields
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v n ai n b
- =Ar ai ff x
Y i=1 J=k+1
where v is the cost of variable inputs used, y is output, the
Pi are variable input prices, the x, are the quantities of the
fixed inputs; and A, ai, and b; are parameters to be
estimated. However, this would be too restrictive for our
purposes since no matter what values are allowed for A, aii,
and b,3, the elasticities of substitution among the factors are
always unity, precluding alternative degrees of substitut-
-ability among factors.
However, the chosen specification must also be simple
enough to permit straightforward calculation of the many
relationships of interest, such as shadow prices and factor
demands. Furthermore, the parameters of the specification
must bear a well defined relationiship to available empirical
relationships so that reasonable, realistic values can be
assigned to them in simulations.
The specification chosen here is a restricted translog
cost function. The translog specification of costs has been
widely used in econometric studies of production and costs. 4
Here we adapt the specification to the case of restricted cost
functions; the specification is attractive because it is
empirically tractable, serves as a good approximation to many
alternative specifications, and offers comparability with the
empirical results of other studies. The functional form we
use is:
4. See Christensen and Greene (1976) for an early cost
function application.
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+ - a lnP lnP + 2 E Bi lnqilnq
2i=j J=1 iJ i i=k+l J=k+l J
(1)
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+ E E y ,:lnP lnqj
i=j 41=1 i
k n
+ Z TilnPilny + E 98lnqilny
i-l i=k+l
where ai = ai and B,j = Bjie
where the pi are variable input prices, the qi are fixed input
quantities, y is output, and v is the cost of variable inputs
used. The structural parameters to be estimated are b, the
a:, the hi, g, the aip the Bij. the y.j. the T., and the O,.
3. Factor Shares, Shadow Prices, and Functional
Restrictions 5
Factor shares and shadow prices, two of the key economic
parameters for assessing alternative subsidy schemes, are
closely related to the cost function. If raising the quantity
of a fixed input by one unit lowers the costs incurred by the
firm for variable factors by x dollars, the firm should be
willing to pay x dollars for that unit. Hence the shadow
price of a fixed input is minus the derivative of the cost
function with respect to that input.
Analogously, if the pr-ice of a variable input rises by
one dollar, the firm's costs will rise by the quantity of that
input being used by the firm. Hence, the demand for a
5. The non-technical reader may wish to skip this section.
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variable input is the derivative of the cost function with
respect to that input price.
If we take the derivatives of both sides of the translog
function with respect to the variable input prices we get
Pi as Piqi kS -- =a a+; lnP
v a V i .=aij ~i
(2)
n
+ E yijlnq, + Tilny i -
Since P q /v is the factor share for the ith factor, S. is a
factor share.
If we take the derivatives with respect to the fixed
inputs we obtain:
qi av qjwi u
-Si = v aq = v hi E yi nP
(3)
n
+ = Bij lnq, + eilny i=k+l v .. eSn
J=k+l
where wi is the shadow price of the ith input, i.e., its
marginal value to the firm. By analogy to Si, we call S ithe
quasi-factor share of the ith fixed input. We use the
expression "lquasi-" to remind us that the value of the fixed
input is being set to its shadow price, which may bear no
relation to what the firm pays for the input, and also that
the denominator is variable cost and does not include the
shadow value of the fixed inputs.
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Christensen and Greene (1976) have discussed a priori
theoretical restrictions that might be placed on the
parameters of an unrestricted translog cost function. If
equation (1) were an unrestricted cost function, we would have
the following restrictions:
, =0, hi = 0 i k+l,,,,,n
ii(4) yij ° i =1,.,..e,ki j = k+l, ..........,n
Bij ° i,j = k+l,...,
i.e., the qi would not appear in the equations and there would
be no quasi-factor share equations (3).
Christensen and Greene explain that homogeneity of degree
zero of factor demands in factor prices (a direct consequence
of cost minimizing behavior) would imply that if the
restrictions in (L) hold, then
(5 x = a = 0.( ij 1 i ii i j t j
Also, the fact that factor shares always sum to one
requires
k
(6) E ai = 1e
i=1
They further note that homotheticity of the production
function underlying equation (3) requires that if the
restrictions in (4) hold, then
T' =0 i c
while homogeneity of that production function would require
g = 0
and linear homogeneity would add the further requirement that
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d = 1.
Since we are not emphasizing the effect of subsidies on
output in the present study, returns to scale are less
important to us than they might otherwise be. We assume (for
convenience) that there are constant returns to scale in the
production process when all inputs are considered. In
instances in which different returns to scale seem
appropriate, the simulation model can accommodate them by
allowing a different technology to be set for large firms than
for small firms. This limited flexibility suffices when each
firm is viewed as having a fixed level of output, as is the
case in this study.
When there are no fixed inputs, we use all of Christensen
and Greene's restrictions; in the presence of fixed inputs,
however, alternatcive restrictions are appropriate. Using a
restricted cost function (one in which the restrictions in (4)
do not hold) does not alter the restrictions (5) and (6).
Factor demands are still homogeneous of degree zero in prices
and the variable factors' shares still sum to one. However,
the remaining restrictions offered by Christensen and Greene
no longer hold.
Constant returns to scale in all inputs require that
factor shares be changed when factor prices remain fixed while
output and all fixed inputs are altered equiproportionately.
This restriction implies that
n(7) e. = i aiev
J=k+1
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Like factor demands, shadow shares must also be
homogeneous of degree zero in factor prices, so
n
(8) E Yji 0 i=k+l, .ee ,nf
J=1
Moreover, shadow shares are als(l, unaffected by
equiproportionate changes in output and fixed inputs so
n
(9) - + Bij i=k+l,...,n
When all these restrictions on share and shadow share
functions are incorporated into equation (1), it can be seen
that the only remaining influence on cost of equiproportionate
changes in output and fixed inputs is through g, d5 and the
hi. As in the unrestricted case, linear homogeneity of the
underlying technology does require
g 0,
but the constant on d is modified to become
n
(10) d -1 - hi
i=k+l
These many restrictions on the parameters of the translog
restricted cost function are both a boon and a bane.
They are a boon in that they reduce the amount of
information required to estimate the cost structure. Given
the slight variation in some variables of interest (most
notably the interest rate) this parsimony is a real blessing.
However, when specifying variations from the estimated
cost structures for use in the simulation model, the
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restrictions became a bane in that they prevent one from
simply assigning values to all the parameters and getting on
with the simulation; instead, one must carefully check that
all the restrictions are faithfully applied so that the
resulting cost structure is consistent with an underlying
technology.
4. Data
The primary data source for this econometric work was the
Korean Cernsus of Manufacturing for 1978.
For our analysis, the key variables in the survey were:
the number of production workers, wages paid to production
workers, lot size, the value of the lot, the value-of the
building, the value of the structure, the value of the
machinery, the value of output, the firm's two digit industry
code and the four digit geocode for the firm's location.
These data were supplemented by the data on interest
rates (the curb rate and the bank rate) gathered by Dr. Sang-
Chuel Choe of Seoul National University, by data on the rate
of inflation in Korea, and by data for the two largest
industries, fabricated metals and textiles, gathered in the
World Bank/Seoul National University Project Survey of the
Seoul region. Our discussions with government and industry
officials in Korea in early 1983 confirmed that in Korea.small
firms generally either finance their operations internally or
rely on the curb market for funds; only larger firms have
access to the bank rate without special provisions by the
government. This fact motivated one major line of simulation
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work reported in chapter IV; it also suggested that the
rental prices of assets would vary between small and large
firms. Tests described below indicate that for analytical
purposes it is appropriate to assume that firms below the mean
size in their industry pay the curb rate, while larger f irms
pay the bank rate.
Specifying the role of interest rates in the study brings
us to the proper measurement of prices in the cost function.
Output is produced and costs are incurred by the f irm anew in
each period; both output and costs are flow concepts.
Similarly, labor is hired anew each period; labor services
are a flow concept. Capital and land, on the other hand,
persist from period to period; they are stock concepts. To
properly account for the role of land and capital in the
firm's cost structure requires converting capital and land
values. We define the value of capital or land times the real
interest rate (the nominal interest rate paid by the firm less
inflation) to be their respective rental values.
We choose our units of measure for capital so that the
purchase price of capital is unity. Consequently, the rental
price of capital is the real interest rate. Our treatment
assumes a six percent rate of depreciation in the pricing of
capital. Exploratory analysis indicated that other
depreciation rates over a modest range would not much alter
our empirical results.
We first tried to estimate the price of land by dividing
reported lot value by reported lot size. Unfortunately, we
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found unbelievable variances in the price of land computed
this way. We hypothesized that firm managers who answered the
survey questions were unclear about either their lot values or
their lot sizes and consequently gave error ridden answers to
these questions. This hypothesis suggested that better
estimates of the price of land could be obtained by computing
the mean reported price of land in each four digit geocode
area, a speculation that proved quite accurate.
Regressions of the log of land used by firms against the
log of the prices of land as computed from the individual
firms's responses to the survey frequently gave insignificant
coefficients on the price of land. The same regressions using
the mean price of land by geocode, however, repeatedly yielded
significant land price coefficients of the appropriate sign.
These relative performances of the two price measures were
mirrored in their performances in other factor demand
equations as well.
We wondered if perhaps the firm specific data, while not
as rich as the geocode means, might not still contain
information not found in the geocode means. To test this
notion we tried instrumental variables estimators based on
these two variables. The instrumental variables estimators
were generally in the neighborhood of the estimates obtained
with the geocode means in ordinary least squares estimators.
This result is consistent with the notion that all the
relevant information about the price of land is to be found in
the geocode means. For this reason, we present only results
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based on the geocode means for land p`.'es. Since, the
purchase price of land varies by geocode, the rental price
will also vary. We chose our units of measure for land so
that the purchase price was unity in Seoul center city. This
implies that at that location the rental price of land was the
real interest rate.
Our findings regarding the land price variable, derived
directly from reported lot value and lot size, led us to try
two measures of land value in computing firms costs. First,
we used reported land value; second, we used reported lot
size times mean land price over the firm's 14 digit geocode.
Our results are not very sensitive to which measure we look
at.
The labor data provided by firms seems much more precise
than the land data. Within industries, within geocodes, the
variation in reported wage rates (production worker's wages
divided by the number of production workers) was relatively
much smaller than that in reported land prices. We believe
this was due to better knowledge on the parts of managers
about how many employees they have and what they pay them than
about the size of their lot or its market worth. This is not
unreasonable when one realizes that the former numbers are
almost constantly subject to the manager's discretion while
lot size is only infrequently altered and hence its price is
of less pressing interest.
The geographic variation observed in land prices is
considerable. There is a twenty-fold difference between land
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prices in central Seoul and those on the outskirts of the
province. In wage rates, however, there is a much less
pronounced pattern by geocode. Although there does seem to be
a relationship between wage rates and locations, it is very
slight, probably due to the dampening effects of commuting to
and from the city center using transit provided by the firm.
We found no better measure for wage rates than those
reported by the individual firms. Nonetheless, one must
wonder about the extent to which the observed variations in
wage rates across firms are spurious effects not mirrored in
the firms factor choices; it strikes us as odd that in a
cross section of firms, firms in a given industry would not be
paying a single wage rate. However, we can point to the
significant coefficients on the wage rate that are repeatedly
of the right sign to argue that at least some of the observed
effect is not spurious. But we must keep in mind that some of
our coefficients may suffer some bias since spurious wage rate
variation is not corrected for in our analyses.
In addition to using the geocode specific mean price for
land, we relied on geocode specific means for other variables
to provide instruments for use in two stage least squares
estimations that we conducted. The rationale for this was
that the behaviors of firms within a geocode were likely to be
correlated, but that the individual peculiarities (the
disturbance terms) of one firm would not be reflected in the
behavior of their neighbors. Since we take factor prices and
publicly provided inputs (and their proxies) as independent of
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the firm, the instrument's only role is to purge quantity of
any bias due to the endogeneity rooted in quantity's
relationship to costs and factor shares. Since the two stage
least squares analyses did not appreciably differ from the
ordinary least squares results, we report only the latter.
In addition to using land, labor, and capital as the
firms inputs we toyed with using office workers as well as
production workers as an additional labor category. However,
both missing data and a high degree of multicollinearity
between the two wage rates ultimately led us to reject this
idea.
In our efforts to measure the effects of publicly
provided inputs we examined: the proportion of a geocode's
area devoted to streets, the proximity of the geocode to a
highway, the electricity transmission capacity in the geocode,
and the distance from the CBD (and an (inverse) proxy for
accessibility). As will be seen below, the results from this
exercise were disappointing for the most part. As a
consequence, for the simulation models we had to resort to the
use of proxies to obtain parameters for publicly provided
inputs.
5. Estimation6
Equations (1), (2) and (3) all contain the parameters of
our econometric model. Treating these equations jointly, and
imposing the constraints on the parameters above, offers a
general strategy for estimating our restricted translog cost
6. The non-technical reader may wish to skip this section.
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function. In practice, however, we make no use of equation
(3) since the shadow shares are unobserved.
It is at this juncture that our preoccupation with the
simulation model begins to shape the empirical work. The
share equations (2) and (3) suffice to estimate the y,j and
ai which are sufficient (coupled with factor shares) to
compute the substitution relationships among variable factors
and between the variable and fixed factors. The cost function
itself has the potential for augmenting the information drawn
from equations (2) in three ways. First, more eofficient
estimates of the Y,j and ai might be obtained. Second., the
cost function offers information about returns to scale. And
third, estimates could be obtained of the Bi, that inform us
about the price elasticities of demand that would apply to the
fixed factors if they were to become variable rather than
fixed.
However, initial estimates from the two largest
industries indicated that none of the advantages from focusing
on equation (1) were forthcoming. When equation (1) was
coupled with equations (2) we learned the following:
i) The theoretical constraints on the parameters
implicit in their repeated appearances across the
equations are not rejected in the data at hand;
ii) The parameter estimates of the aij and Yi,j from
equations (2) alone are nearly identical to those
obtained from equations (1) and (2) taken together;
and
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iii) The Bij cannot be estimated at all precisely with
the data at hand; the standard errors on these
parameters were always large.
Based on these preliminary findings, we chose to rely on
equations (2) for estimating the elasticities that were of
interest to us studying each of the nine manufacturing
industries in detail.
Estimation of the parameters of equations (2) is
straightforward but mechanically cumbersome. Note that each
at Jappears in two share equations, that for input i and for
input J. Also recall that the share equations must always sum
to one.
The adding up property implies that once k-1 shares are
estimated, the kth is known, so one share equation is dropped
in the estimation procedure. (The empirical results are
unaffected by which share equation is dropped.) The
repetition of the a across equations can be handled by
physically "stacking" the equations--and the data--so that the
equations are estimated by least squares procedures as if they
were a single equation.
In stacked form, for example, the variable attached to
coefficient ai would be lnP if the dependent variable were
input i, and lnPi if the dependent variable were input J. For
coefficients appearing in only one equation, a similar
treatment applies. For example, the variable attached to y,j
would be lnqJ if the dependent variable were input i but would
be a zero otherwise.
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Ordinary least squares applied to such stacked equations
yields maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the
model under the usual OLS conditions. Instrumental variables
estimators can also be applied to such stacked equations to
obtain consistent parameter estimates under the usual
conditions.
6. Summary of EstimaCion Results
Before reporting the results of a series of hypothesis
tests, it is important to once again emphasize the
relationship between the econometric model and the simulation-
model. The data base used in this study is a rich one, one
with the potential to permit subtle distinctions to be made
among alternative hypotheses. Indeed, with large sample sizes
such as ours (ranging from 580 to 3418) one must expect that
the data will "expose" the fact that the translog
specification is at best only an approximation to the true
cost function; many specitic hypotheses about the model are
likely to be rejected for this reason alone. However our real
concern is not whether a.J, say, is .01 or .011; rather, our
concern is with differences in parameter values that are large
enough to matter in the application of the simulation model.
In this regard we find the model to be quite robust with
respect to alternative sets of restrictions on the parameter
values.
We found that when small firms were assumed to pay the
curb interest rate and large firms the bank rate, the
technologies estimated for the two groups were quite similar,
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although we could generally reject the hypothesis of identical
technologies at the ten percent level. (Small firms were
defined to be firms below the mean level of output for the
industry and large firms were those above the mean level.
Fiddling with the break point had no appreciable effect on our
results.) Restricting large and small firms to pay identical
interest rates, on the other hand, led to much more sharply
distinguishable estimates of the cost function.
Conditional on pooling the large and small firms, more
often than not we do not reject the hypothesis that all the
theoretical restrictions implied by cost minimization hold.
Even in the cases in which the constraints are rejected, the
rejection is mild, suggesting that the translog is a
reasonably good approximation to the true underlying cost
minimization function. Similarly, conditional on the above
restrictions, we generally fail to reject the hypothesis of
constant returns to scale in all inputs.
The coefficients of the price variables are uniformly
significant. The fixed input variables perform much less
satisfactorily, however. The electricity, highway, and
streets variables are each significant in fewer than ten
percent of the cases. Only the distance measure is
persistently significant. The distance measure reveals a
persistent pattern of substituting away from labor and towards
capital and land as accessibility declines, a result in accord
with our irntuitions.
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Tables 1 and 2 contain the estimated aij and yf, from the
translog cost share equations with all restrictions imposed.
Land value is measured as reported lot size times the mean
price of land for the 4 digit geocode area. Tables 3 and 4
contain the estimates with land value measured by the land
value reported by the firm. The parameters estimated directly
appear with t-statistics; the parameters derived from the
estimated parameters using the parameter restrictions appear
without t-statistics.
Table 5 presents mean elasticities of substitution from
the models reported in Tables 1-4 evaluated at the mean factor
shares for each of the nine industries (See Appendix B for the
elasticity formulae.). Asterisks denote instances in which
the estimated elasticity is negative, and hence zero is a
better estimate. A limitation of the translog specification
is that it permits concave regions in the isoquants of the
underlying technology. In the simulation model we modify the
translog so that elasticities of substitution never become
negative, but rather stay constant at zero once they reach
zero. For this reason, we simply report the estimated
negative elasticities as the zeros they become in the
simulation model.
Diane Reedy of the World Bank provided us with a survey
of econometric estimates of elasticities of substitution in
the U.S. and in developing 'countries (Reedy (1985)). That
survey provides a useful benchmark to assess the plausibility
of the elasticity estimates in Table 5. Table 6 reports the
TABLE 1
OWN AND CROSS PRICE INTERACTION TERMS (Xi j)
IN THE TRANSLOG RESTRICTED COST FUNCTION*
Food Textiles
Land Labor Capital Land Labor Capital
Land .09 -0.06 -0.03 .12 -. 07 -0.05
(8.90) (-8.47) (9.13) (-7.95)
Labor -0.06 0.08 -0.02 -.07 .12 -.05
(7.50) (10.61)
Capital -0.03 -0.02 0.05 -.05 -.05 .10
Wood Paper
Land Labor Capital Land Labor Capital
Land .12 -.07 -.05 .04 -. 06 .02
(9.13) (-7.95) (3.73) (-8.04)
Labor -. 07 .12 -.05 -.06 .10 -.04
(10.61) (9.25)
Capital -.05 -. 05 .10 .02 -. 04 .02
Chemical Mineral
Land Labor Capital Land Labor Capital
Land e08 -.04 -.04 .17 -.07 -.10
(7.40) (-7.07) (9.32) (-7.13)
Labor -. 04 .10 -. 06 -.07 .08 -. 01
(13.68) (6.18)
Capital -. 04 -. 06 .10 -. 10 -. 01 .11 4
r\)
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TABLE I (cont.)
Basic Metal Fabricated Metal
Land Labor Capital Land Labor Capital
Land .10 -. 03 -. 07 
.07 -. 04 -. 03(5.83) (-3.33) (9.73) (-9.74)
Labor 
-. 03 .11 
-. 08 
-. 04 .11 
-. 07(8.05) (20.93)
Capital 
-. 07 -. 08 .15 
-.03 -.07 .10
Other
Land Labor Capital
Land .05 -. 04 -. 01
(3.30) (-4.39)
Labor 
-. 04 .11 
-. 07
(8.96)
Capital 
-. 01 -. 07 .08
*expressions in parentheses are t-statistics
TABLE 2
PRICE AND FIXED INPUT INTERACTION
TERMS Y' ') IN TRANSLOG RESTRICTED COST
^NCTION BY INDUSTRY*
INDUSTRY 31 INDUSTRY 32
Food Textiles
Dist Elec Hwy Strt DiSt Elec Hwy Strt
Land .045 .009 .003 -.045 .020 -.001 .008 -.017(3.79) (1.00) (043) (-2.49) (2.60) (-.33) (1.68) (-1.46)
Labor -.051 -. 014 .001 .039 -. 025 -.005 -. 002 .003(-4.32) (-2.74) (.11) (2.25) (-3.35) (-1187) (-.037) (.23)
Capital .006 .005 -.004 .006 .003 .004 -.009 .016
INDUSTRY 33 INDUSTRY 34
Wood Paper
Dist Elec Hwy Strt DiSt Elec Hwy Strt
Land .045 .001 S .018 -. 039 .011 -.007 .001 -. 013(3.20) (.16) (1.70) (-1.84) (.72) (-1.19) (.13) (-.62)
Labor -.048 -. 005 -.009 .023 -. 058 .008 .013 .034(-3.41) (-.86) (-.92) (1.12) (-4.14) (1.29) (1.31) (1.67)
Capital .003 .004 .009 .016 .047 -.001 -.014 -.021
INDUSTRY 35 INDUSTRY 36
Chemical Mineral
Dist Elec Hwy Strt Dist Elec Hwy Strt
Land .051 -.003 .017 -.007 .085 -.026 .016 -.009(4.18) (.67) (2.40) (.49) (4.16) (3.46) (1.51) (-.35)
Labor -. 059 .005 -. 006 -.008 -.073 .011 -.016 -.003(5.06) (1.29) (-.93) (-.56) (-3.65) (1.60) (-.55) (-.14)
Capital .008 -. 002 -.011 -. 015 -.012 .015 
- .012
* 4 I....... .. .... ..... ..
TABLE 2 (cont'd)
INDUSTR-Y 37 INDUSTRY 38Basic Metal Fabricated Metal
Dist Elec Hwy Strt Dist Elec Hwy Strt
Land 
.020 
-. 005 
-. 003 
-. 029 
.035 
-. v'02 .003 
-. 021(.93) (-.83) (-.22) (1.12) (4.35) (-.63) (.63) (-1.93)
Labor 
-. 048 
-. 003 .022 
.046 
-. 048 
-. 005 .004 .021(2.26) (-.48) (1.65) (1.84) (-6.06) (-1.55) (.87) (2.01)
Capital 
.028 .008 
-. 019 
-. 017 
.013 .007 
-. 007 
--
INDUSTRY 39
Other
Dist Elec Hwy Strt
Land .033 .002 
-. 001 
-. 016
(1.81) (.32) (-.096) (-.58)
Labor 
-. 055 
-. 011 
-. 002 .038(-3.14) (-.62) (-.21) (1.47)
Capital 
.022 .009 .003 
-. 022
*expressions in parentheses are t-statistics
TABLE 3
ALTERNATIVE OWN AND CROSS PRICE INTERACTION TERMS (cz ij)
IN THE TRANSLOG RESTRICTED COST FUNCTION*
Food Textiles
Land Labor Capital Land Labor Capital
Land .06 -. 06 .002 .05 -004 -. 01
(4.92) (-7.34) (6.41) (-7.98)
Labor -.06 .12 -.06 .04 .12 -. 08
(9.79) (14.75)
Capital .002 -. 06 .06 -. 01 -. 08 .09
Wood Paper
Land Labor Capital Land Labor Capital
Land 06 -. 07 .01 .03 -. 06 .03
(3.06) (-5.61) (2.15) (-6.98)
Labor -. 07 .17 -10 -.06 .12 -.06
(9.94) (9.50)
Capital .01 -. 10 .09 .03 -. 06 .03
Chemical Mineral
Land Labor Capital Land Labor Capital
Land .04 °.05 .01 .13 -.07 -.06
(2.77) (6.74) (8.54) (7.62)
Labor -. 05 .13 -. 08 .07 .09 -. 02
(14.59) (8.15)
Capital .01 -. 08 .07 -. 06 -.02 .08
ON
TABLE 3 (cont.)
Basic Metal Fabricated Metal
Land Labor Capital Land Labor Capital
Land .02 -.03 .01 .04 -.05 .01
(1.23) (-2.49) (4.55) (-9.65)
Labor -. 03 .13 -. 10 -. 05 .13 -. 08
Capital .01 -. 10 .09 -. 01 -.08 .07
Other
Land Labor Capital
Land .05 -. 04 -. 01
(2.43) (-3.60)
Labor -. 04 .13 -. 09
(8.55)
Capital -. 01 -. 09 .10
*expressions in parentheses are t-statistics
TABLE 4
ALTERNATIVE PRICE AND FIXED INPUT INTERACTION
TERMS (Yi)IN TRANSLOG RESTRICTED COST
FUNCTION BY INDUSTRY*
INDUSTRY 31 INDUSTRY 32
Food Textiles
Dist Elec Hwy Strt Dist Elec Hwy Strt
Land 
-. 001 .002 
-.019 
-. 036 .009 
-. 010 .005 .015(-.04) (.38) (-2.35) (-1.73) (1.01) (-2.87) (.93) (1.10)
Labor 
-. 023 
-. 004 .021 .060 
-. 022 .011 
-. 001 
-.012(-1.69) (-.65) (2.52) (2.94) (-2.54) (3.37) (-.15) (-.89)
Capital .024 .002 
-.002 
-.024 .003 e002 .018 
-.017
INDUSTRY 33 INDUSTRY 34Wood Paper
Dist Elec Hwy Strt Dist Elec Hwy Strt
Land .026 
-.010 
-.038 
-. 012 
-.001 
-.006 
-.004 .015(1.30) (-1.11) (-2.51) (-.41) (-.07) (-.82) (-.36) (.63)
Labor 
-.029 .012 .020 .029 
-.044 .007 
-. 006 .013(-1.42) (1.38*) (1,38*) (.98) (-3.42) (1.10) (1.21) (1.14)
Capital .003 
-. 002 .018 
-. 017 .0565 
-. 002 
-. 010 
-. 041
INDUSTRY 35 INDUSTRY 36Chemical Mineral
Dist Elec Hwy Strt Dist Elec Hwy Strt
Land .016 .003 .012 
-. 00003 .064 
-. 019 .009 
-. 002(-.07) (-.82) (-.36) (.63) (1.19) (.71) (1.50) (-.0016) c
Labor 
-. 054 .008 .014 .026 
-. 044 .007 
-. 006 .013(-3.42) (1.10) (1.21) (1.14) (-3.74) (1.83) (-1.41) (-.05)
Capital .055 
-. 002 
-.010 
-.041 .028 
-.010 
-.006 
-.01297
TABLE 4 (contld)
INDUSTRY 37 INDUSTRY 38
Basic Metal Fabricated Metal
Dist Elec Hwy Strt Dist Elec Hwy Strt
Land 
-. 0;28 .002 
-.012 
-. 033 .012 .001 
-.004 
-. 017(-1.17) (.28) (-.75) (-1.16) (1.26) (.31) (-.06) (-1.31)
Labor 
-. 004 .003 .011 .072 
-. 053 -. 011 
-. 0002 .046(-.17) (.45) (.74) (2.59) (-3.97) (-.96) (.93) (2.99)
Capital .032 
-. 005 .001 
-. 039 .026 .002 
-. 0056 
-.020
INDUSTRY 39
Other
Dist Elec Hwy Strt
Land .032 .004 
-. 002 
-. 021
(1.57) (.48) (-.20) (-.71)
Labor 
-. 053 
-. 011 -. 0002 .046
(-2.70) (-1.44) (-.02) (1.56)
Capital .021 .007 .0022 
-. 025
*expressions in parentheses are t-statistics
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TABLE 5
ELASTICITIES OF SUBSTITUTION
AMONG VARIABLE INPUTS
Land/Labor Land/Capital Capital/Labor
Food .23 .76 .76
Textiles .42 .51 .54
Wood .40 .41 .37
Paper .38 .66 .59
Chemicals * 1.45 .71
Mineral .34 * .86
Basic .54 * .44
Metal
Fabr. .32 .52 .55
Metal
Other .34 .57 .43
*indicates negative estimated elasticity.
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median elasticity of substitution found by Reedy for each
industry for the United States and for developing economies.
(In computing the medians, studies of specific members of an
industry, e.g., glass companies within the mineral industry,
were excluded since it is unclear how estimates for more
narrowly defined firms relate to the industry wide
elasticities.)
Comparison of Tables 5 and 6 reveals that our estimates are
persistently somewhat lower than the medians of other studies.
However, all our values are well within the mid-range of
numbers reported by others. One reason for caution in
comparing our results with Reedy's is that the studies she
reports for specific industries are generally two input
production functions, labor and capital, while our results
rely on three inputs. To check for the sensitivity of our
results to this difference, we also estimated translog
restricted cost functions for the three inputs taken in pairs.
Table 7 reports the resulting elasticities of substitution.
On the whole, the elasticities of substitution between labor
and capital reported in Table 7 conforms more closely to those
in Table 5 than those in Table 6, suggesting that the
differences in our results are not rooted in our multifactor
specification but either reflect a genuine difference in
Korean technology from that used elsewhere, or are rooted in
statistical quirks of the models and data used by ourselves
and others.
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TABLE 6
MEDIAN ELASTICITIES OF SUBSTITUTION
BETWEEN CAPITAL AND LABOR IN
REEDY'S SURVEY, OF U.S. AND
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRY STUDIES
Manufacturing Ut.S. Developing
Industry
Food .75 .80
Textiles .85 
.59
Wood 
.85 .89
Paper Q96** t40***
Chemicals 
.83* .88
Mineral 
.98 .75
Basic Metals .81 .86
Fabr. Metals .72 .92
Other 1.1**** 
.81
*Chemicals .89, Petroleum .78, Rubber .82
**Paper 1.06, Printing .86
***Paper 1.17, Printing .87
****Manufacturing Sector as a whole, only 2 studies
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TABLE 7
ELASTICITIES OF SUBSTITUTION FROM TWO
VARIABLE FACTOR TRANSLOG RESTRICTED
COST FUNCTIONS
Industry Land/Labor Land/Capital Capital/Labor
Food 
.42 
.46 
.74
Textiles 
.53 
.45 
.67
Wood 
.35 
.13 
.54
Paper 
.34 
.65 
.69
Chemicals 
.62 
.41 
.62
Minerals 
.55 
.12 1.15
Basic Metals .33 
.18 
.35
Fabricated
Metals 
.46 
.29 
.57
Other 
.50 
.40 
.43
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Since few other studies have included land among the
factors used by manufacturing firms, we have no checks within
the literature for our elasticities of land with other
factors. However, by using the World Bank/Seoul National
University Survey of 500 firms in the Seoul region undertaken
by the World Bank, we were able to obtain independent
estimates of these elasticities for the two largest industry
groups, textiles and fabricated metals. The results of this
analysis are reported in Table 8. The elasticities for
capital and labor and for land and labor are higher than from
the larger Korean survey; those for capital and labor are in
the range found in the Reedy survey. The elasticities for
land and capital, however, are lower than those from the
larger Korean survey.
The main lesson we draw from Tables 5-8 is that the
potential for variability in estimates of elasticities of
substitution is modest but genuine and that our simulations
should reflect this potential by permitting variation in
elasticities of substitution for all factors within the ranges
reported in Tables 5-8. We also note with some satisfaci._n
that when land and capital are focused on in isolation, the
elasticities of substitution we estimate are positive in all
cases. Moreover those elasticities are lowest, and generally
quite low, in those cases in which the multi-factor translog
obtained negative elasticities of substitution between land
and capital when evaluated at mean factor shares. This is
quite in accord with our decision in the simulation model
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TABLE 8
ELASTICITIES OF SUBSTITUTION IN KOREAN
MANUFACTURING USING AN ALTERNATIVE
SURVEY OF MANUFACTURING FIRMS
Land/Labor Land/Cap Cap/Labor
Textiles .61 .27 .72
Fab Metals .57 .14 .77
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below to impose zero elasticities when negative elasticities
are estimated; further it underlies our choice to use very
low but non-zero values for the elasticity of substitution
when establishing initial values in the industries with
negative estimates. (This assumption simply assures us that
in their initial position firms are not operating along non-
strictly convex portions of their isoquants; it permits
government policies to move firms to the cusps of the
isoquants and, indeed, assures that initially these particular
firms are near the cusp.)
7. Publicly Provided Inputs
The most disappointing aspect of the econometric results
is the weak performance of the variables intended to reflect
publicly provided inputs. There are several interpretations of
these results that bear mentioning.
First, it is possible that the publicly provided inputs
we examined do not substitute with land, labor, or capital
either at all or suffficiently for the tradeoff to be
measurable. That would leave open the question whether the
inputs are substitutes for other inputs or simply sine qua non
for production of certain goods, without which ffirms do not
operate. Non-substitution between public and private inputs
will serve not to exclude them altogether, but to limit the
number and sizes of ffirms in an area, to the extent that the
publicly provided inputs are not public goods (ffor example,
electricity transmission capacity is a good from which users
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can be excluded and is a good that cannot be inexhaustibly
consumed by as many users as want to use it).
An implication of this interpretation is that the volume
of output from a particular location might be the only aspect
of industry behavior influenced by public investments. If
such is the case, studying the effects of location policy on
quantities produced by firms becomes markedly more important
than recognized in the simulations. Furthermore, the
relationships among publicly provided inputs in supporting
private production also become quite important since the goal
of government would be to find the least costly configuration
of public inputs that could support a given level of
output--and that study would be quite separate from an
analysis of private inputs if there is little or no
substitution among public and private factors.
Second, it might be that publicly provided inputs only
substitute to any appreciable degree for inputs that are not
included in the present study, chiefly materials and energy.
It is difficult to imagine that publicly provided inputs
substitute onl for materials or energy, but it is possible
that the subactivities the firm would have to engage in to
replace publicly provided inputs would, at the margin, be
highly energy intensive. For example, a firm with trucks
might impress the trucks for transit duty at the start and end
of the day with little incremental capital costs, and hence
the gasoline costs might loom large in the balance.
Third, it may be that although the publicly provided
inputs found at any one site are exogenous to the firm, the
fact that the firm chooses its location precisely because of
its resources vis-a-vis other locations makes the "fixed"
inputs truly variable (within a set restricted by local
opportunities) for the firm. Such simultaneity of fixed
inputs and variable input choices could lead to. biases in our
parameter estimates that mask the true relationships between
variable and fixed inputs.
Fourth, the data at hand may be too coarse to permit
extraction of the true underlying relationships. The data on
firms is from 1978; the data on publicly provided-inputs is
from 1983. The rate of growth so diverse, that the five year
lag in data could easily cover up the true relationships
between the variable and fixed inputs.e
Fifth, one might imagine that it was too ambitious to
include all of the publicly provided inputs in the function,
that multicollinearity among them would drown them all. Two
considerations lead us to reject this possibility. First, the
distance measure does manage to perform as one would
anticipate. Second, runs in which various subsets of the
public inputs were included led to no improvement in the
performances of any of them. The only finding from these runs
was a hint of positive correlations between electricity
capacity and the usage of capital and labor. Such a finding
is quite consistent with the endogeneity interpretation given
above.
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Finally, one might take the results at their face value.
Perhaps no one publicly provided input has enough effect to be
uncovered (Just as one might be hard pressed to analyze a
small subset of the workforce in a study like this), while the
collection of publicly provided inputs still does have an
appreciable effect on factor choices. And perhaps the overall
level of public support for firms is closely enough correlated
with distance from the city center for distance to serve as a
proxy capable of reflecting the influence of publicly provided
inputs as a whole.,
Given the structi.:',I of our model, and the poor
performance of other measures of publicly supplied inputs, we
are left with little choice but to accept for now this last,
optimistic, interpretation of our results.
The simulation model relies on the elasticities of
variable factor demands with respect to fixed factors. Since
in our exploration of the fixed inputs' influences we estimated
these parameters directly using log linear factor demand
equations (to see if those variables' poor performance was
rooted in the restrictions of the translog specification) it
is preferable when specifying the simulation model, to rely on
those estimates for the elasticities of variable input demands
with respect to the distance function. This Judgment rests on
two considerations. The first is the heavy computational
burden of using the translog parameters to compute these
elasticities that, as we demonstrated in Appendix B, depend on
the unobserved shadow shares of the fixed inputs. Second, and
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more importantly, the double log specification yields
elasticity estimates that are robust with respect to the
relationship between fixed inputs and output. If fixed inputs
are available equally for the production of ea6h unit of
output, the effective level of such inputs is proportional to
output; at the other extreme, fixed inputs are available
equally to each firm independently of output, and the
effective level of such inputs is independent of output. The
log specification yields the same elasticity with respect to
fixed inputs in either case; only the interpretation of the
output coefficient differs between the two. This robustness
makes these elasticity estimates especially useful -in the
simulations.
Table 9 contains the elasticities of interest for each
industry. The parameter estimates were relatively insensitive
to the uise of OLS or two stage least squares, as well as to
the inclusion or exclusion of other measures of public inputs.
It is worth noting that the log-linear factor demand equations
gave further support to the assumption of linear homogeneity
of the underlying technology since all but a few of the income
coefficients were not significantly different from unity.
TABLE 9
DEMAND ELAASTICITIES OF VARIABLE INIPUTS
WITH RESPECT TO DISTANCE FROM THE
CITY CENTER, BY INDUSTRY*
Land Labor Capital
Food 
.41(3.6) 
.05(.7) .30 (2.4)
Textiles 
.41(6.1) 
.16(3.3) 
.29(4.7)
Wood 
.38(2.7) 
-. 11(1.0) .03(.2)
Paper 
-.09(.2) .16(.7) 
.56(1.7)
Chemical 
.46(4.5) 
-. 04(.7) .21(2.2)
Mineral 
.72(3.2) 
-. 06(.6) .41(2.4)
Basic Metal .35(1.5) .09(.6) .57(2.7)
Fabr. Metal 
.50(6.2) 
.06(1.5) 
.23(3.4)
other 
.66(3.1) 
.69(3.6) .16(.6)
*Figures in parentheses are t-statistics
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CHAPTER IV
Simulating Alternative Policies
1. Introduction
The theoretical and econometric analyses of the previous
chapters provide a groundwork for quantifying the costs and
benefits of alternative subsidy schemes for Korean
manufacturing. A major advantage of using simulation models
in conjunction with econometric studies of technology is that
one can explore the robustness of one's findings through
sensitivity analyses. Moreover, rather than simply
quantifying existing circumstances, simulations enable one to
ask "what if" questions. Policy schemes outside the range of
current arrangements can be considered side by side with
schemes already in place. These comparisons enable us to
Judge the efficiency of present policies and to suggest how
they might be improved.
2. Simulation Model
To influence firms' location decisions, the government
must offer a subsidy that overcomes the cost or profit
disadvantage of the site the government favors. No matter
what input is subsidized, and no matter whether the price or
the quantity is the avenue used for providing the subsidy, the
subsidy must lower the firm's cost by some specific amount.
The simulation model offers two approaches co specifying
the benefit required to move the firm0 First, one can enter
into the program a specific cost reduction that all subsidies
considered must provide. The program will then calculate i)
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what price reduction for a given variable input or ii) what
quantity increase for a given variable input or iii) what
quantity increase for a given input that is otherwise fixed is
needed to provide the firm the needed benefits.
Alternatively, one can specify that particular price
reductions or specific quantity increases be given the firm
and the program then calculates the cost reduction the firm
would realize under such a scheme.
The cost of input subsidies to the government is
generally larger than the benefits of such subsidies to the
recipients. The difference between the cost of the subsidy
and the benefit to the firm is the "deadweight loss" resulting
from the distortions in incentives for the firm created by the
subsidy schemes. A central function of the simulation model
is to calculate the deadweight loss associated with each
subsidy plan that is examined by the user. Among subsidies
which all ofPer a firm the same level of benefits, the most
efficient subsidy is the one for which the deadweight loss is
smallest.
The simulation model presumes the firms' variable cost
function is a restricted translog function of the form
described in chapter III. When a particular subsidy scheme is
provided by the user, the simulation program uses the cost
function and the share equations to compute the firms' costs
and factor demands with ard without the subsidy scheme. By
comparing the firm's unsubsidized costs with, in turn, the
firm's subsidized costs and the full market value of the
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resources used by the firm under the subsidy, the program
obtains the benefits and deadweight loss associated with the
subsidy scheme. (See Appendix A for a formal representation
of benefits, deadweight losses and the efficiency of
alternative subsidy schemes.)
The simulation model has a more difficult task when
provided as input a benefit level that subsidy programs must
offer. The program solves for the specific subsidy the chosen
input that yields the required benefits to the firm by
conducting a binary search over possible values of the
subsidy, after first discovering an upper bound for the
subsidy level. Once the required subsidy scheme is
ascertained, computation of benefits, subsidized factor
demands, and deadweight loss are conducted as in the first
mode.
One important practical problem must be confronted in the
calculation of deadweight losses. The appropriate prices for
computing deadweight losses are the marginal social values of
the inputs. In applications it is common to rely on market
prices to reflect marginal social values; in the absence of
externalities, government intervention, and imperfect
competition, this is the appropriate approach. But for
publicly provided inputs, there is no market determined price
to use as a proxy for marginal social value.
One obvious proxy for the marginal social value of
puL.icly provided inputs would be estimates of their marginal
cost to government. Such cost based values would probably be
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as acceptable as market prices if it were not for the shared
nature of so many publicly provided inputs. Many firms
benefit from improved road service to the urban center from
some fringe business zone, for example, and consequently, an
appropriate allocation of cost across the beneficiaries must
reflect this sharing. It is, unfortunately, not easy to guess
the appropriate fraction or marginal social cost to charge
each firm in assessing the deadweight loss (or gains)
associated with changes in fixed, publicly provided inputs.
We are lucky that this problem does not arise when we
focus on subsidies for variable inputs, since for them we have
acceptable proxy values for social costs and since such
subsidies involve no changes in fixed inputs and hence no need
to compute changes in the value of fixed inputs from
unsubsidized to subsidized conditions. (In the one instance
in which we have serious questions about appropriate marginal
social prices for variable inputs--interest rates--we have
well defined alternatives that permit us to analyze the cases
sensibly.) But when we consider subsidies to fixed inputs, we
face some serious dilemmas. In these cases we have chosen to
develop several competing measures of deadweight loss (or
indicators of inefficiency) that may assist us in evaluating
these particularly nettlesome policies.
First, we assess deadweight loss using both the method
described above and a user provided guess at the initial
"social price" of the fixed input. Second, we assess
deadweight loss on the assumption that the unsubsidized shadow
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price of the fixed factor is the true "social price" of the
input. Finally, we report how the Initially declared social
value would have to change if the deadweight loss 5f ror the
subsidy were to be held to zero.
The simulation model's final chores are to summarize the
percentage changes in factor prices and quantities associated
with the subsidy scheme in question and to express the
deadweight loss as fractions of i) benefits to the firm, ii)
total subsidy costs and iii) the firm's output.
One limitation of the model that should be noted here is
that subsidy schemes are presumed to influence input mix but
not output levels. It would be worthwhile in follow up
research to adapt the model to permit output effects.
However, to assess correctly the inefficiencies associated
with output changes would require estimates of the market
demands for manufactured goods, a task beyond the scope of
this research.
Appendix D contains the documented Fortran code for the
twenty subroutines that comprise the simulation model.
Appendix B describes the theoretical relationships that enable
the program to parameterize the translog restricted variable
cost function from elasticities and factor shares provided by
the user.
3. Parameterizing The Simulation Model
The first step in conducting simulations is the
determination of what cases are of interest. In the present
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study this determination has two dimensions: the technologies
to be analyzed, and the policies to be studied.
The ranges of factor share combinations and technological
substitution relationships examined in this section are
intended to be representative of what is found in the Korean
manufacturing sector. The industry classification scheme used
by the manufacturing survey that underlies the econometric
work reported in chapter III divided the manufacturing sector
into nine primary categories: food, textiles, wood, paper,
chemicals, minerals, basic metals, fabricated metals, and
"others". (The largest two of these nine industries are
textiles and fabricated metals.) We also develop simulation
cases in groups of nine, one corresponding to each industry.
The factors of production we have chosen to emphasize are
labor, capital, and land. None of the subsidy plans in use in
Korea subsidize materials inputs, so we refrain from including
them in our analysis. Labor is the single largest remaining
component of firm costs for all industries; capital is
generally the next largest component. Capital and land, as we
show below, are the inputs for4which government subsidies are
most important in Korea.
Across the nine manufacturing industries, mean annual
firm costs for labor, land, and capital range from about 75
million won to about 145 million won per year, according to
the survey data. However, to facilitate comparisons across
simulations, we have chosen to lump the industries into two
cost categories. The lower cost category, including the wood,
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chemicals, and "other" industries are taken to have a typical
cost level of 100 million won per year. The remaining
industries are taken to have a typical cost level of 125
million won per year.
The mean annual values of output in manufacturing are
much higher than the mean annual costs of land, labor, and
capital, reflecting the importance of factors of production
that are not included in our analysis, such as materials,
energy, and entrepreneurial risk taking. The variance in mean
annual output values across industries is considerably greater
than that in mean annual land, labor, and capital costs.
Table 10 reports typical output levels for medium, small
and large firms in each of the nine industries. These figures
correspond, approximately, to the means of output levels (i)
for all firms in the 1978 Korean Census of Manufacturing, (ii)
for firms below that industry mean, and (iii) for firms above
that industry mean.
The shares of land, labor, and capital in annual costs
vary appreciably across industries. The mean share of land
ranges from about eight percent to about twenty percent; that
for capital from about twenty to forty percent; and that for
labor from about forty-five to seventy percent.
The computation of factor shares requires assumptions be
made about the real rate of interest borne by firms for funds
tied up in land and capital. Altering one's assumptions about
that interest rate could alter the share of labor vis-a-vis
land and capital, but the pattern of across industry factor
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TABLE 10
TYPICAL FIRM SIZES BY INDUSTRY GROUP
ANNUAL OUTPUT IN MILLIONS OF WON
SMALLa MEDIUMb LARGEC
Food 150 2250 18000
Textiles 100 800 3000
Wood 75 475 2500
Paper 150 900 2600
Chemicals 200 1400 6500
Minerals 100 625 2000
Basic Metals 300 1550 8500
Fabricated Metals 200 1200 6500
Other 150 475 1400
aApproximately the mean of all firms in the
industry group whose output is below the mean
output for the industry as a whole. (Based on
firms analyzed in part II.)
bApproximately the mean output for the industry
for all firms analyzed in Part II.
CApproximately the mean of all firms in the
industry group whose output is above the mean
output for the industry as a whole. (Based on
firms analyzed in part II.)
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share differences would be little affected. As we discuss
below, it is plausible to believe that the shares reported
here give lower bounds for mean labor shares and upper bounds
for mean shares of land and capital.
Once again, to facilitate comparisons across simulations,
we round factor shares in the cases analyzed below; the
results are relatively insensitive to this rounding. Table 11
reports the typical factor shares for each industry that are
used in the simulations.
The econometric work of others and that reported in
chapter III yield estimates of the elasticities of
substitution among land, labor, and capital for each of the
manufacturing industries. Based on these estimates, we
established the values found in Table 12 for these
elasticities; again, rounding was used to achieve easier
comparability across simulations; although the results are
relativelj insensitive to this rounding.
The empirical evidence for elasticities of the demands
for land, labor, and capital with respect to publicly provided
inputs is not at all precise. However, there is a strong
negative correlation between distance from the city center and
publicly provided infrastructure. Lee, Choe, and Pahk
(forthcoming) used the World Bank/Seoul National University
Survey to tally firms' assessments of the quality of various
public services in the Seoul region. Table 13 is taken from
that report. Using five rings, each further from the center of
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TABLE 11
TYPICAL FACTOR SHARES BY INDUSTRY
Land Labor Capital
Food 
.15 .45 .40
Textiles 
.10 .65 .25
Wood 
.20 .60 .20
Paper 
.10 .60 .30
Chemicals 
.15 .55 .30
Minerals 
.20 .60 .20
Basic Metals 
.15 .60 .25
Fabricated Metals .10 .65 .25
Other 
.10 .70 .20
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TABLE 12
TYPICAL ELASTICITIES OF SUBSTITUTION AMONG LAND,
LABOR, AND CAPITAL
LAND/LABOR LAND/CAPITAL CAPITAL/LABOR
Food 
.25 .75 .85
Textiles 
.40 .50 .85
Wood 
.40 .40 .85
Paper .l0 1.45 1.0
Chemicals 
.40 .65 .85
Minerals 
.35 el0 1.0
Basic Metals 
.55 .10 .85
Fabricated Metals .30 .50 1.0
Other 
.35 .60 1.5
TABLE 13
QUALITY OF URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE PROVIIONS
BY ZONE IN THE SEOUL REGION
Ring 1 Ring 2 Ring 3 Ring 4 Ring 5 All
(Percent of Establishments in Each Ring)
Electricity Never Interrupted 67 57 58 35 28 47
Water Never Interrupted 71 85 83 49 15 61
Excellent Telephone Service 100 76 53 46 58 56
Excellent Telegraph Service 71 41 14 25 5 26
Excellent Garbage Collection
ServiceA/ 19 11 10 7 10 9
Excellent Fire Protection 57 58 39 25 35 36
Number of Establishments 21 85 112 241 40 499
a/ 178 firms responded as using municipal services.
Source: K.S. Lee, S.C. Choe, and K.H. Pahk, "Determinants of Locational Choice of
Manufacturing Firms in the Seoul Region: Analysis of Survey Results,"
The World Bank (forthcoming).
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the city, with ring one including the central business
district, the authors examined the tiiality of six publicly
provided services. As is clear from the table, the perceived
quality off services declines steadily with distance from the
city center. Estimates of the elasticities of the demands for
land, labor, and capital with respect to publicly provided
infrastructure that exploit the strong negative correlation
between distance from the city center and publicly provided
infrastructure are reported in Table 14. As proxies for the
elasticities with respect to infrastructure, we obtain
elasticities with respect to distance from the CBD or
manufacturing firms in the 1978 Korean Census of
Manufacturing. These numbers provide at least useful initial
values for analyses involving publicly provided inputs.
4a Simulation Scenarios
The second determination to be made in conducting
simulations is the choice of questions to be addressed in the
simulations4 The World Bank/Seoul National University Project
Survey provides strong evidence the ^ central attention should
be focused on credit subsidies and land price subsidies. Of
the 141 firms In the survey that had relocated, 50 reported
credit subsidies as the most important government subsidy
available to them (8 more c-ted credit subsidies as being of
some importanSs.a),, 15 reported subsidized land prices as most
important (32 more cited land price subsidies as being of some
importance to them). No other saibsidy mechanism was cited by
more than 4 firms as most important.
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TABLE 14
BASE VALUES FOR ELASTICITY OF DEMANDS FOR PRIVATELY
PURCHASED INPUTS WITH RESPECT TO PUBLICLY PROVIDED INPUTS
LAND LABOR CAPITAL
Food 
-. 40 -. 05 -. 30
Textiles 
-. 40 - .15 -. 30
Wood 
-. 40 -. 05 -. 05
Paper 
-.05 -.15 -.55
Chemicals 
-.40 -. 05 - 20
Minerals 
-. 70 -.05 -. 40
Basic Metals 
-.40 -.10 -.60
Fabricated Metals -. 50 -.05 -.25
r  
-. 70 -.70 -.15
Based on elasticities with respect to distance from citv
center.
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Credit subsidies are sometimes tied to capital loans and
are sometimes allowed on loans used to purchase either land or
capital. When the credit subsidy is tied to capital loans, it
amounts to a reduction in the price of capital. As noted in
chapter II, investment tax credits also provide a reduction in
the price of capital. Consequently, when below we analyze
credit subsidies tied to capital, we are implicitly also
analyzing comparably valued investment tax credits. Such tax
credits were cited by 14 of- the 141 firms as being of some
importance to them.
In chapter II we also noted that property tax exemptions
were equivalent to land price subsidies for analytical
purposes. 33 firms in the World Bank/Seoul National
University survey cited property taxes as being of some
importance to them.
Apart from the credit and land price subsidies, the
subsidies most cited by firms as being of some importance
were programs that introduce no production distortion: tax
breaks on relocation expenses or capital gains on old plant
and equipment (29 firms), exemption from registration and
acquisition taxes (34 firms), and tax breaks on cash
relocation grants (21 firms). However, a measure of the
quantitative importance of these programs is that even taken
together they are cited as being of most importance by only 11
firr, Credit and land price subsidies are clearly the
programs deserving particular attention.
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Loan guarantees are the most common form of credit
subsidy in Korea, and it is these guarantees we shall focus
on. These guarantees raise complex questions about the proper
measurement of the market price of capital for the subsidized
firms; we must address these if we are to properly analyze
the efficiency of these subsidies.
In the following sections we analyze credit subsidies
(emphasizing loan guarantees), land price subsidies, and the
provision of public infrastructure. We close with some
discussion of firm size and a summary of our analytical and
empirical results.
5. Simulating Loan Guarantees
In the loan guarantee simulations we overlook fixed
factors and restrict attention to land, labor and capital,
analyzing the loan guarantees sometimes given to firms that
relocate according to government wishes. Many firms moving to
Banwoel, for example, received such subsidies.
A curiosity about these guarantees is that they do not
offer lower interest rates than bank loans ordinarily afford;
they only guarantee access. Since the large firms in each
industry can generally get access to bank loans in any event,
these guarantees attract only small and medium sized
enterprises that would otherwise be unable to obtain such
loans.
Firms unable to obtain bank credit must rely on either
the curb market or internal financing. Since in our travels
in the Seoul region we were repeatedly told by firm managers
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that curb market financing was prohibitively expensive for
their enterprises, we conclude that the real curb interest
rate provides an upper bound on the opportunity cost of
capital to the firm shut out from bank financing.
Consequently, on the supposition that the curb rate is the
true opportunity cost of capital for firms receiving
guarantees, analysis of the benefits and deadweight loss of
loan guarantees provides upper bounds on both the benefits to
the firms and the extent of deadweight losses.
-a. Curb Rate versus Bank Rate -
Table 15 presents the simulated benefits and deadweight
losses from loan guarantees that lower the real interest rate
faced by the firm from the curb rate to the bank rate for two
cases: (1) the loans can be used for land or capital
expenditures and (2) the guaranteed loans can only be used for
capital expenditures. Most of the loan guarantees offered by
the Korean governin.r. ;it appear to be of the "capital only"
variety; however some firms do receive unrestricted loan
guarantees, so we examine both types.
Table 15 reveals that the general loan guarantees are
most attractive to industries with lower labor cost shares,
such as the food industry, and least attractive to industries
with high labor shares, such as the "other" industry group.
Loans for capital only ar'e, as we would expect, more
attractive to industries with higher capital shares (see Table
11): food, paper, and chemicals.
TABLE 15
BENEFITS AND DEADWEIGHT LOSSES FROPI LOWERING
THE INT13REST RATE FROM THE CURB RATE TO THE BANK RATE*
Subsidizing_Land and Capital Loans
Benefits** (B) Deadweight B B
Loss** (D) Cost*** (B + D)
Food 58.33 13.84 .467 .808
Textiles 40.18 13.92 .321 .743
Wood 37.12 9.75 .371 .792
Paper 44.58 16.42 .357 .731
Chemicals 40.44 11.80 .404 .774
Minerals 46.73 13.22 .374 .779
Basic Metals 47.21 16.31 .378 .743
Fabricated Metals 40.87 16.32 .327 .715
Other 31.88 18.75 .319 .630
TABLE 15 (cont3 d)
Subsidizing Capital Loans On]Ly
Benefits** (B) Deadweight B e B
Loss** (D) Cost*** !B + D)
Food 43.46 17.25 .348 .716
Textiles 28.63 13.75 .229 .676
Wood 18.13 8.22 .181 .688
Paper 36.86 21.87 .295 .628
Chemicals 26.99 12.20 .270 .689
Minerals 23.06 11.22 .184 .673
Basic Metals 27.42 10.96 
.219 .714
Fabricated Metals 30.14 17.14 .241 .637
Other 23.44 20.31 
.234 .536
* Curb rate taken as marginal social cost of loaLn
** Millions of won per year
*** 125 million won per year for all industries except wood, chemicals
and other for those three costs are 100 million won per year.(see text p. 67-68 for discussion.)
co
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Within an industry, deadweight losses will rise as
benefits rise since greater benefits require greater
distortions in prices. However, deadweight losses do not
uniformly rise with benefit levels across industries because
of differences in the cost functions across industries. For a
striking example, deadweight losses are greater in the
industry least favored by general loan guarantees (the "other"
industry group) than in the most favored industry (the food
industry).
-b. Loan Guarantees versus Alternative Subsidies -
Rather than offering firms loan guarantees, the
government could offer subsidies on other inputs that would be
equally valued by the firm. As noted above, land price
subsidies are frequently used by government; the large cost
share of wages also suggests that wage bill (price of labor)
subsidies should be considered, too. Our question is whether
such alternative schemes would be more or less efficient than
loan guarantees. Since the value of the interest subsidy
depends on whether loans are for land and capital or for
capital alone (see Table 15 for the differences), alternative
policies mut t be examined at two different levels of
generosity in these comparison.
The simulation model conducts these analyses by beginning
with the benefit levels given in Table 15 from the interest
rate reduction schemes. The computer program then calculates
how deep a subsidy on another input's price (the price of
land, for example) would yield the firm those same benefits.
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The value of all inputs chosen by the firm under the new
subsidy scheme is then compared with the lowest cost at which
the firm could produce its output given market prices. The
difference is the deadweight loss associated with the subsidy
scheme.
Table 16 compares the loan guarantees with several
alternative subsidy mechanisms that yield equal benefits to
the firms. Subsidies on the price of land only, the price of
labor only, and the price or capital only are reported (the
restricted loan guarantee is itself a subsidy on the price of
capital only, so that comparison is not given.) Since each
subsidy scheme matches the unrestricted or restricted loan
guarantee in benefits, the only differences are in the
"efficiencies" of the subsidy mechanisms, which we measure as
the ratio of firms' benefits to the social cost (benefits plus
deadweight loss) of the subsidy. The "interest rate subsidy"
rows in Table 16 are the efficiencies reported in Table 15.
The remaining rows are the corresponding efficiencies
(benefits divided by the sum of benefits and deadweight loss)
for the alternative subsidy plans.
In general, subsidies directly to land or labor are more
efficient than unrestricted loan guarantees, while subsidies
on capital's price alone are markedly less efficient. The
roots of these differences are not all the same. Land price
subsidies are particularly efficient primarily because of the
relatively low elasticity of substitution of land for other
inputs. Labor price subsidies appear to derive most of their
TABLE 16
COMPARISON OF LOAN SUBSIDIES WITH EQUALLY YVALUED SUBSIDIES ON
OTHER INPUTS WHEN LOAN SUBSIDY DROPS INTEREST RATE
FROM CURB RATE TO BANK RATE
FOOD TEXTILES WOOD PAPER CHEMICALS MIN:ERALS BASIC FABRICATED OTHER
METALS METALS
Land and Capital Loan Subsi42y
Efficiencies*
Loan Subsidy .808 e7 439 .7929 . 7 319 . 7 749 *7 7 9 g9 *7 43 g .7159 630g
Land Subsidy .9 5 8 9m .9 8 1 gm .9 6 7 gm 9 369gm .9 5 0 9m .9 9 1 gm .9 7 5gm .9 9 29m .9 8 5 gm
Labor Subsidy .663 .912 .877 .869 .818 .870 .862 .904 .909
Capital Subsidy .577 .518 .3309 .550 .487 .273 .436 .502 .427
Capital Only Loan Subsidy
Efficiencies*
Loan Subsidy .716 .676 .688 .628 .689 .673. .714 .637 .536
Land Subsidy *9 4 4gm .9 7 3gm .9 3 5 gm .9 24gm .9279m *9 8 3gm .9 5 7gm *9 8 9gm .9809m
Labor Subsidy .786 .944 .954 .899 .897 .950' .933 .936 .937
* Efficiency = Benefits ( Benefits + Deadweight Loss) w
g The subsidized input demand (land if several inputs subsidized) became perfectly inelastic at a
price above the subsidized price.
m The subsidy required a negative price on the subsidized inpiut.
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advantage from having a higher cost share than capital; in
the one industry (Food) with a higher cost share for capital
than for labor, the labor subsidy is less efficient than the
unrestricted loan guarantee.
However, it is important to note that the unrestricted
loan guarantee subsidies are large enough to require quite
deep subsidies of only land or only capital if the benefits
from the unrestricted loan guarantees are to be matched.
Indeed, in most instances one would have to put a negative
price on land to match the guarantee. Needless to say, such a
strategy would be politically untenable. Since this
difficulty may be an artifact of using the curb rate, which is
only an upper bound on the true opportunity cost of credit, we
examine alternative cases below. However, even at this most
generous level, subsidies to labor costs appear a viable and
more efficient alternative to interest subsidies.
Guarantees for loans on capital alone are less efficient
than land or labor subsidies yielding equal benefits to the
firm. Given the greater efficiencies of land or labor
subsidies relative to capital subsidies as alternatives to
unrestricted guarantees, this result is not surprising.
However it is somewhat surprising that "capital only" loan
guarantees are always some ten percent or so less efficient
than unrestricted loan guarantees, despite the fact that the
unrestricted guarantees offer roughly half again as large
benefits to the firms.
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The explanation for this seeming anomaly is that the
subsidy to land that differentiates the restricted and
unrestricted loan guarantees is highly efficient, raising the
overall efficiency of the unrestricted guarantees above that
of the restricted guarantee. The root of this efficiency is
that as the price of land falls markedly (as it does under the
unrestricted guarantee plan), most firms virtually run out of
opportunities for substituting land for labor and capital.
When the elasticity of substitution between land and other
factors falls to zero, further subsidization of land results
in no additional deadweight loss. This effect leads to a high
average efficiency for large subsidies to the price of land.
-c. Half the Curb Rate versus Bank Rate and Alternatives
Revisited -
The curb rate provides an upper bound on the opportunity
cost of capital to small and medium sized firms. Perhaps a
better guess of the true opportunity cost would be the mid-way
point between the bank and curb rates of interest. Tables 17
and 18 are patterned after Tables 15 and 16 but are based on
the assumption that typical small and medium sized firms face
an interest rate half way between the bank and curb rates.
Table 17 makes clear why so many firms cite credit subsidies
as being of great import to them. The benefits from either
unrestricted or "capital only" loan guarantees are very high
relative to the firms' costs.
Comparisons between Tables 16 and 18 confirm the rather
general result that within industries the degree of
TABLE 17
BENEFITS AND DEADWEIGHT LOSSES FROM LOWECRING THE
INTEREST RATE TO THE BANK RATE FROM HALF
THE SUM OF THE BANK AND CURB RATES3*
Subsidizing Land and Capital Loans
Benefits** (B) Deadweight B * B
Loss** (D) Cost*** (B + D)
Food 43.98 5.66 .352 .886
Textiles 29.79 5.73 .238 .839
Wood 28.95 4e54 .290 .865
Paper 32.94 5.45 .263 .858
Chemicals 30.67 5.46 .307 .849
Minerals 33.04 5.47 .288 .868
Basic Metals 35.62 7.61 .285 .824
Fabricated Metals 29.92 6,20 .239 .828
Other 22.59 6.86 .226 .828
00
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TABLE 17 (cont'd)
Subsidizing Capital Loans Only
Benefits** (B) Deadweight B . B
Loss** (D) Cost*** (B + D)
Food 29.85 6.02 .239 .832
Textiles 19.61 5.26 .157 .788
Wood 12.48 3.22 .125 .795
Paper 24.67 8.17 .197 .751
Chemicals 18.60 4.69 .186 .799
Minerals 15.77 4.32 .126 .785
Basic Metals 19.08 4.36 .153 .814
Fabricated Metals 20.28 6.39 .162 .761
Other 14.81 7.21 .148 .673
* Half the sum of the bank and curb rates taken as marginal social
cost of loan
** Millions of won per year
* 125 million won per year for all industries except wood, chemicals
and other for those three costs are 100 million won per year. co(see text p.67-68 for discussion.) 
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TABLE 18
COMPARISON OF SUBSIDIES WITH EQUALLY VALUED
SUBSIDIES ON OTHER INPUTPS WHEN LOAN SUBSIDY
DROPS INTEREST RATE TO BANK RATE FROM HALF THE SUM OF
THE BANK AND CURB RATES
FOOD TEXTILES WOOD PAPER CHEMICALS MINERALS BASIC FABRICATED OTHER
METALS METALS
Land and Capital Subsidy
Efficiencies*
Loan Subsidy 
.8869 *8 3 9 9 .8659 *8 5 8 9 .849 .8689 .8249 .8289 . 7 679
Land Subsidy 
. 9 88gm , 9 7 49m .958gm .9169m .936gm e959gm .967gI 0 989m e 9 7 9gm
Labor Subsidy 
.782 .941 .915 .913 .878 .911 
.907 .936 .939
Capital Subsidy .722 .660 .461 .667 .637 .456 .604 .640 .548
Capital Only Loan Subsidy
Efficiencies*
Loan Subsidy 
.832 .788 .795 .751 .799 .785 .814 .761 .673
Land Subsidy 
. 9 8 3gm . 9 62m .914 . 8 9 1gm .8 9 8 9 *975 9 . 9 40 g .9859m .9689m
Labor Subsidy 
.871 .964 .970 .939 .936 .968 .957 .960 .962
co
* Efficiency = Benefits 
- (Benefits + Deadweight Loss)g The subsidized input demand (land if several inputs subsidized) became perfectly inelastic at aprice above the subsidized price.
m The subsidy required a negative price on the subsidized input.
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inefficiency associated with a specific type of subsidy
declines with the generosity of the subsidy. The only
exceptions are land subsidy alternatives, the efficiency of
which, as explained above, rises once substitution
possibilities are exhausted.
The lesser subsidies in Tables 17 and 18 are not enough
lower than those in Tables 15 and 16 to make land subsidies a
viable alternative, despite their attractive high efficiency.
The share of land in total costs is so small that government
would, in general, have to pay firms for the land they use to
match the benefits of loan guarantees.
Furthermore, the reduced generosity closes the-gap
somewhat between unrestricted loan guarantees and subsidies to
labor costs, although the latter are still generally
preferable--and clearly dominate "capital only" loan
guarantees. Similarly, the gap between "capital only" and
unrestricted loan guarantees is narrowed somewhat, though the
former are still markedly less efficient despite their lesser
benefits.
-d. Loan Guarantees and Inefficient Credit Rationing -
There is an alternative perspective that one might take
on loan guarantees. The above analyses assumed the true
marginal cost of credit to small and intermediate size firms
is the curb rate or some other rate above the bank rate. In
this view, allowing these firms access to bank credit rates
distorts true factor prices and induces inefficiencies in
operations. But it is more plausible to argue that the small
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and intermediate size firms face an artificial barrier to bank
borrowing and that the true marginal cost of credit to these
firms is the bank rate, not the curb rate.
If this alternative view is correct, as seems likely to
the author, small and intermediate size firms suffer increased
costs and society suffers deadweight losses from the
"artificial" credit prices faced by these firms in the curb
market or elsewhere.
Tables 19-20 report the costs increases and the
deadweight losses suffered from artificial credit constraints
imposed on typical firms in each industry, as well as what
those deadweight losses would be if only land were affected
(i.e., under "capital only" loan guarantees). Table 19 is
premised on firms paying the curb rate when denied bank
financing; Table 20 is premised on them paying halfway
between the bank and curb rates.
Columns 1 of Tables 19-20 report the increase in costs
incurred by typical firms when the interest rate rises
artificially from the bank rate. Columns 2 in those tables
report the deadweight losses induced by these artificially
high interest rates. Columns 3 express that deadweight loss
as a function of costs in the absence of the artificially high
interest rates. Column 4 reports the decline in deadweight
loss (expressed as a fraction of costs in the absence of
artificially high interest rates) if firms were given "capital
only" loan guarantees so they only faced the artificially high
interest rate on loans for land purchases.
TABLE 19
COST INCREASES AND DEADWEIGHT LOSSES FROM ARTIFICIALLY HIGH
INTEREST RATES ON LAND AND CAPITAL LOANS OR CAPITAL ONLY
LOANS, GIVEN ARTIFICIAL RATE IS CURB RATE
High Interest on Land and Capital
Increased Deadweight Percentage Deadweight
Cost Loss asCosts* Loss* Increase** Fraction of
Initial
Cost (L2)
Food 58.33 8.34 
.875 
.125
Textiles 40.18 8.27 
.474 
.098
Wood 37.12 6.42 
.590 
.102
Paper 44.58 8.43 
.554 
.105
Chemicals 40.44 7.23 
.679 
.121
Minerals 46.77 8.36 
.597 
.107
Basic Metals 47.21 9.95 
.607 
.128
Fabricated Metals 40.87 8.96 
.486 
.106
Other 31.88 9.74 
.468 
.143
. , . . .. .. , , - ., , . .v ., 
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TABLE 19 (cont'd)
High Interest on Land Only
Increased Deadweight Percentage Deadweight (Ll-L2 )
Cost Loss as
Costs* Loss* Increase** Fraction of
Initial
Cost (Li)
Food 14.87 3.21 .223 .048 .077
Textiles 11.55 2.13 .136 .025 .073
Wood 18.99 3.06 .302 .049 .053
Paper 7.72 1.33 .096 .017 .088
Chemicals 13.84 2.95 .226 .050 .071
Minerals 23.67 2.65 .302 .034 .073
Basic Metals 19.79 4.06' .254 .052 .076
Fabricated Metals 10.74 1.47 .128 .017 .089
Other 8.43 1.29 .124 .019 .124
* Millions on won per year
** Initial cost is what costs would be at bank rate of interest
* I g
TABLE 20
COST INCREASES AND DEADWEIGHT LOSSES FROM ARTIFICIALLY HIGH
INTEREST RATES ON LAND AND CAPITAL LOANS OR CAPITAL ONLY
LOANS GIVEN ARTIFICIAL RATE IS HALF THE SUM OF
THE BANK AND CURB RATES
High Interest on Land and Capital
Increased Deadweight Percentage Deadweight
Cost Loss as
Costs* Loss* Increase** Fraction of
Initial
Cost (L1 )
Food 43.98 4.27 .543 .053
Textiles 29.79 4.39 .313 .046
Wood 28.95 3.71 .407 .052
Paper 32.94 4.32 .358 .047
Chemicals 30.67 4.03 .442 .058
Minerals 36.04 4.50 .405 .051
Basic Metals 35.62 5.54 .399 .062
Fabricated Metals 29.92 4.51 .315 .047
Other 22.59 4.83 .292 .062
TABLE 20 (cont'd)
High interest on LandOl
Increased Deadweight Percentage Deadweight (Ll-L 2)
Cost Loss as
Costs* Loss* increase** Fraction of
Initial
Ci-st (L2)
Food 13.95 2.56 .172 .032 .021
Textiles 10.18 1.59 .107 .017 .029
Wood 16.47 2.24 .232 .032 .020
Paper 8.27 1.49 .090 .016 .031
Chemicals 12.07 2.24 .174 .032 .036
Minerals 20.27 1.81 .228 .020 .031
Basic Metals 16.54 2.73 .185 .031 .031
Fabricated Metals 9.64 1.10 .101 .012 .035
Other 7.77 1.03 .10.013 .049
*Millions on won per year
**initial cost is what costs would be at bank rate of interest
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The rnost important numbers in Tables 19 and 20 are the
deadweight loss figures. The higher credit costs paid by
small and medium size manufacturing firms are, after all,
income to someone else, and therefore not a real loss to the
Korean economy. By contrast, the deadweight losses are real
subtractions from the general economic welfare.
The average deadweight loss in Table 19 is approximately
11-12 percent of land, labor, and capital costs; that in
Table 11 approximately 5 percent. Since the small and medium
size firms that are affected by credit restrictions account
for as much as forty percent of all manufacturing production
(based on estimates from the 1978 Korean Census of-
Manufacturing), the numbers in Table 19 translate roughly into
a 4.5 percent increase in land, labor, and capital costs
across all manufacturing due to the credit restrictions. The
comparable figure from Table 20 is 2.0 percent. These figures
presume that it is the bank rate that reflects the true
marginal cost of credit to small and medium size firms in
Korea.
The numbers in Tables 19 and 20 suggest two important
lessons for Korean policy makers. First, artificial credit
restrictions on the manufacturing sector do not come cheaply;
the two to fout percent of all manufacturing costs for land,
labor, and capital is an appreciable social cost to be
incurred from such policies. Second, given the presence of
such credit restrictions, their relaxation is a promising
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approach to subsidizing firms as part of industrial relocation
programs.
A third lesson worth drawing from Tables 19 and 20 is
that restricted loan guarantees which only offer access to
capital loans realize the greater part of the available
windfalls. Such restricted access schemes could reduce the
deadweight losses associated with credit restrictions by about
two-thirds.
For analysts there is an important lesson to be found in
comparing Tables 15 and 17 with Tables 19 and 20. Measuring
the impact of loan guarantees on social welfare critically
depends on which view of the true marginal cost of credit to
small and intermediate firms is correct. Juggling
elasticities of substitution and factor shares, as we do, for
example, across industries, has relatively little impact on
our assessments of the relative benefits and efficiencies of
alternative policies, but shifting one's view about which
interest rate is appropriately taken as the true marginal cost
of credit, drastically alters the balance between benefits and
deadweight losses.
For example, in Table 15, the efficiency of unrestricted
guarantees ranges from .63 to .81 across industries, a spread
of .18; but for unrestricted loan guarantees, the spreads
within industries between the efficiencies in Table 15 and
those implicit in Table 19 average about .50. (For example,
from Table 19, a restricted loan guarantee to a typical food
industry firm would lower the firms costs by 58.33 while at
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the same time reducing deadweight loss by 8.34. Thus, the
efficiency measure applied to Table 19 yields an efficiency of
1.17, or .37 higher than reported in Table 1'5.)
The point is perhaps more forceful when one states it
this way: "If the true social cost of loans to small and
intermediate size firms is the curb rate or some other rate
above the bank rate, subsidies to capital are the' least
efficient mechanisms for industrial relocation; but if the
true social cost is the bank rate, capital subsidies are the
most efficient mechanisms for industrial relocation."
-e. Low Elasticities of Substitution
Tables 15-20 are based on the elasticities of
substitution given in Table 12. The capital-labor
elasticities given there are indicative of the "majority view"
based on the study of Korean manufacturing discussed in
chapter III, studies of U.S. manufacturing and studies of
manufacturing in developing countries surveyed by Reedy
(1985).
In five instances, however, a minority view of the
capital-labor elasticity was sharply below the majority.
Usually the lower value arose from the specific study of
Korean data described in chapter III (see Tables 5 and 7).
Consequently, it is of interest to see how the findings of
Tables 15-20 are affected by using markedly lower capital-
labor elasticities in those five industries. Table 21 reports
the alternative capital-labor elasticities used.
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TABLE 21
ALTERNATIVE CAPITAL-LABOR ELASTICITIES
OF SUBSTITUTION
Capital/Labor
Textiles .55
Wood .40
Basic Metal .45
Fabricated Metal .55
Other 
.45
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Tables 22, 23, and 24 are derived in the same fashion as
Tables 17, 18 and 20 except that the elasticities of
substitution between capital and labor are set at the
alternative, lower values. (Replications of Tables 15, 16,
and 19 lead to similar qualitative results as reported here
for 22, 23, and 24, so we do not report them.)
The lower elasticities of substitution between capital
and labor bring a very slight decline in the differences
between firms' costs under high and low interest rates. More
substantial effects are seen when we look to deadweight
losses.
As shown in Table 22 the efficiency of unrestricted loan
guarantees rises some, especially for the "other" industry
group (in which the largest elasticity change is made, from
1.5 to .45), if one takes the non-bank rate as marginal social
cost. The efficiency of "capital only" loan guarantees goes
up markedly; as we would expect since capital is the good
that has become less substitutable for other inputs.
But Table 23 shows that increased efficiency of
subsidized loans for capital expenses do not qualitatively
alter the relative merits of subsidies on land, labor, and
capital. Labor subsidies still tend to be the most efficient,
with land subsidies slightly dominant over capital subsidies.
However, the quantitative differences we see between land and
capital subsidies make-us doubtful if there is any good reason
for choosing one over the other on efficiency grounds.
TABLE 22
TABLE 17 RESULTS USING ALTERNATIVE (LOWER)
CAPITAL-LABOR ELASTICITY
CAPITAL AND LAND
Benefits* (B) Deadweight B B .
Loss* (D) Cost (B + D)
Textiles 28.58 3.76 .229 .984
Wood 27.95 2.98 .279 .904
Basic Metal 34.22 5.50 .274 .861
Fabr. Metal 28.09 3.17 .225 .899
Other 19.57 1.82 .196 .915
CAPITAL ONLY
Benefits* (B) Deadweight B B
Loss* (D) Cost (B + D)
Textiles 18.27 2.96 .146 .861
Wood 11.24 1.02 .112 .817
Basic Metal 17.42 1.47 .139 .922
Fabe Metal 18.27 2.96 .146 .861 H
Other 11.50 1.48 .115 .886 0
* Millions of won per year
I a
TABLE 23
TABLE 18 RESULTS USING ALTERNATIVE (LOWER)
CAPITAM-LABOR ELASTICITY
LAND AND CAPITAL
TEXTILES WOOD BASIC FABRICATED OTHER
METALS
EFFICIENCIES
Loan Subsidy 
.884 
.9049 
.861 
.8999 
.9159
Land Subsidy 
.9739m 
.9579m 
.9669m 
.9889m 
.9769m
Labor Subsidy 
.957 
.941 
.934 
.960 
.976
Capital Subsidy 
.771 
.9579 
. 9 4 8 g .775 .8809
CAPITAL ONLY
TEXTILES WOOD BASIC FABRICATED OTHER
METALS
EFFFICIENCIES
Loan Subsidy 
.861 
.917 
.922 
.861 
.886
Land Subsidy *9599m 
.917 
.9359 
.982gm 9599
Labor Subsidy 
.976 
.982 
.973 
.977 
.988 FHC)
g The subsidized input demand (land if several inputs subsidized) became perfectlyinelastic at a price above the subsidized price.m The subsidy required a negative price on the subsidized input.
TABLE 24
TABLE 20 RESULTS USING ALTERNATIVE (LOWER)
CAPITAL-LABOR ELASTICITY
LAND AND CAPITAL
Increased Deadweight Percentage Deadweight
Cost Loss as
Costs* LOss* Increase** Fraction of
Initial
Cost (LI)
Textiles 28.58 3.17 .296 
.033
Wood 27.95 2.71 .388 
.038
Basic Metals 34.22 4.14 .377 
.046
Fabricated
Metals 28.09 2.69 .290 
.028
Other 19.57 1.82 .243 
.023
CAPITAL ONLY
Increased Deadweight Percentage Deadweight L1-L2
Cost Loss as
Costs* Loss* Increase** Fraction of
Initial
Cost (L2)
Textiles 10.31 1.61 .107 
.017 .016
Wood 16.70 2.28 .232 
.032 .006
Basic Metals 16.80 2.77 
.185 
.031 .015
Fabricated
Metals 9.82 1.12 
.101 
.012 .016
Other 8.08 1.07 .100 
.013 .010
* Millions on won per year 
'
**Tnitial cost is what costs would be at bank rate of interest
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The lower elasticities of substitution also lower the
simulated deadweight losses associated with artificially
raising the cost of credit from the bank rate to a higher non-
bank rate. In Table 20, we found a 2 percent increase in the
resource cost of land, labor, and capital in Korean
manufacturing arising from such a policy. In Table 24, the
comparable figure is 1.5 percent, with an especially large
drop in the "other" industry group.
Nonetheless, 1.5 percent of manufacturing costs for land,
labor, and capital is not a trivial amount, and the deadweight
losses recorded in Tables 22 and 23 are also non-trivial.
Consequently, we conclude that even if the substitution
between labor and capital is at the lower end of wha;t', we might
expect, differences in the efficiencies of alternative subsidy
mechanisms should not be overlooked.
Since using the alternative, lower elasticity measures
for the substitutability of labor and capital has not altered
our comparisons among alternative policies, in the following
simulation exercises we rely on the higher, "dominant", views
on these elasticities.
6. Simulating Land Price Subsidies
Land price subsidies are the second most important relocation
policy, according to firm managers. Most of these subsidies
in the Seoul region are offered to firms that move to the new
industrial city Banwoel. The absence of private land markets
makes it difficult to assess the degree of these subsidies.
However, from private discussions with local developers and
104
from firm managers' assessments obtained in a small informal
survey conducted by Dr. S.C. Choe of Seoul National
University, we surmise that in 1985 the market value of land
in Banwoel was about one half to one third the price in Seoul
itself, with firms located in Banwoel actually paying only one
fourth or one fifth of the market value.
To permit an analysis of the public provision of
infrastructure as a policy alternative to land price subsidies
we rely on a restricted cost function that includes land,
labor, and capital as variable inputs and, as explained above,
an inverse distance from the center of Seoul as a proxy for
public infrastructure.
At a distance 2 km from the center of Seoul, the price of
land is at the upper end of the price range that anecdotal
evidence suggests for Banwoel. If the price of land varies to
reflect differences in publicly provided infrastructure, the
level of publicly provided infrastructure in Banwoel would be
somewhat below that found 2 km from the center of Seoul.
However, since land 2 km from the city center also benefits
from better accessibility and greater privately provided
infrastructure (such as agglomeration effects), the level of
publicly provided inputs in Banwoel must be somewhat higher
than its land price would suggest. For this reason we assume
public infrastructure in Banwoel is equal to that found 2 km
from the city center.
Because of our uncertainty about the elasticities between
publicly provided and variable inputs, we conducted our
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analyses using both the elasticities reported in Table 14 and
also elasticities equal to half those values (with the
exception that elasticities equal to .05 were not further
reduced). The estimated elasticities capture the cost savings
associated with the better publicly provided infrastructure,
better privately provided infrastructure (such as
agglomeration effects), and better accessibility found closer
to the city center. Since public policies cannot alter all of
these items, the sensitivity of factor demands to publicly
provided inputs is probably less than the elasticities of
Table 14. This is the rationale for examining the lower
elasticities.
The benefits and deadweight losses from a seventy-five
percent land price subsidy for typical firms in each
manufacturing industry are presented in Table 25; this
subsidized land price, the market land price and the level of
public infrastructure are all chosen with the intent of
mimicking the land price subsidies offered firms in Banwoel.
The table makes it obvious why so many firms find the land
price subsidies important. The cost reductions realized by
the firms range from ten to twenty percent of the firms
expenditures on land, labor, and capital (see the third and
seventh columns of Table 25). This is a aenerous level of
benefits comparable to the benefits from "capital only" loan
guarantees reported in Table 17 -- although well below the
benefits from unrestricted loan guarantees. The efficiency of
these land price subsidies varies markedly across industries
TABLE 25
BENEFITS AND DEADWEIGHT LOSS FROM 75 PERCENT LAND SUBSIDIES
GIVEN HIGH AND LOW ELASTICIT.'ES OF DEMAND FOR VARIABLE
INEPUTS WITH RESPECT TO FIXED INPUTS
High Elasticity Specification Low Elasticity Specification
Benefits Deadweight B . B I Benefits Deadweight B . B '
(B)* Loss (D)* Costs (B+D) (B)* Loss (D)* Costs (B+D)
Food 20.92 6.04 .166 .776 22.85 7.21 .174 .760
Textiles 13.83 2.80 .114 .831 15.11 3.51 .118 .811
Wood 22.21 3.55 .207 .862 24.33 4.90 .221 .832
Paper 16.16 7.60 .135 .680 16.25 7.27 .128 .691
Chemicals 16.71 4.64 .162 .782 18.27 5.73 .172 .761
Minerals 24.09 1.26 .191 .950 28.33 2.31 .212 .924
Basic
Metals 24.75 6.17 .179 .800 22.75 5.29 .174 .811
Fabricated
Metals 13.10 1.27 .105 .912 14.69 1.96 .114 .882
Other 9.57 1.88 .117 .835 11.29 21.41 .120 .824
* Millions of won per year
01 .
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(isee columns 4 and 8 of Table 25). The minerals industry, for
which land is least substitutable for other inputs (see Table
25), has a very high efficiency with only a five percent
deadweight loss. The paper industry, for which the estimated
land/capital elasticity of substitution is very high, has
deadweight loss of nearly one third. Table 26 compares this
land price subsidy with equally beneficial subsidies on labor
or capital prices. The qualitative results here should come
as no surprise since the comparisons are similar in principle
to those done for the restricted loan guarantee. However, two
points are worth emphasizing.
First, altering the assumed responsiveness of variable
input demands with respect to publicly provided inputs has
little impact on what we say about the relative merits of
alternative subsidies on variable inputs. Second, although
labor price subsidies dominate both capital price and land
price subsidies, land price subsidies do not appear nearly as
attractive relative to capital subsidies as in the analysis of
loan guarantees. The reason for this latter result is that in
nearly all cases in Table 26, in contrast to the loan
guarantee simulations, the demand for land does not become
perfectly inelastic within the subsidized price range, and
thus the average efficiency of subsidies is not driven up in
the manner described in the analysis of loan guarantees.
(Notice, however, that in Table 26, too, the efficiency of
land subsidies is generally high when the demand for land
becomes perfectly price inelastic (indicated by footnote ') on
TABLE 26
EFFICIENCIES OF LAND, LABOR, AND CAPITAL PRICE SUBSIDIES
YIELDING BENEFITS EQUAL TO 75 PERCENT LAND PRICE SUBSIDY
High Elasticity*_Specification
FOOD TEXTILES WOOD PAPER CHEMICALS MINERALS BASIC FABRICATED OTHER
METALS METALS
Price
Subsidized: EFFICIENCIES
Land .776 .831 .8629 .680 .782 *9509 .800 .9129 .8359
Labor .917 .975 .939 .960 .944 .948 .942 .975 .962
Capital .871 .839 .620 .808 .815 .589 .756 .833 .770
Low ElasticitX* Specification
FOOD TEXTILES WOOD PAPER CHEMICALS MINERALS BASIC FABRICATED OTHER
METALS METALS
Price
Subsidized: EFFICIENCIES
Land .760 .811 .832 .691 .761 .9 249 .811 .88 2g .8 24g
Labor .906 .972 .930 .960 .936 .934 .949 .971 .963
Capital .869 .836 .583 .832 .807 .558 .745 .824 .743
g The subsidized input demand (land if several inputs subsidized) became perfectly inelastic at a
price above the subsidized price.
m The subsidy required a negative price on the subsidized input.
* Elasticities in question are elasticities of variable input demands with respect to fixed
input. 0
. .
.cc
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the Table). Only for the "other" industry group do we obtain
land price subsidy efficiencies below ninety percent when the
demand for land turns perfectly inelastic, and in this case it
so happens that demand turns perfectly inelastic Just barely
above the subsidized price.)7
7. Simulating Publicly Provided Inputs
The most difficult and tenuous comparison we attempt is
that between the land price subsidy of Table 25 and equally
beneficial subsidies in the form of higher levels of publicly
provided inputs. This comparison raises important measurement
problems.
-a. Measurement Problems
The measurement problems bear on both the price and the
quantity of publicly provided goods. We shall discuss each in
turn.
Identifying the marginal social cost of variable inputs
is a much less nettlesome problem than finding a comparable
social cost for fixed inputs. The market place offers a price
for varia.ole inputs; and even in the face of monopolistic
elements in the economy, these. market prices are likely to
give a reasonable range for marginal social co.sts--and will
often provide very good estimates. (Even in the face of
artificial government requirements, for example, we are fairly
confident that the marginal social cost of credit to small and
7. One might wonder if the difference in the land price
subsidy efficiency depends critically upon the use of
unrestricted cost functions in the loan guarantee analysis
and restricted cost functions here. Appendix C explores this
issue and suggests this is not the case.
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intermediate firms lies between the bank and curb rates.)
However, firms do not purchase publicly provided inputs, and
the marginal social cost of such fixed inputs is much more
problematic since we do not have a market in which to observe
how much firms are willing to pay for these factors.
In our simulations we take two approaches to evaluating
the marginal social costs of fixed factors. First, we
evaluate these costs at a preset number that is provided to
the simulation model by the user. In ideal circumstances this
number would be based on cost studies that indicate how much
government must pay to provide various levels of public
services. But even in our less ideal circumstances, the use
of a fixed base allows comparisons across industries and
ao.ross firm sizes that a sliding scale of marginal costs could
not easily accommodate.
Second, we evaluate the marginal social costs of fixed
inputs at their initial marginal shadow value to the firm.
That is, we compute the change in the firms costs that would
result from a one unit increase in the publicly provided
input. This is the amount the firm would be willing to pay
for that fixed input - the shadow value of the input. If
publicly provided inputs had no "public goods" aspects, this
would be the appropriate marginal cost so long as publicly
provided inputs were available initially in an optimizing mix.
It is this idealistic scenario that warrants the use of shadow
values as an interesting basis for evaluating deadweight
losses. It is important, however, to note two limitations in
using shadow values in this way. First is the obvious point
that publicly provided inputs are likely to have at least some
public goods aspects, and consequently the conditions for
Pareto optimality require marginal costs to be set to
something besides the input's shadow value for a single firm.
Second is a more important point. Differences in the shadow
value of publicly provided inputs across industries, will
yield incomparable deadweight loss estimates across industries
if the deadweight losses are computed using the specific
shadow price of publicly provided inputs for each industry as
the value of fixed inputs. This arises because in such cases
the social prices for computing deadweight losses would be
different for each industry or output level.
-b. Publicly Provided Inputs Versus Land Price Subsidies -
Table 27 reports the efficiencies of land price subsidies
(taken from Table 25) under the high and low elasticity of
variable input demands with respect to fixed infrastructure.
The table also reports the efficiency of equally beneficial
subsidies in the form of increased infrastructure. The second
and fifth rows provide efficiencies of the infrastructure
subsidies premised on marginal social cost being equal to the
initial shadow value of the fixed infrastructure for a firm in
the industry. Since the shadow values differ from industry to
industry, these efficiency measures do not permit cross
industry comparisons. The third and sixth rows provide
efficiencies of the infrastructure subsidies premised on a
single, albeit arbitrary, social cost for fixed
TABLE 27
EFFICIENCIES OF LAND PRICE AND FIXED INPUT QUANTITY SUBSIDIES
EQUAL TO 75 PERCENT LAND PRICE SUBSIDY
High Elasticity* Specification
FOOD TEXTILES WOOD PAPER CHEMICALS MINERALS BASIC FABRICATED OTHER
METALS METALS
Subsidy
Mechanism:
Land Price .776 .831 .862 .680 .782 .950 .800 .912 .835
Fixed Inputs
(Shadow Valuea) .663 .768 .441 .763 .584 .692 .700 .712 .899
Fixed Inputs
(Preset Valuea) .789 .904 .301 1.008 .430 1.147 1.636 .621 2.166
FOOD TEXTILES WOOD PAPER CHEMICALS MINERALS BASIC FABRICATED OTHER
METALS METALSSubsidy
Mechanism:
Land Price .760 .811 .832 .691 .761 . 9 249 .811 .8829 .8249
Fixed Inputs
(Shadow Valuea) .441 .566 .299 .511 0355 .470 .506 .526 .815
Fixed Inputs
(Preset Valuea) .291 .335 .098 .404 .152 .435 .390 .274 1.02
g The subsidized input demand (land if several inputs subsidized) became perfectly inelastic at aprice above the subsidized price.
a See text.
m The subsidy required a negative price on the subsidized input.
* Elasticities in question are elasticities of variable input demands with res,pect to fixedinput.
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infrastructure. These measures permit cross industry
comparisons of relative efficiency but offer no insight into
the actual levels of these efficiencies in any industry.
Despite the limitations of the infrastructure subsidy
efficiency measures in Table 27, some insights persist. In
particular, we see that the relative efficiency of subsidies
in the form of higher fixed inputs depends crucially on the
substitutability of the fixed inputs for variable inputs, just
as the theoretical discussion of chapter II leads us to
expect. The efficiency of fixed input subsidies drops
markedly when the assumed elasticities of variable input
demands fall in magnitude no matter how fixed inputs are
evaluated. Second, from the second and fifth rows of Table 27
we conclude that unless the social cost of publicly provided
inputs is well below the shadow value of those inputs to the
firm, land subsidies sharply dominate increases in publicly
provided goods for all industries. This conclusion can be
strongly drawn if one Judges the high elasticity specification
to be an upper bound on the substitutability of publi.cly
provided inputs for variable inputs.
-c. Publicly Provided Goods and Firm Size
Just as nettlesome as the pricing of publicly provided
inputs is their quantification. The difficulty here is not
measuring government investments; using miles of road or
megawatts of electricity transmission capacity--or even
distance from the city center, are not unacceptable devices.
But one must ask how firms of different sizes respond to
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government investment in a region. Most government
investments offer benefits that can be realized anew with each
increment to output, and consequently the input is, in effect,
proportional to output--for example, every unit of output gets
to the city center faster when the road system is improved.
On the other hand, some public investments are more
exclusionary in nature, each firm gets access to them without
regard to the level of output--for example police surveillance
deters breaking and entering from both small and large
enterprises equally. In this view, publicly provided inputs
are available in fixed quantity independent of the firms level
of output.
In this section we do not explore in detail the
consequences of externality or public goods aspects of
publicly provided inputs. But we do explore the two extremes:
benefits from publicly provided inputs accruing in proportion
to output, and the effective levels of those inputs being
independent of output.
Our cost model assumes that the technology is linearly
homogeneous in all inputs, i.e., doubling both variable and
fixed inputs will double output (and costs). Consequently,
the percentage results in Tables 25-27 pertain to all output
levels for the firm if publicly provided inputs yield their
benefits in proportion to output: (i.e., if the quantity of
publicly provided input at a given location is proportional to
the firm's size). While we lean towards believing this view
of-,publicly provided inputs, we recognize that some
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independence of the effective quantity of public inputs from
firms' output levels is likely. Consequently in Tables 28-30
we recalculate the high elasticity specification results of
Tables 25-27 for large and small firms under the hypothesis
that the effective levels of government inputs in an area are
independent of quantity produced. Such complete independence
is an extreme that permits us to bound our results. The truth
of the matter, however, is likely to lie much closer to Tables
25-27.
The simulations underlying our analysis of firm size and
public infrastructure subsidies assume large firms have output
and cost levels approximately equal to the means for firms in
the industry which have outputs above the overall industry
mean. The simulations assume small firms have output and cost
levels equal to the means for firms in the industry that have
outputs below the overall mean for the industry.
Consequently, each industry has different low and high cost
and output levels. This suggests we be cautious in comparing
across industries within high and low output levels.
What we do want to focus on is comparisons across high
and low output levels within industries and ask what results
then generalize across industries. To facilitate comparisons
across output levels we have assumed for Tables 28-30 that all
firms pay the bank rate of interest. To interpret this
specification it is suitable to say that the tables analyze
the marginal effect of land price subsidies for firms that
have already been given loan guarantees so long as the true
TABLE 28
BENEFITS AND DEADWEIGHT LOSS FROM 75 PERCENT LAND
SUBSIDY GIVEN NO VARIATION OF FIXED INPUTS EFFECTS WITH OUTPUT
LOW OUTPUT FIRMS HIGH OUTPUT FIRMS
Benefits Benefits Benefits Benefits
as a as a as a as a
Fraction Fraction Fraction Fraction
of Firm's of Subsidy of Firm's of Subsidy
Cost Cost Cost Cost
Food 
.084 
.983 .222 .702
Textiles 
.076 
.959 .144 .734
Wood 
.099 
.998 .303 .748
Paper 
.179 .637 .108 .744
Chemicals 
.078 .989 .227 .697
Minerals 
.079 1.000 .299 .802
Basic Metals 
.139 
.906 .215 .742
Fabricated Metals .042 1.000 .176 .716
Other 
.102 
.893 .132 .781
. . . . . .. ., .* . . .
TABLE 29
EFFICIENCIES OF LAND, LABOR, AND CAPITAL PRICE SUBSIDIES
YIELDING BENEFITS EQUAL TO 75 PERCENT LAND PRICE SUBSIDY
GIVEN NO VARIATION OF FIXED INPUTS EFFECTS WITH OUTPUT
LOW OUTPUT FIRMS
FOOD TEXTILES WOOD PAPER CHEMICALS MINERALS BASIC FABRICATED OTHER
METALS METALS
PRICE
SUBSIDIZED:
Land .9839 .050 .0099 .637 .9899 1.000g .906g 1.0009 .8 93g
Labor .981 .989 .982 .969 .584 .99 .983 .980 .953
Capital .909 .874 .854 .427 .904 .529 .997 .538 .874
HIGH OUTPUT FIRMS
FOOD TEXTILES WOOD PAPER CHEMICALS MINERALS BASIC FABRICATED OTHER
METALS METALS
PRICE
SUBSIDIZED:
Land .702 .734 .748 .744 .697 .802 .742 .916 .781
Labor .816 .958 .864 .958 .882 .835 .859 .930 .970
Capital .861 .819 . 4 889 .898 .755 .438 .829 .770 .579
g The subsidized input demand (land if several inputs subsidized) became perfectly inelastic at aprice above the subsidized price.
TABLE 30
EFFICIENCIES OF LAND PRICE AND FIXED INPUT QUANTITY SUBSIDIES
EQUAL TO 75 PERCENT [AND SUBSIDY GIVEN NO VARIATION
OF FIXED INPUTS EFFECTS WITH OUTPUT
LOW OUTPUT FIRMS
FOOD TEXTILES WOOD PAPER CHEMICALS MINERALS BASIC FABRICATED OTHER
METALS METALS
SUBSIDY
MECHANI SM:
Land Price .9 8 3 9 .9 5 9 9 .9989 .637 i99 .000g .9069 i.ooog .893
Fixed Inputs .857 .863 .728 .800 .811 .808 .798 .873 .919(Shadow Valuea)
Fixed Inputs .034 .101 .058 .063 .055 .061 .13 29 .035 .039
(Preset Valuea)
HIGH OUTPUT FIRMS
FOOD TEXTILES WOOD PAPER CHEMICALS MINERALS BASIC FABRICATED OTHER
METALS METALS
SUBSIDY
MECHANISM:
Land Price .702 .734 .748 .744 .697 .802 .742 .716 .781
Fixed Inputs .579 .672 .231 .785 .403 .498 .589 .494 .912(Shadow Valuea)
Fixed Inputs 5.717 4.587 1.061 4.827 1.873 4.798 15.619 3.212 71.66(Preset Valuea)
g The subsidized input demand (land if several inputs subsidized) became perfectly inelastic at aprice above the subsidized price.
a See text.
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social cost of credit is the bank rate, a quite realistic view
of the situation in, say, Banwoel.
The first point to notice is in Table 28. Benefits from
a land price subsidy rise as a fraction of firm costs as
output rises, while the efficiency of the subsidy falls as
output rises. This result appears to reflect the fact that
land is a better substitute (according to Table 14) for the
publicly provided inputs than are other inputs, so larger
firms, being relatively more "starved" for publicly provided
inputs (the ratio of fixed inputs to output falls with firm
size under this specification's interpretation of publicly
provided inputs), make a larger substitution towards land when
land's price falls than do smaller firms. This shift raises
both benefits and deadweight loss, but raises the latter by
more.
The second point to note is from Table 29. The
efficiencies of alternative subsidies on labor and capital
fall as output rises. Large firms appear to have greater
substitution possibilities among variable inputs than do
smaller firms, and consequently show greater deadweight
losses. This greater substitutability is also evident in
Table 30 when we look at increasing the quantity of the
publicly provided input. Consider the third and sixth rows in
which the social cost of the fixed input is set equal to the
marginal value of the fixed input for a typical size firm
rather than for a small or large firm. Notice that when the
social cost of the fixed inputs are set equal to this arbitrary
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single price for both large and small firms, the larger firms
always value the fixed input more highly, and therefo-re suffer
smaller deadweight losses. Indeed, the marginal value larger
firms put on the fixed inputs is 3o large that deadweight
losses would be negative ("deadweight gains") if the marginal
social cost were initially set to the marginal valuation
typical size firms place on the fixed input. It is this
result that suggests characterizing large firms as being
"starved" for the fixed input in these simulations.
Indeed, in general, if the publicly provided inputs are
independent of the firms output level, one will always find
that individual firms disagree about the optimal level of
public investment. Large firms will always want a higher
level of public investment than small firms. However, if
firms use publicly provided inputs in intensities proportional
to output, we will tend to find the disputes about public
investment breaking along industry lines (due to differences
in technologies) rather than by size of firm.
8. Summary
The simulations reported in the previous section suggest
several lessons for policymakers and make clear several
important avenues for future research.
Since the simulation evidence indicates that the
variations in efficiencies and subsidy benefits across
industries are small relative to the variations across types
of subsidies, we shall dwell on the latter here.
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If, as seems likely to us, the inability of small and
medium size firms to obtain bank loans is an artificial
constraint resulting from government policies, the message
from the simulations is clear. Loan guarantees are a highly
cost effective location policy tool. Perhaps twenty percent
of the subsidy payments granted to firms through loan
guarantees will be recouped through the increased social
efficiency of input choices by the benefitted firms.
Quite apart from industrial location policy itself, this
observation raises important questions about the government
policies that restrict the access of small and medium size
firms to bank credit. These restrictions may result in
efficiency losses equal to as much as 4 percent of the land,
labor, and capital costs incurred by the manufacturing sector.
Certainly one must question the wisdom of such policies.
Of course it is possible that these are good reasons for
the government's credit policies. But given the magnitude of
the costs incurred, these reasons need careful thought. If
there are good reasons for these policies, then one must ask
if the objectives of those policies are misserved by the loan
guarantees used in industrial location policies. The
simulations do not touch upon these interactions between
location policies and other objectives of the Korean
government, but such interactions must be considered by
policymakers who wish to make good use of our findings.
It is also important to note that if the Korean
government were to alter its policy of credit rationing,
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subsidies to the price of labor would become the most
efficient devices for relocating firms. This finding is not
particularly surprising on theoretical grounds--the cost share
of labor is high and that suggests relatively high efficiency.
But there is some surprise since the Korean government has
relied only little on subsidies of this form in its efforts to
influence location choices. Indeed, wage bill subsidies
appear to be more efficient than the currently popular land
price subsidies favored by the government.
Less clear from the simulations is the relative merits of
subsidies to fixed and variable inputs. We do find that if
the marginal social costs of private fixed inputs are anywhere
near their shadow values to individual firms, subsidies to
fixed inputs are dominated by subsidies to variable inputs.
However, most fixed inputs are public goods, or at least
quasi-public goods, and the comparison of shadow value to
shadow cost is not wholly appropriate for these inputs since
the optimal choice of public goods depends on the sum of the
shadow values across firms, not on the shadow value of one
firm in isolation.
This last observation highlights one important feature of
subsidies of public goods: such subsidies will be more
efficient the more densely populated the area in which the
investments are made. Since one aim of relocation policy is
to deconcentrate economic activity, subsidies to fixed inputs
are likely to be less efficient where, from a policy point of
view, they are most wanted. This does not imply that fixed
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input subsidies cannot dominate variable input subsidies on
the outskirts of the city, only that for such dominance the
marginal social cost of the fixed input must be lower than it
would have to be in a more densely populated area.
Before a fuller evaluation of the efficiency of fixed
input subsidies can be conducted it is quite important that
further research into the costs of such investments be
conducted. The simulations in the previous section were
sharply constrained by the absence of such cost information.
A second issue related to subsidies on fixed inputs is
the relationship between firm size and publicly provided
inputs. At one extreme one could view publicly provided
inputs as available to all firms in a single fixed quantity.
At the other extreme one could view the fixed inputs to be
available in proportion to the firms' output.
The simulations reveal that literal application of the
former view leads to markedly more variation in total land,
labor, and capital costs as output varies than is observed in
data from Korean manufacturing. Hence we lean toward the
latter view under which the relative attractiveness of fixed
input subsidies is independent of the level of output.
However, some publicly provided inputs are likely to fit
better the first mold, and to the extent that they do, the
relative benefits and efficiency of fixed input subsidies will
vary with firm size. The simulations indicate that in the
face of literally constant fixed inputs, the balance of
12 4
efficiency tilts toward fixed input subsidies and away from
variable input subsidies as the level of output rises.
We close by noting that the simulations suggest that
returns to scale may be of greater interest than we initially
thought. Loan guarantees alter the marginal cost of output by
a factor of about two. Such large alterations of marginal
cost could have considerable impact on the level of output
selected by the firm even if returns to scale are fairly close
to unity (as our evidence suggests). This result is confirmed
in our casual surveys of Korean firms receiving such
guarantees, it was not uncommon for us to find them doubling
their output. The consequences of such output level effects
for the overall efficiency of industrial location policy (or
credit allocation policies) should be accounted fore However,
since our focus is on the relative efficiencies of mechanisms
yielding equal benefits to the firm, we have less concern with
the differentials across policies, and the differentials in
output inefficiencies are likely to be small given the
observed pattern of nearly constant marginal costs.
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Appendix A
A Formal Analysis of Alternative
Industrial Location Policies
In this appendix I develop a formal analysis of the
relative efficiencies of alternative relocation policies.
The policies considered are all intended to induce the firm
to choose one particular site rather than another. To be
successful, each must offer the firm some level of benefits,
B, sufficient to make the government's preferred site as
profitable as the firms's preferred location in the absence
of the policy. By the relative efficiency of two policies,
I mean the difference in the net social worth of the bundles
produced by the firm under the two policies given that both
policies are successful in yielding the firm benefits B.
The total inefficiency of policies would also include the
social cost (B in the case of no externalities and optimal
provision of public services) of not locating at the firm's
most desirable location.
These analyses of the cost to government of relocating
the firm are richer than the usual economist's fare. All
too frequently economists point out that the cheapest way to
achieve a policy goal, such as relocation, is to make a cash
grant. Unfortunately, such simplistic policies are often
not feasible, whatever their economic virtues. In the
following I try to be more realistic by looking for optimal
policies in the face of restrictions on feasible policies.
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Thus, for example, I establish conditions for determining
price and quantity subsidy mechanisms when firms are able to
vary some inputs but must take others as fixed and the
government must choose its policies from a set of
politically feasible subsidy schemes.
The first analyses are limited to location policies
which rely on price mechanisms. These analyses will be
familiar to many readers; they are very similar to the
consumer analyses found in Diamond and McFadden (1975). The
analysis of price mechanisms provides a comfortable path to
the less familiar analysis of non-price mechanisms which
follows. Extending our analysis to embrace the non-price
mechanisms will simply require replacing the unrestricted
cost and profit functions suitable for studying price
mechanisms with their restricted counterparts. The analyses
I conduct are in the same spirit as the consumer behavior
studies of Latham (1980) and Kennedy and MacMillan (1980).
To demonstrate the power of cost and profit functions
for comparing policies, I shall pose and answer the
following eight questions:
* Ifs only one input price is to be subsidized, which
input should be chosen if the firm must receive benefits B
to be induced to choose this site?
* If several, but not necessarily all, inputs to be
subsidized, what are the optimality conditions for the
subsidies?
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Would it be optimal to achieve the required benefits
at this site by offering the firm the prices which prevail
at the alternative site? In particular, if two sites only
differ in transportation costs of inputs, is it an optimal
(second best) solution to offer to pay differential
transport costs? Or if two sites differ in regard to only
one price, should that input be subsidized rather than
another?
* Are price subsidies more attractive to firms for
which the deadweight loss from the subsidy would be larger?
* If only one input which is provided by government
rather than bought by the firm is to be increased, which
input should be chosen if the firm must receive benefits B?
e If several government provided inputs are to be
increased, what are the optimality conditions for these
increases?
e What is the optimal mix of price and non-price
mechanisms for inducing a move given that not all prices and
inputs can be altered?
* When are non-price mechanisms more efficient than
price mechanisms?
Now, as a prelude to the technical analysis itself, I
shall establish some notational apparatus.
Let y be the output of the firm, q be a vector of
privately purchased inputs, and s a vector of publicly
provided inputs. Let Py be the price out output, p be a
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vector of input prices for q, and r a vector of input prices
for S.
y = f(q,s)
is the firm's production function
a = c(p,s,y)
is the cost function corresponding to f and
w = W(PY p,s)
is the profit function corresponding to f. A restricted
profit function corresponding to a set of constraints of the
torm
i i i 1 ee n
is denoted by
= s(p,p,,S S)
However, to begin with we shall ignore S and q, considering
only purchased inputs, their prices, and output in the long
run.
Define the subsidy paid by government, S, to be the
difference between the market value of the bundle of inputs
chosen under the subsidy and the payments made by the firm
for the inputs at subsidized prices. Denote market prices
Pm and subsidized prices p.
(1) 8 (pa-p )
i-li ± api
(Recall the derivative of the cost function is the
conditional demand for the input.)
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Define the benefits to the firm, B, as the reduction in
costs incurred due to the subsidy.
(2) B - c(P ,Y) - C(P,Y) - Z p3  (p) - i tii BP BP
The economic loss associated with the subsidy is
therefore:
3 C(p,y) 
- a_______(3) L - S-B- 
- ap E, 3Cp¶ > 0
with the inequality following from the fact that
3C(p ,y)
_____ i 1c,.s.,n, is the Cost minimizing vector of q's
apj
for p = p.
One input subsidized. The choice of which input to
subsidize turns on two factors: the substitutability of
factors one for another, and the amount of each factor in
use. To see this, let us ask how inefficiency, L, varies
with benefits, B, when benefits are transmitted by
subsidizing one input, say q.
From (2) we obtain by differentiation
1 - 3C(p,y)(* dB
(C(pm,y) if fixed as pi changes.) hence,
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dp1.
-p 11
dB ac ply), qj(Py)
api
Differentiating (3) we obtain
~ Pj aP a
3L~~  ~ g, 32 aq1)di
(4) aB , p; igg a L dBi qij
i-I
which indicates that choosing to subsidize a good used in
large quantity (qi >> 0) or a good which is not much of a
substitute for others will reduce the inefficiency incurred,
in granting benefits.
At this point I shall introduce two concepts which will
appear frequently below.
Ms is the budget share of the quantity of the ith
input picked at subsidized prices when evaluated at market
prices:
piqi tPIY), 8a s
ins
J! pjq i(P,Y)
MS. is the elasticity of the cost inputs chosen at
subsidized prices evaluated at market price:
eE Pia(Epaqi (p,Y))
n~~~ E q: , tW
J!1 i J "
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Equation (4) thus becomes
aL ±(4') . , - i
The rule of thumb for subsidy schemes which (41')
suggests is to subsidize a good which makes up a relatively
large part of the firms' outlays, and which is not easily
substituted for. Another way to view (4C) is that the
denominator indicates that when is large, only a small
change in price is needed to confer a given level of
bernefits; the numerator indicates the extent to which any
particular change in price distorts consumption.
Optimal Subsidy Schemes. Suppose the government will
subsidize a given subset of inputs qi...qk k < n. What
are the optimality conditions for the subsidy scheme given
the requirement that firms receive benefits B from the
subsidies.
We wish to minimize:
1 P Pi - 'p,
subject to B = B.
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.Form the Lagrangian
Pi qi - ZP qT + I(° C(pe,y) + C(p,y))
The first order conditions are:
n aq~w
Ec (, - 0
aPi J-1
or
qi
i5 e @? eD 
yk
5>~ ~ M Ms a 81
plus B =
Condition (5) can also be expressed in terms of the Allen
Elasticities of Substitution (AES). The AES between goods s
and t, sst can be expressed (Blackorby, Primont, and Russell
(1978) ) as:
a2C
0 8- C(py).%t qs qt
thus
2a c
C(Psy) qt
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and
a psqa E
a- -1 P8 pS at
UC(p,y) qt
Consequently, condition (5) can be expressed as
n a(5,) Z a -8 a u131 .
11:Iaa' 1-1T i LJj
In general, the expression em /s can be replaced by
n T
Er Stlat
1 n
- where s is the average rate of subsidy, SI E pq
l-s ' J=1 j j
The tie of this result to the previous is obvious. One
should first subsidize the input of which ems/aMs is a
ms m;
minimum, as in the case above. When Ri /ai for that input
exceeds that for a second input, that second input should
then be subsidized. This practice should be continued until
B = B.
Notice that in the special case of k - n, when all
inputs can be subsidized, we find that if the quantities of
goods chosen at subsidized prices are the same as at market
prices (which, of course, is achieved by equiproportionate
subsidies),
X aqi(p,Y) X- 3q (p¶y) -
beaP us
because
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ac (pa, y) . ii a mq,ap 
-T- q ZPi
i-
implying that the first order condition is met with g = 0.
Matching the Alternative Site. Suppose prices are p in
the site most attractive to the firm. Prices in the site
which the government wants selected are pm. Clearly the
government can make the firm indifferent between the two
sites by charging prices p at the second site also. When is
this desirable? When not desirable, what changes should be
made?
Let us suppose prices have been set at p, and the
government now contemplates altering p1 and P2 keeping B
as required. Thus,
M 8 0 M Sc -c + 5 -A
alp1  ~1 2 1 2
hence
ac
&P2 a, tq (p,y)
U- .~ m -. , .
Sp aC q2 (P,y)
The effect on inefficiency of these price changes is
dL dp2  a
dpl 2 aP 'dP}2
U 3q4  q1  n u3j
J ;~ t q2  ;1;
This can be formulated as
135
dL/m Emq / p pq 
__
1. Pi 1  i Ep qj K p Zpq2ql dpl )B pm m q , ql p; m^ q2.
ea ems
(6) . M -
al "2
Thus if goods 1 and 2 meet the optimality conditions, no
change in these two prices is called for. However, if the
difference (6) is not zero, a more efficient device to
entice the firm to come to the desired site is available.
The prices at the alternative site should not be matched.
In particular, if two sites differ only in the cost of
transporting inputs from their sources, it is inappropriate,
in general, to induce location at the more costly site by
offering to pay the differentials in transport costs.
In the same vein, and also important, if two sites
differ only with regard to one input price, it is possible
that the optimal subsidy scheme is to subsidize still
another good.
These remarks would be trivial if we were always
allowing for a first best solution, i.e., equiproportionate
price subsidies, however the force of these comments comes
from their applicability even in second best cases in which
only one or several inputs will be subsidized.
What is Drawn to the Subsidy? The deadweight losses
induced by a price subsidy scheme yielding fixed benefits
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are smallest for the firms which both use much of the
subsidized good and find it difficult to substitute for the
subsidized good. If we ask for what sort of firm will a
particular price subsidy be most attractive, we find that on
the one hand, the subsidy will appeal more to firms which
use much of the subsidized good, but that it will also
appeal more to firms that can substitute more easily for
that good.
To see this, simply note that
aB
apt qi
but
ah aq
ap2 api.
Hence, firms with high qi benefit more for each dollar
of subsidy, but the marginal gains rise faster for firms
whose consumption of qi is more responsive to price. Firms
for whom there is a large inframarginal benefit will be more
.attracted to price subsidies, which is good from an
efficiency perspective. But firms ready to respond more to
the subsidy at the margin will also be more attracted, which
is bad for efficiency.
Allowing for Output Effects. Little is changed in the
above results by allowing the firm to alter its output in
response to changes in factor prices. Benefits are altered
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in that altered revenues may shift benefits to the firm, and
changes in input use will arise from output changes as well
as substitution effects. However, if one reinterprets e M
as the elasticity (with respect to the price of goods) of
the market value of inputs net of increased revenues,
evaluated at initial market prices, then all the formulae
above would be repeated in an analysis based on profit
functions rather than cost functions, except that total
inefficiency would have to include any lost consumer's
surplus.
If all inputs were purchased at set prices, with or
without distortions, the above analysis would fill all our
needs. However, in reality some inputs are available only
in fixed quantities at any given moment. Moreover, some
governments' relocation mechanisms share this character:
the government provides the firm with a fixed quantity of
some good at no cost, or at less than market cost. If the
fixed quantities of goods do not coincide with the cost
minimizing or profit maximizing amounts, then actual costs
or profits will diverge from those which would be calculated
from unrestricted cost for profit functions. If government
is providing an input to the firm, the firm's choices may
also be distorted, although underprovision by government can
sometimes be overcome by private purchases to supplement the
government's provisions.
I shall now introduce the apparatus of restricted cost
functions which will enable us to incorporate analyses of
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non-price relocation mechanisms into our general framework.
The adaptation of the foregoing results on price-mechanisms
to include quantity restrictions will be clear from our
discussion, so we will not repeat all of those
manipulations. Similarly, the extension of these results to
profit functions from cost functions is straightforward, and
I won't go into details.
It is worth noting that two common location policies,
prohibitions and mandates, are not treated in this section.
These policies do not alter the relative input prices in the
target site, nor do they require increases in the provision
of publicly provided goods. Consequently, they induce no
misallocation of resources except for their possible effect
on optimal location per se.
The primary purpose of the following development is to
establish that adaptations of the notions of cost or profit
functions will permit one to analyze non-price relocation
mechanisms as well as price mechanisms. The approach taken
to the firm here is similar to that taken to the consumer by
Latham (1980) and Kennedy and MacMillan (1980).
First let us consider a policy which provides a firm
thwith a fixed amount of the n input, qn, at a cost
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C < PJ If
qn < aCp,y
then the firm will accept the offer and augment the quantity
qn exceeds the firm's planned use of qn, then it will accept
the offer if costs would be lower by using qn at cost Cn
than otherwise, i.e., if
C(p,y,i) 4 C(p,y)
where C(p,y,q) denotes the cheapest way to produce y given
that prices are p and that one uses q obtained at cost Cne
It is of interest to allow the government to Jointly
offer qn and alter other input prices, in which case the
benefits to the firm from a policy are
B = C(p ,y) - C(p,y,q)
The subsidy to the firm from such a policy would be
i- iqi C(p.Y,i)
where q, .X.qs 1 are the quantities the firm would choose
if ql e... pn-1 given q and qn.
Holding C fixedn
C(p.y,qn) C(PYqn2 ) ifW ql > n2
Furthermore
SC(Pby,. )
v ~~  o .. ....... < nV E '(U 
-n
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if qn > 6C(Py)/6Pn since otherwise it would pay the firm to
purchase 'n without constraint. Also
a2c(p,y,qn,
a (Pysn)< O
a2i
as it becomes increasingly difficult to substitute q for
other inputs as qn rises.
A striking result is that the derivatives of the
restricted cost function with respect to factor prices still
yield input demands, although now they are restricted
demands conditioned on qn qn4 To see this, let q*
minimize the cost of producing y at p = p* given qn ° qn
Then
g(p) - C(P.Y,in) - Z Piqi n 0
reaches a maximum at p p* and that implies
3g(p) a
api
so
n(a',q )
(pys ) apW
(Let q3 qn)
As with price mechanisms, non-price mechanisms
generally bring deadweight losses.
L m S - B Z Pq - £ pq >
i-i i -l
Now we can ask as before how deadweight loss changes
with benefits, but here the benefits are altered by
increasing i. (holding Cn fixed).
eB
n -B81- -. ___
a,,-1 1
aB Cpy)/a
a aqi
dL - ami -
(6) i-Pi X v
The intuition of this result is straightforward.
First, if the shadow price of q-, vn, is low, a larger
increase in qn is needed to achieve a given increase in
benefits. Second, a given increase in gn can substitute for
other inputs.
This relationship reflects a much more general result,
Just as equation (4) reflected more general optimality
conditions. Consider a set of relocation mechanisms which
alter the prices of some inputs and provide amounts of
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others which exceed what the firm itself would choose. Let
P1 . ° Pn denote the prices of goods, ql ... q k which the
firm buys in the market price, perhaps at distorted prices.
Let qk+12 .. q n denote a vector of goods provided by the
government for a set cost C . We shall now ascertain a set
of optimality conditions for these mechanisms given benefits
must equal some set level B.
The problem, then is to minimize
L p- q Piq1
where q are the cost minimizing input choices given
Pl .. $Pk'g y, and qk+110e e q n Also q, qj j e
The constraint is that
B u( C ,y) t
ccF
From
L + (B - B)
which yields the following first order conditions
k 3q6
(7) z - - 0 1,...,k
k q
(8) ac8-+Pi 1- 0 ± +,.,
J-1 J a +i i dq
BB
1 43
Conditions (7) are simply the optimality conditions for
price mechanisms obtained above with restricted input
demands replacing unrestricted input demands. Conditions
(8) indicate that dL/dB (see eq. 6) must be the same for
each quantity qk+V*--'qnj and must equal dL/dB for each
price as well.
Reflection upon the optimality conditions for price
mechanisms vis-a-vis those for non-price mechanisms exposes
a striking difference. Equation (4) indicates that if Pi is
manipulated:
aq3.
dL EPJ apt
dB qi
while equation (6) says that if qi is manipulated:
aq
dL
dB vi
From an initial market solution, it will be more
efficient to apply a non-price subsidy to a good when that
good has a high shadow price, is used in small quantity, and
is easily substitutable for other goods. Price mechanisms
will be more efficient when the shadow price of the good is
low, the good is used in large quantity, and the good is not
easily substitutable for others.
The optimality conditions for non-price mechanisms have
analogous implications for non-price relocation mechanisms
as were drawn earlier for price mechanisms. They firmly
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establish the power of the restricted cost function (and
with simple adaptation, the restricted profit function) for
analyzing how relocation policies alter firms' allocative
efficiency.
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Appendix B
Parameterizing The Translog Restricted Cost Function
Using User Provided Elasticities and Factor Shares
We now discuss how the simulation model converts user
supplied data on (i) elasticities of substitution, (ii)
demand elasticities of variable inputs with respect to fixed
inputs, and (iii) factor shares, into parameters for the
translog restricted cost function.
The first step is to declare the initial conditions for
the model. These include the levels of output and fixed
inputs, the variable factor prices, and the level of total
cost for which the user-provided elasticities and factor
shares are presumed to hold.
There are two important cases to be considered. In the
first, the technological data from other sources are assumed
to be estimated under the same restrictions that apply to
the translog restricted cost function. For example, if only
publicly provided inputs are being held fixed, it seems
reasonable to assume that these conditions correspond to the
conditions under which most elasticities of substitution
among capital and labor have been estimated (i.e., with
fixed levels of publicly provided inputs).
The second case is that in which the simulation model
is holding fixed a quantity that was allowed to vary in the
empirical studies. Perhaps we wish to simulate a fixed-
quantity capital subsidy; how can we adapt to our
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needs elasticity of substitution estimates from studies in
which capital was varying freely?
In the first case, if the available estimates of the
elasticity of substitution are conditional on fixed levels
of some inputs, such as publicly provided inputs, then the
formula given above for the elasticity of substitution in
terms of the cost function still applies, but the
appropriate cost function is the restricted cost function.
2
V
q q~
i j
Equations (2) above can be rewritten as
k
UP- n (ai + 1 o ij lnPj
n
+ jk+l yj lnqj + Ti lny) = p (Si)
Thus it follows that
____ v Si v9p>p p= .V aij + V ¢ Si
1 J 1Ji J
Consequently, for the translog restricted cost function,
we obtain
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a..
ai j = W. + 1S.S.
or
aij = (aij-l)SiSj
Thus, the elasticities of substitution, coupled with
equation (8), allow us to fix all the Yij once initial
variable factor shares are specified.
Values for the Yij are determined through knowledge
of the elasticities of demand for the variable inputs with
respect to the fixed inputs.
qi = av - v (Si) i=l k
therefore,
aqj p i *j j-
j =kl...n
or
q. 3q. 'y.
i j q i aq gi - 3
so that
Yij = (Sij + S*j)Si
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The elasticities £ij used in the simulations reported in
chapter IV are drawn from the econometric work reported in
chapter III, and the initial shares of the variable inputs,
Si. used are those that we observed in Korea. The computer
program will accept any E and Si provided by the user. The
shadow shares of the fixed inputs pose a more subtle problem
because only the initial quantities of the fixed inputs are
observed; we are in the dark about their shadow prices.
Fortunately, we can indirectly retrieve the shadow shares of
the fixed inputs from other variables.
The shadow value of the Jth fixed input is simply the
savings in other inputs that access to one more unit of that
fixed input would yield. That is,
k aqi
w = -E P J=k+l,...,n
J ~J=1 aqj
so that
k qiq aqi
w qj = - Pi - p
k=l qj aq
or
k
wqj = Piqi ij
i=l
so that
w q k
v* = - = -1 i ij J=k+1,e ,n
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Hence, the Yij can be fixed by computing
k
Yij = (Sij - 1 SQ., %j)Si i=l,...,n
j=k+l,...,n
These numbers, coupled with equation (7) then provide
values for the Ti as well.
With Ti, Yij, and aij all in hand,.initial variable
prices and shares for the variable inputs, initial fixed
input quantities and initial output level permit us to
calculate the ai using equations (2)e
The only remaining parameters in the model are the
hi, the Bij, and the ei. Once the Bij are determined,
equation (9) dictates the i. With the ei and Bij, the
formula above for the S*i, coupled with equations (3),
yield values for the hi.
Because of the limited information available to us
regarding fixed inputs, the values of the Bij in the
simulation model had to be set arbitrarily. We chose to
assume values consistent with the following conjectures:
had firms been allowed to vary the fixed inputs at a
marginal price equal to the shadow price, then (i) the own
price elasticities of demand for the fixed inputs would be
unitary and (ii) the cross price elasticities among the
fixed inputs would be zero.
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The first conjecture has little impact on our
analyses since cross price elasticities are much more
important in determining deadweight loss and benefits than
are own price elasticities. The second conjecture has
little impact because we seldom consider two fixed inputs
in our analyses (so there is usually no cross price effect
needed in the models) and also because deadweight losses
are driven more by cross effects between fixed and
variable inputs or among variable inputs than between
fixed inputs.
The link between Bij and the "as if" demand
elasticities will be clearer as we now develop
parameterization of the translog restricted cost function
in the second case (in which we consider fixing an input
that is variable in the available econometric stud- .:-).
For analytical tractability in this second case, we
abstract from other fixed inputs. Thus, we find ourselves
considering the relationship between an unrestricted cost
function and its restricted counterpart in which one input
is fixed.
The available econometric evidence pertains to an
unrestricted cost function
C - C=Plr rPkrY)
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I assume that the kth input is to be fixed and use P =
(Pl...,Pk-1) as needed. Since the elasticity of
substitution and factor share information available to us
pertain to this unrestricted cost function and its
derivatives, we wish to explore the link between this set
of equations and the restricted cost function v(P, qk,Y)
and its derivatives. The link is forged by noting that if
Pk were equal to the shadow price of qk at the fixed level
in question (wk) the firm, if left unrestricted, would
choose to purchase just the restricted quantity qk.
Consequently we find
H = c(P, wk , y) = v(P, qk, y) + wkqk
where the last term on the right reflects the fact that
the restricted cost function only yields variable costs.
The point is that for given p, if Pk = Wk, it doesn't
matter whether the firm is restricted or not, because
factor choices would be the same in either event.
It is very useful to explore some of the derivatives
of H. (Throughout keep in mind that wk = -av/aqk.)
ac(p, wKt Y) a . a
ask aqKY apK a,q2C2
and
a[v(p, qt ; Y) + wKqX] = 2
aqK_ _q_  _ _ _ __K
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which confirms that
K
Similarly
a2H a2c a2v 2 ac a3v a2 c a2v a3vl- I> -] ~ n * <2( )_ qX
2qK2 ap  aq apK 9qK aP2 aq2 aqK
~' K K K
and
a2 H a3v a2v
3q2 aq 3 K ° 2aqK K K
Thus
2c(11) 3ac - 1
2 a2 v
K
aqK2
when the left hand side is evaluated at (p, wk, y).
Stated alternatively
DqK 1
K wK
when the left hand side is evaluated at (p, wk, Y)r a
result that should come as no surprise.
Next consider-
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aH ac ac a2v
aP aP aPK aqKaPi
so that
D H a c a v ac a3v ac
aPiaqK aPiaPK aqK2 aPK aq2ap a pKK2
a2v a2 v
*aqK2 agKa?
But by (11)
a2c ava * 
-. = 
-I
apK2  aqK2
so
a2H a2 c a2 v ac a3v a2v
aP a~q ap Pa 2 aP q2 aq aP.Ki K K K aq aP
But using the alternative form of H, we obtain
a 2 H a3v
api_q_ 2ap K
Hence
a 2 v
(12) ap 3P- 
- 2 F
iK av
aqK
Next consider
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aH Dc ac a2v(1)api api~ aPK *aqKap
so that
a2H a2c a2c a2v
api2 2Pi2 api pK aqKapi
a2c a2c a2v a2v
2
K i a K KqaPi aqpi
_c 33v
1K i aq K 2
a2c a2c a2v a 2c a2v 2;2 -2 +
9P.2 aPi DPK 3q ap aP 2 aq Da.
a3v
qK 2Xaq Kapi2
Using equations (10) and (12) we obtain
a2v 2 2v 2
2 2 2 qa (Pi ap i 32 2
a.i a v a v KaK
CK
K K
v. 2
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But once again, the alternative form of H yields another
version
2 2 2 qK
so
a2 = D2 3 aqKvp
(14) 2 = 2
api api a v
aq2
Returning to (13) and obtaining cross partials we find:
a 2H a2 c a2 a2v
ap.ap.- aP_ a_ ' DP_ aq1 J i K Ka-
-
2c a_c a_v a_v
DP aPap ap 2 eq T73Pj aqg
a2c 3v
aPK aqKapi ap
a2 a2v
a2 a q Kapi a2v aqKap. a2v
=apiapi ; 2V e aq Kapi a2 * qKDP
32a 3 a2v
e+
q P3P. 2qK Pi a3v
a2 K rqY5Pj5a
aq2
a2v 
_a2_
2_____ Kapi P qap. a3
DP 3Pj + 32 1 qK - q___P.
qK2
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But the alternative form of H yields
a2_H a 2 v a 3 v
__ap__P_ 
__ _ nq DP apj K1 j 2. j 1(2
So we find
a2v a2v
(15) a2c- 32 3Kapi DqKDP,
( Pi)p aPi3P. a2v
aDq 2
Taken together, equations (11),r (12), (14), and (15)
permit strikingly simple characterizations of the links
between the unrestricted and restricted cost functions. We
obtain
a2c a2v a2(16a) ap a2K
or
u
(16b) iK = eri i=1,, ... ,K-1KK i
where the terms on the left side are unrestricted price
elasticities with respect to Pk, evaluated at (p, Wk, Y)
and the right hand side is the restricted demand
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elasticity for qi with respect to qk. And for
elasticities of substitution in the restricted technology,
r
aij, we obtain:
U U
(17) (l+S* )0r = auiK - -a iI.
1XK iii u
r
where aij are the unrestricted elasticities of
substitution.
And for the effect of qk on wk we obtain:
(18 r -- 1(7->8 gKK =°u
EKK
where the term on the left is the elasticity of the shadow
price with respect to qk and the term on the right is the
unrestricted own price elasticity for qk.
One might guess that since the own and cross
unrestricted demand elasticities are related by
kc u
(19) i.-l Picik = 0
where pi is the unrestricted share of the ith input, the
value of kk is determined through (16b) and (18) once the
rik are set. However, this proves not to be the case.
What (19) does imply is the finding above that the shadow
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share of q can be expressed in terms of the erik and the
shares of the variable inputs.
Application of (18) to the specific case of the translog
restricted cost function yields
-s
kk= (+Sk)Sk
Thus the assumption of a unitary own price elasticity of
unrestricted demand at the shadow price yields
B - 2
kk k -
which is what we use in the simulations for all publicly
provided fixed inputs since we have not alternative
information.
More generally, equations (16) - (18) have permitted us
to '"translate" unrestricted elasticities of substitution or
demand into appropriate restricted elasticities that permit us
to parameterize a restricted translog cost function using the
transformed elasticities in the manner described earlier in
this section.
One important activity carried out by the simulation
model is to render convex the technology underlying the
translog cost function. An unfortunate shortcoming of the
translog specification is that for goods that have an
elasticity of substitution less than one, the isoquants
implied by the cost structure have concave segments. This is
illustrated in Figure 1 by the solid line QQ. These segments
are inconsistent with interior solutions to the cost
minimization problem. Rather than cast aside the very useful
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translog function altogether, the simulation model adapts the
model by, in effect, forcing the isoquants to become vertical
or horizontal and remain so rather than become concave. This
is illustrated with the dashed lines in Figure 1.
This convexification of the isoquants underlying the cost
function simply reflects an intuitively appealing idea: in
the real world, the substitution relationship that is most
likely to give rise to negative elasticities of substitution
(when we approximate the technology with a translog cost
function) is indeed a zero elasticity of substitution.
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APPENDIX C
This appendix presents simulation results to supplement
those reported in the text. The first set offered focus on
land prices and firms' costs in an effort to lend credence
to our use of distance from the center of the city as a
measure of publicly provided inputs. The second set of
simulations explore the relationship between restricted and
unrestricted translog cost function specifications.
Simulations and Spatial Structure
The first simulation results we report in this appendix
pertain to the spatial structure of the Seoul region. We
use the inverse of the firm's distance from the city center
as a measure of fixed "non-]purchased" inputs available to
the firm. The mean distance in our sample is about 3
kilometers so we use .333 as the base value of fixed inputs
in specifying the simulation model.
When non-purchased inputs are raised to 2.0 (1/2
kilometer from the city center), costs generally decline
from fifteen to twenty-five percent with a mean of about
twenty-five percent. When these inputs are cut to .125 (8
kilometers from the city center), costs generally rise from
ten to twenty percent. (The "other" industry category is
the one outlier in these findings, due, we think, to the
relatively high demand elasticities obtained for this
industry (see Table Cl); this result is probably specious,
arising from misspecifications in lumping all "other"
manufacturing industries in one categorye)
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TABLE Cl
AVERAGE FIRM COSTS FOR ALTERNATIVE FIXED
INPUT LEVELS WITH AND WITHOtUT ACCOMPANYING
LAND PRICE CHANGES
Fixed input
level 2.0 1.0 .333 .20 .125
Cost w land 146 136 115 105 102
price change
fixed at .222
Cost w land 119 124 115 116 112
price changing* (1.85) (.555) (.222) (.111) (.037)
* Figure in parentheses is assumed price of land
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Table C2 reports the mean change in costs from a base
cost of about 115 when fixed inputs are .333 for each of
four alternative levels of fixed inputs. Below these
changes are reported the net changes in costs which would
occur if the altered levels of fixed Inputs (distances) were
accompanied by changes in land prices comparable to those
observed at those distances in the Seoul region. As can be
seen from the table, the land price gradient very nearly
neutralizes the fixed input advantages or disadvantages of
alternative locations.
This relatively good conformity of our simulation
results (except for the outlier "other industries")
encourages us that our parameterization of the industries is
reasonably good, at least !.'or the typical size firms for
which these results are derived. (The problems associated
with firms of other sizes are discussed below.) However,
the good fit of our simulations does raise some concern
about the appropriateness of using elasticities with respect
to distance as a proxy for elasticities with respect to
publicly provided inputs, even if the two are highly
correlated.
Greater distance from the city center does not bring
just lower publicly provided inputs; other problems also
arise, most particularly increased transportation costs.
Consequently, elasticities with respect to distance are
probably an upper bound on the magnitude of the elasticities
with respect to publicly provided inputs. In the above
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TABLE C2
RESTRICTED AND UNRESTRICTED ELASTICITIES
FOR THE FOOD INDUSTRY
Unrestricted
Elasticities of Substitution
LAND/LABOR LAND/CAPITAL CAPITAL/LABOR
.25 .75 .85
Shares (.15) (.45) (.40)
Restricted
Elasticity of Elasticity of
Substitution Variable Input
Demand
LAND/LABOR LAND WITH CAPITAL LABOR WITH CAPITAL
.75 .23 .77
Shares (.25) (.75) (.67)
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application, it is the relationship between the price
gradient and the total effects of altered distance that
interests us, so there is no difficulty. But in the
analyses in chapter IV, the interpretation desired is that
of publicly provided input's effects on costs;
consequently, in that chapter we examine simulations using
reduced magnitudes for the elasticities of variable inputs
with respect to the fixed input.
Simulations and Duality
The last simulation we report demonstrates the dual
nature of price and quantity subsidies and supports the
flipping back and forth between restricted and unrestricted
specifications in implermienting the simulation model. For
each quantity subsidy government can make, there is a
corresponding price subsidy that yields the firm the same
benefits and generates the same deadweight loss. For this
example, we focus on only one industry -- the Food group.
Table 18 shows the specifications of elasticities for both
an unrestricted and a restricted cost function for a firm
receiving either price or quantity subsidies for capital
when land and labor are the other two inputs.
Using prices for land and labor that reflect those paid
by a typical firm, and choosing a firm with combined land
and labor costs of 100 million won, we find that initial
capital holdings are 6.7 units with a shadow value of 9.5
million won per unit which is, roughly, the cost of capital
for a typical firm that is paying the bank rate for credit.
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Using the restricted technology, offering the firm 1.1
additional units of capital reduces labor and land costs by
10 million won as the firm contracts its usage of those
factors. The subsidized shadow price for land concomitantly
drops to 7.98 million won per unit.
Using the unrestricted specification of the technology
we find that a subsidized price for capital of 7.98 million
won per units yields the firm 10.56 million won on 163
million won of total land, labor, and capital costs. Of
these benefits, .13 million result from lower capital costs
and 10.43 from lower land and labor costs.
The difference between the 10 million and 10.43 million
won benefits in the two simulations arises from two sources.
First, the computations of elasticities were rounded, so the
restricted and unrestricted elasticities do not correspond
exactly. Second, the translog functional forms for the
unrestricted and restricted cost functions are not duals to
one another; consequently, the cost structures will not, in
general, coincide exactly over any finite range, even if
their implicit elasticities match up properly at some point,
as here. However, a discrepancy of four percent between the
specifications in this case suggest that moving back and
forth between the restricted and unrestricted forms is
tolerable as long as one makes the adjustments to
elasticities described in the theoretical section above.
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APPENDIX D
Fortran Simulation Code and Program Documentation
The Fortran simulation program developed for this
research can be used in either interactive or batch mode.
However, the program was designed especially for interactive
use so the batch input mode requires input records that
correspond to what would be called for by the program in the
interactive mode. The inputs will depend on which options
offered by the program the user wishes to use.
The program begins by prompting the user for the number
of variable inputs and the number of fixed inputs. The
maximum permitted for the former is 5, for the latter 2.
These numbers are entered as zero followed by the number of
variable inputs, immediately followed by zero and the number
of fixed inputs.
The second prompt asks the user to input the initial
quantity of output, and reminds the user that unless
otherwise directed, the user is to input all information
with a decimal point.
The program next prompts the user for the factor prices
and factor shares of the variable inputs, the quantity and
social price of the fixed input, and initial total variable
costs. Thereafter the user is asked to input the
elasticity of substitution for each variable input pair and
the elasticity of each variable input demand with respect to
each fixed input.
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At this point, the program calculates the parameters of
the translog restricted cost function and starts an
iterative loop in which the user can conduct simulations
using the initial or alternative technologies.
The loop begins by asking the user whether a simulation
is to be conducted under the initial conditions or altered
conditions, or if the user is finished. If the user wants
to alter the initial conditions, there is an option for
complete reentry of initial conditions and another for only
partial alterations in the initial conditions.
If a simulation is desired, the user is offered three
options for setting the benefits to be received by the firm
from the subsidy scheme. First, the benefits may be
declared by the users. Second, the user can permit the
benefits to be determined by providing the program with a
specific subsidy scheme for analysis; such a subsidy scheme
can alter any number of variable input prices or fixed input
quantities. Third, the user can select the benefit level
used in the immediately preceding simulation if the current
simulation is not the first.
If the user chooses to declare the benefit level
directly, the program asks the user which one variable input
price or fixed input quantity is to be altered to yield the
benefits. If the user chooses to provide a subsidy scheme
that implicitly determines benefits, the program asks the
user to input the subsidized levels of variable input prices
and fixed input quantities.
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At this point, the program calculates benefits of
subsidy levels, subsidized factor uses and shadow prices,
deadweight losses, and a variety of measures of possible
interest to the analyst. These outputs are then written out
by the program.
Next, the program returns to the top of the loop by
querying the user whether or not another simulation is
desired.
The inputs to the program are read from logic file
number 5. The prompts are written on logical unit 6. The
program output is written on logical unit 4. By
anticipating what input the program will ask for, and in
what order, the user can use cards or card images on a disk
or tape to input the needed data in batch mode; the data
will be read from logical file5. In interactive mode, the
console output file should be assigned logical file 5.
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C
C LOCATION POLICY SIMULATION MODEL
C SEPTEMBER 1983
C STORED AS MPM FORTRAN IN PHZIA ACCOUNT
C BACKUP IN FTN M
C AS OF 21:50 11/04/83
C DEBUG M CONTAINS DEBUGGING ROUTINES
C
COMMON/QUANT/Q
JSTRNM=O
888 JSTRNM=JSTRNM+1
CALL VARNUM(JSTRNM,NV,NF)
CALL INIT
CALL INPUT(NV,NF)
CALL SETPAR(NV,NF)
C CALL CHECK(NV,NF)
CALL BSCVAL(NV,NF)
CALL WRBSVL(NV,NF)
DO 100 ISMNM=1,100
CALL SMSTR(LPTION,ISMNM,JSTRNM,NV,NF)
IF(LPTION.EQ.O)GO TO 999
IF(LPTION.EQ.2)GO TO 888
WRITE(4,7)ISMNM,JSTRNM
7 FORMAT(1H /,/,/,/,lH ,' SIMULATION NUMBER',13,1X,
1 ' COST STRUCTURE NUMBER',I3)
CALL TOL
CALL BENSET(ISMNM,NV,NF,JNEGSH)
IF(JNEGSH.EQ.1)GO TO 99
CALL DWLC(NV,NF)
CALL PQCHGS(ISMNM,NV,NF)
C CALL CHECK2
99 CONTINUE
100 CONTINUE
999 CONTINUE
STOP
END
SUBROUTINE VARNUM(J,NV,NF)
WRITE(4,3)J
3 FORMAT(1H /,/,/,/,IH
1 J COST STRUCTURE NUMBER',I3,1X,'FOLLOWS.')
WRITE(6, 1)
1 FORMAT(1H J/,/,/,/,/1H ,'INPUT NUMBER OF VARIABLE INPUTS AS "O#"",
1 /,1H ,-INPUT NUMBER OF FIXED INPUTS AS 'o#"',/,
2 1H ,'MAX OF FORMER IS 05 , OF LATTER 02')
READ(5.2) NV,NF
2 FORMAT(2I2)
RETURN
END
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SUBROUTINE SMSTR(LPTION,I,J,NV,NF)
WRITE (6,5)1 ,J
5 FORMAT(1H ,/,lH ' IF YOU WANT TO CONDUCT SIMULATION NUMBER',
1 13,/,1H , FOR COST STRUCTURE NUMBER',13,/,1H ,
2 ' TYPE 1',/,1H ,
3 ' IF YOU ARE FINISHED',/,lH ,
4 ' TYPE 0',/,1H ,
5 ' IF YOU WANT TO FULLY RESPECIFY THE COST STRUCTURE,',/,1H
6 ' TYPE 2',/,1H ,
7 ' IF YOU TO ALTER THE COST STRUCTURE OR WANT-,/,
a I1 ,' ANOTHER SET OF PRICES OR QUANTITIES',/,
9 ' TYPE 3')
READ (5,6)LPTION
6 FORMAT(I1)
IF(LPTION.EQ.3)CALL NWVAR(NV,NF)
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE NWVAR(NV,NF)
COMMON /QUANT/Q
COMMON/PSNQS/PV(5) ,PF(2) ,SHR<5) ,XF(2),BFFO(3),FQO(2),HO(2) ,ZQ
WRITE ( 6, 31)
31 FORMAT(lHO,/,/,lH -'IF YOU WANT A NEW QUANTITY OF OUTPUT',
i /,1H ,' TYPE 1 ;OTHERWISE TYPE ZERO')
READ (5, 32) INDEX
32 FORMAT( 1)
IF(INDEX.EQ.O)GO TO 50
WRITE(6, 33)1
33 FORMAT(IHO,/,1H ,'TYPE NEW QUANTITY OF OUTPUT',I2)
READ(5,34)Q
34 FORMAT(F12o3)
50 CONTINUE
WRITE (6,20)
20 FORMAT(l1H0,'IF YOU WANT TO CHANGE SOME VARIABLE PRICE, TYPE 1;',
1 /,1H ,'OTHERWISE, TYPE.O')
READ (5,2) INDEX
IF(INDEX.NE.1)GO TO 101
DO 100 I=1,NV
WRITE(6,I1) I
I FORMAT(lHO,/,/,1H ,'IF YOU WANT A NEW PRICE FOR VARIABLE INPUT',
1 I2,' TYPE 1 ;OTHERWISE TYPE ZERO')
READ (5,2) INDEX
2 FORMAT(I1)
IF(INDEXcEQeO)GO TO 100
WRITE(6,3) I
3 FORMAT<lHO,/,lH ,'TYPE NEW PRICE FOR VARIABLE INPUT',12)
READ(5,4)PV(I)
4 FORMAT(F12.3)
100 CONTINUE
101 CONTINUE
IF(NF.LT.1)GO TO 301
WRITE( 6, 21)
21 FORMAT(lHO,'IF YOU WANT TO CHANGE SOME FIXED QUANTITY, TYPE 1;',
1 /,1H ,'OTHERWISE, TYPE 0')
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READ(5,2) INDEX
IF(INDEX.NE.1)GO TO 201
DO 200 I=1,NF
WRITE(6,5)1
5 FORMAT(1HO,/,/,1H ,'IF YOU WANT A NEW QUANTITY FOR FIXED INPUT',
1 12,' TYPE 1 ;OTHERWISE TYPE ZERO')
READ(5,6)INDEX
6 FORMAT(I1)
IF(INDEX.EQ.O)GO TO 200
WRITE(6,7)I
7 FORMAT(1HO,/,1H 'TYPE NEW QUANTITY FOR FIXED INPUT',I2)
READ(5,8)XF(I)
8 FORMAT(F12.3)
200 CONTINUE
201 CONTINUE
WRITE(6,22)
22 FORMAT(1HO,'IF YOU WANT TO CHANGE SOME FIXED INPUT PRICE, TYPE 1:'1 /,1H ,'OTHERWISE, TYPE 0')
READ(5,2)INDEX
IF(INDEX.NE.1)GO TO 301
DO 300 I=1,NF
WRITE(6,9)I
9 FORMAT(1HO,/,/,1H ,'IF YOU WANT A NEW PRICE FOR FIXED INPUT',
1 12,' TYPE 1 ;OTHERWISE TYPE ZERO')
READ(5,12)INDEX
12 FORMAT(I1)
IF(INDEX.EQ4O)GO TO 300
WRITE(6,13)I
13 FORMAT(1HO,/,lH ,'TYPE NEW PRICE FOR FIXED INPUT',I2)
READ(5,14.)PF(1)
14 FORMAT(F12.3)
300 CONTINUE
301 CONTINUE
WRITE(4,15)
15 FORMAT(/,/,/,1H 
, '
1 /,/,1H ,' NEW ECONOMIC VARIABLES',/,1H
2 AND/OR COST STRUCTURE.O,/,/,
3 1H ,' FOLLOWING HOLD UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE',4 /,/,IH p'********************************************* )CALL BSCVAL (NV, NF)
CALL WRBSVL(NV,NF)
WRITE(6,30)
30 FORMAT(1H),/,1H ,'IF YOU WANT SOME CHANGE IN TECHNOLOGY, TYPE 1:',
1 /,1H ,'OTHERWISE TYPE 0')
READ (5,32) INDEX
IF(INDEX.EQ.1)C!.ALL TECSET(NV,NF)
RETURN
END
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SUBROUTINE INIT
COMMON/BEN/BNFTS
COMMON/QUANT/Q
COMMON/PSNQS/PV(5),PF(2),SHR(5),XF(2),BFFO(3),FQO(2),HO(2),ZQ
COMMON/ELASS/ESOREL(5,5),ELASVV(5,5),ELASVF(5,2)
COMMON/CS/BASE,A(5),H(2),AVV(5,5),GVF(5,2),BFF(2,2),TVQ(5),THFQ(2)
,SMSHEL(2)
COMMON/BSVL/BY(5),BW(2),BCOST,SCOST,BFXCST
COMMON/SUBPQS/SUBPV(5),SUBXF(2),SW(2),SY(5)
Q=0.0
BNFTS=0.0
BCOST=0.0
BFXCST=0 0
DO 100 1=1,5
BY(I)=OO
5Y(I)=O.O
SUBPV(I)=O.O
PV(I) =0.O
SHR(I)=O.O
TVO(I)=O.O
AUI OaO
DO 10 J=1,5
ESOREL(I,J)=OO
ELASVV(ISJ)=O.O
AVV(I,J)=O.O
10 CONTINUE
DO 20 J=1,2
GVF(I ,J)=O.O
ELASVF(I,J)=OO
20 CONTINUE
100 CONTINUE
DO 200 1=1,3
BFFO(I)=OO
200 CONTINUE
DO 300 1=1,2
XF(I)=OO
PF(I)=O=.
FQO(I)=OsO
THFQ(I)=OO
BW(X)=O.O
SW ( I) = 0.
SUBXF (I) =0.0
H(I)=OO
HO(I) =O.O
DO 45 J=1,2
BFF(I,J)=O.O
45 CONTINUE
300 CONTINU'E
RETURM
END
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SUBROUTINE INPUT(NV,NF)
COMMON /QUANT/O
COMMON/PSNQS/PV(5) ,PF(2) ,SHR(5) ,XF(2) ,BFFO(3) ,FQO(2) ,HO(2) ,ZQ
COMMON/ELASS/ESOREL(5,5),ELASVV(5,5) ,ELASV". ,5,2)
COMMON/CS/BASE,A(5),H(2),AVV(5,5),GVF(5,2), 3FF(2,2),TVQ(5),THFQ(2)
1 ,SMSHEL(2)
WRITE(6,2)
2 FORMAT(/,/o1H ,'INPUT QUANTITY. USE DECIMAL POINTS IN ALL INPUTS')
READ(5, 3)0
3 FORMAT(F12.2)
WRITE(4, 2)
WRITE (4,33)0
33 FORMAT(1H ,F12.2)
DO 100 I=1,NV
WRITE(6,31) I
31 FORMAT(lHO,'INPUT PRICE OF VARIABLE INPUT',3X,12)
READ(5,4)PV(I)
WRITE (6,32)1
32 FORMAT(1lHO,'INPUT SHARE OF VARIABLE INPUT',3X,12)
READ(5,4)SHR(I)
4 FORMAT(F12.2)
WRITE(4,31) I
WRITE(4,44)PV(I)
WRITE(4,32) I
WRITE (4,44)SHR (I)
44 FORMAT(1H ,F12.2)
100 CONTINUE
WRITE(6, 16)
16 FORMAT(IHO,'INPUT BASE COST LEVEL')
READ(5, 4) BASE
WRITE(4,16)
WRITE(4,44) BASE
IF(NF.EO.O)GO TO 201
DO 200 I=1,NF
WRITE (6,5)1
5 FORMAT(IHOJ,'INPUT QUANTITY OF FIXED INPUT',3X,12)
READ(5, 4)XF(I)
C WRITE(6,6)I
C 6 FORMAT(IHO,'INPUT BFFO, OWN SQUARE COEFF, FOR FIXED INPUTT',3X,12)
C READ(5,4)BFFO(I)
C IF(I.LT.2)GO TO 69
C WRITE(6,66)
C 66 FORMAT(IHO,'INPUT CROSS BFFO FOR FIXED INPU.TS',3X,12)
C READ(5,4)BFFO(3)
69 CONTINUE
WRITE C6, 666) I
666 FORMAT(IHO,'INPUT SOCIAL PRICE OF FIXED INPUT',3X,I2)
READ(5,4)PF(I)
WRITE (4,5)1
WRITE(4,44)XF(I)
WRITE (4,666)I
WRITE(4,44)PF(I)
C WRITE(4,6)I
C WRITE(4,44)BFFO(I)
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C IF(I.LT.2)GO TO 70
C WRITE(4,66)
C WRITE(4,44)BFFO(3)
70 CONTINUE
200 CONTINUE
201 CONTINUE
NVM1=NV-1
DO 300 I=1,NVM1
II=I
IP1=I+.
IF(IP1.GT.NV)GO TO 400
DO 300 J=IP1,NV
JJ=J
WRITE(6 ,9)I,J
9 FORMAT(1HO,'INPUT ELAS. OF SUBST. FOR VARIABLE INPUTS',
1 lX, 12,X, ' AND' lX, I2,1X)
READ(5,4)ELASVV(I,J)
ELASVV(J, I) =ELASVV( I J)
WRITE(4,9) I,J
WRITE(4,44)ELASVV(I,J)
300 CONTINUE
400 CONTINUE
IF(NF.EQ.0)GO TO 501
DO 500 I=1,NV
DO 500 J=1,NF
WRITE(6, 10)I, J
10 FORMAT(lHO,'INPUT ELAS. OF VARIABLE INPUT',1X,I2,1X,
1 'WITH RESPECT TO FIXED INPUT',1X,I2)
READ(5,4)ELASVF(I,J)
WRITE(4, 10)I,J
WRITE (4,44)ELASVF(I ,J)
500 CONTINUE
501 CONTINUE
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE SETPAR (NV, NF)
COMMON/QUANT/Q
COMIMON/PSNQS/PV(5) ,PF(2) ,SHR(5) ,XF(2) ,BFFO(3) ,FQO(2) ,HO(2) ,Za
COMMON/ELASS/ESOREL(5,5) ,ELASVV(5,5),ELASVF(5,2)
COMMON/CS/BASE,A(5),H(2),AVV(5,5),GVF(5,2),BFF(2,2),TVQ(5),THFQ(2)
1 P SMSHEL(2)
C* *****************^***************************.********,**#***** ***
C SET AVV FOR I NE J
C* *** **e* **'*~*,"********g*d*w***************P***
NVM1=NV-1
DO 100 I=1,NVM1
IP1=I+1
DO 100 J=IP1,NV
AVV(I,J)=ELASVV(I,J)* (SHR(I)*SHR(J))-SHR(I)*SHR(J)
AVV(J,I)= AVV5IJ)
100 CONTINUE
IF(NF.EQ.O)GO TO 281
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** * *4*4** ** * *** * **** * * ** ** * *** ** * ** ***4** * * **4*4* **4*4***4*4***** * * *4** 4
C SET GVF USING INITIAL SHADOW SHARES
NVM1=NV-1
DO 250 J=1,NF
SUMGVF=O.
SMSHEL(J) =O.
DO 150 K=1,NV
SMSHEL(J)=SMSHEL(J) + SHR(K)*ELASVF(K,J)
150 CONTINUE
DO 200 I=1,NVM1
GVF(I,J)=SHR(I)*ELASVF(I,J)-SMSHEL(J)*SHR(I)
SUMGVF=SUMGVF GVF (I, J)
200 CONTINUE
GVF(NV,J) =-SUMGVF
BFF(J,J) =- (SMSHEL(J) **2)
250 CONTINUE
C~ *4***4**4**4**4*4*4*4**4*4"*4**4*4*4** *4**4*4**4*4**4**4**4*4***4*44***4**4*4***4*4*4**4*4**4**4*
C SET TVQ
C * *4*4*4*4*4*4*****4*4*4*4**4* 4*4*4*4*4*4* '*4**4**4*4**4*4*4**4*4*4*4*4*4**4* *********4*4**4**4*4**4*
DO 280 I=1,NVM1
SMGVFF=0 .0
DO 275 J=1,NF
SMGVFF=SMGVFF.GVF (I ,J)
275 CONTINUE
TVQ(I) =-SMGVFF
280 CONTINUE
281 CONTINUE
SUMTVQ=0. 0
DO 290 I=1,NVM1
290 SUMTVQ=SUMTVQ+ TVQ (I)
TVQ(NV)=-SUMTVQ
C SET AVV FOR I=J
C *4*4**4*4*4*4*"***4*4*4*4*4*"*******************4*****
DO 400 I=1,NV
SUMAVV=O
DO 300 J=1,NV
IF(J.NE.I)SUMAVV=SUMAVV+AVV(I,J)
300 CONTINUE
AVV(I,I)=-SUMAVV
400 CONTINUE
4** **** 4*4*00000*000*****4***4*4**4**4**4******4**4**4*4*****4*************4
C SET A(V)
C~*~ *44444444444 *4***4********44444*******4***4***y*,,,*****4***44444444444*****
DO 500 I=1,NV
SUMVVP=O
SUMVFX=O
DO 450 J=1,NV
450 SUMVVP=SUMVVP.AVV(I,J)*LOG(PV(J))
IF(NF.EQ.O)GO TO 476
DO 475 K=1,NF
SUMVFX=SUMVFX+GVF(I,1)*LOG(XF(K))
475 CONTINUE
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476 CONTINUE
A(I)=( SHR(I)-SUMVVP -SUMVFX ) - LOG(Q)*TVQ(I)
500 CONTINUE
IF(NF.EQ.O)GO TO 4501
C * **.**OO**0******0000***w**********P****************00000000000**P**
C SET BFF
DO 3000 I=1,NF
IF(I.EQ.1)GO TO 1000
BFF(1,2) O
BFF (2, 1) =0
C BFF(2,2)=BFFO(2)
C GO TO 2000
1000 CONTINUE
C BFF(1,1)=BFF0(1)
C2000 CONTINUE
3000 CONTINUE
CoOo ****0******OX*******O********0***^**¢7P**§********O***0********0**
C SET THFO
DO 4000 I=1,NF
SUMBFF=0. 0
DO 3500 J=1,NF
SUMBFF=SUMBFF+BFF (I ,J)
3500 CONTINUE
THFQ (I) =-S.UMBFF
4000 CONTINUE
C* * *****o*o*o0********^*ooo.******o*0o*********o*******************o*
C SET H(F)
DO 4500 I=1,NF
SMGVF=O.
SMBFF=O.
DO 4100 J=I,NV
SMGVF=SMGVF+GVF(J,I)*LOG(PV(J))
4100 CONTINUE
DO 4200 J=1,NF
SMBFF=SMBFF+BFF (I,J) *LOG (XF (J))
4200 CONTINUE
H (I) =SMSHEL (I) -SMBFF-SMGVF-THFQ (I) oLOG (Q)
4500 CONTINUE
4501 CONTINUE
C SET ZO ( COEFFICIENT OF LOG(O) )
SUMH=0.
IF(NF.1LT.1)GO TO 4506
DO 4505 I=1,NF
SUMH=SUMHHH (I)
4505 CONTINUE
4506 CONTINUE
ZQ= 1-SUMH
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C SET BASE (CONSTANT TERM)
SV=O.
SF=O.
SVV =O.
SVF=O.
SFF=O.
SVQ=O0
SFQ=O.
DO 5000 1=1,NV
SV=SV+A(I)*LOG(PV(I))
SVQ=SVQ.TVQ(I)*LOG(Q) *LOG(PV(I))
DO 4600 J=1,NV
SVV=SVVY.5*AVV(I,J)*LOG(PV(I))*LOG(PV(J))
4600 CONTINUE
IF(NF.EQ.O)GO TO 4701
DO 4700 K=1,NF
SVF=SVF+GVF(I,K)*LOG(PV(I))wLOG(XF(K))
IF(I.GT.1)GO TO 4700
SFQ=SFQ+THFQ(K)*LOG(XF(K) )*LOG(Q)
SF=SF+H ( K) *LOG ( XF ( K) )
DO 4650 L=1,NF
SFF-SFF+.5*BFF(K,L)*LOG(XF(K))*LOG(XF(L))
4650 CONTINUE
4700 CONTINUE
4701 CONTINUE
5000 CONTINUE
BASE=LOG(BASE) -SV-SF-SVV-SVF-SFF-SVO-SFQ-ZQ*LOG(Q)
CALL TECH
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE BSCVAL(NV,NF)
COMMON/QUANT/Q
COMMON/PSNQS/PV(5) ,PF(2) ,SHR(5) ,XF(2) ,BFFO(3) ,FQO(2) ,HO(2) ,ZQ
COMMON/CS/BASE,A(5) ,H(2) ,AVV(5,5) ,GVF(5,2) ,BFF(2,2) ,TVQ(5) ,THFQ(2)
1 ,SMSHEL(2)
COMMON/BSVL/BY(5),BW(2) ,BCOST,SCOST, BFXCST
C* ** ****.* **************** .******* ********~* m***.*. *****F***.* ** ** F*
C CHECK FOR A GIFFEN GOOD
ICALL=-1
IG=O
CALL GIFCHK(NV,NF,ICAL.L,IG,SUBPVL,SUBPVH)
IF(IG.EQ.O)GO TO 1
IF (IG .EQ s1)RETURN
WRITE(4,2)
2 FORMAT(1H -'BASIC VALUES INCLUDE MULTIPLE GIFFEN EFFECTS')
***** ** ****w * ***** if *if i if f ifif i if f i if f ifif i if f ifif i if f ifif * ** i if f ifif
C INITIALIZE
1 -BFXCST=O 0O
SUMLV1=0.0
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SUMLF1=0. 0
SUM 1=O.O
SUM2=0. 0
SUM3=0.0
SUM4=0. O
SUM5=0. 0
C *oo*o*.o*oo*oo***o**oo*oooo*****o***owoo***o************
C ACCUMULATE PARTS OF COST FUNCTION
DO 2O0 I=1,NV
SUMLV1=SUMLV1+A(I)*LOG(PV(I))
DO 100 J=1,NV
100 SUMI=SUM1+ .5*AVV(I,J)*LOG(PV(I) )oLOG(PV(J))
IF(NF.EQ.O)GO TO 151
DO 150 K=1,NF
SUM2=SUM2+GVF(I,K)*LOG(PV(I) )*LOG(XF(K))
150 CONTINUE
151 CONTINUE
SUM3=SUM3-TVQ(I)oLOG(PV(I))*LOG(Q)
200 CONTINUE
IF(NF.EQ.O)GO TO 401
DO 400 I=1,NF
SUMLF1=SUMLF14H(I)*LOG(XF(I))
DO 300 J=1,NF
300 SUM4=SUM4+.5*BFF(I,J)oLOG(XF(I))*LOG(XF(J))
SUM5=SUM5+THFQ(I)oLOG(XF(I))*LOG(Qt
400 CONTINUE
401 CONTINUE
C *0* 0000****ww*********w***************00000000000000*oo*oooooo*oooo
C COMPUTE LOG COST & COST
c * * ***************0000*******0**000************************^*****000*^
BLGCST=SUM1+SUM2+SUM3+SUM4+SUM5+SUMLV1+SUMLF1.+BASE+ZQ*LOG(Q)
BCOST=EXP (BLGCST)
Co*0 ********** **~**000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ***** ** *
C COMPUTE VARIABLE INPUT DEMANDS
DO 700 I=1,NV
SsUMl=OeO
SSUM2=0. 0
DO 500 J=1,NV
500 SSUM1=SSUM1..AVVCI,J)*LOG(PV(J))
IF(NF.EQ.O)GO TO 601
DO 600 K=1,NF
SSUM2=SSUM2+GVF(I,K)*LOG(XF(K))
600 CONTINUE
601 CONTINUE
BY(I)=(BCOST/PV(I))*(A(I) *SSUM1+SSUM2+TV. (I)oLOG(Q))
700 CONTINUE
IF(NF.EQ.0)GO TO 1101
Coo.*****0*0***w***v*O*******************~**Q*******0*P*******w**s7**~* 00
C COMPUTE FIXED INPUT SHADOW PRICES
DO 1000 I=1,NF
SSSUM1=O.O
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SSSUM2=0.0
DO 800 J=1,NV
800 SSSUMI=SSSUMI+GVF(J,I)*LOG(PV(J))
DO 900 K=1,NF
900 SSSUM2=SSSUM2+BFF(I,K)*LOG(XF(K))
BW(I)=-1.*(BCOST/XF(I))*(H(I)-9SSSUM1+SSSUM2+THFO(I)*LOG(Q))
1000 CONTINUE
C.***.***********~*******~**************"***********,e***********"***
C COMPUTE FIXED COST AT SOCIAL PRICES
C ****^********.*******w***************0********F****'***************
DO 1100 I=1,NF
BFXCST=PF(I)*XF(I)+BFXCST
1100 CONTINUE
1101 CONTINUE
RETURN
END
STJBROUTINE WRBSVL(NV,NF)
COMMON/QUANT/Q
COMMON/PSNOS/PV(5),PF(2),SHR(5),XF(2),BFFO(3),FQO(2),HO(2),ZQ
COMMON/BSVL/BY(5),BW(2),BCOST,SCOST,BFXCST
WRITE(4,1)Q,BCOST
1 FORMAT(/,IH ,'FIRM OUTPUT=',F12.3,/1H ,'INITIAL COST=',F11.3)
DO 100 I=1,NV
WRITE(4,2)I,BY(I)
2 FORMAT(1H ,/,/,1H 'INITIAL DEMAND FOR VARIABLE INPUT',
1 12,2X,'=',F12.3)
WRITE(4,4)I,PV(I)
4 FORMAT(1H ,'INITIAL PRICE FOR VARIABLE INPUT',I2,2X,'=',F12.3)
100 CONTINUE
IF(NF.EQ.O)GO TO 201
DO 200 J=1,NF
WRITE(4,3)J,BW(J)
3 FORMAT(1H /1H ,'INITIAL SHADOW VALUE OF FIXED INPUT',12,2X,'=',
1 F12.3)
WRITE(4,5)J,XF(J)
5 FORMAT(1H -'INITIAL QUANTITY FOR FIXED INPUT',I2,2X,-=',Fi2.3)
WRITE(4,6)J,PF(J)
6 FORMAT(1H ,'INITIAL SOCIAL PRICE FOR FIXED INPUT',I2,2X,-=',F12.3
200 CONTINUE
201 CONTINUE
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE TOL
COMMON/TOLI/TOLER
TOLER=.0001
C WRITE(6,1)
1 FORMAT(lHO,/,/,1H ,'DO YOU WANT THE DEFAULT TOLERANCE THAT',/,
1 1H ,'YIELDS BENEFITS WITHIN 1/2 PERCENT OF',/,
2 1H ,'BENEFITS SPECIFIED FOR SIMULATION?',/,
3 1H 'IIF YES, TYPE 1; OTHERWISE TYPE 0.')
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C READ(5,2) J
2 FORMAT(I1)
C IF(J.EQ.1)GO TO 100
C WRITE(6,3)
3 FORMAT(/,1H ,'ENTER THE DESIRED TOLERANCE AS A DECIMAL FRACTION',
1 /,1H ,'EG., .005 IS THE DEFAULT LEVEL YOU HAVE REJECTED')
C READ(5,4)TOLER
C4 FORMAT(F6I.3)
C TOLERP=100*TOLER
C100 WRITE(4,5)TOLERP
5 FORMAT(1H ,/,/,1H ,'ESTIMATES OF BENEFITS WILL BE WITHIN ',F4.2,
1 2X,'PERCENT OF SPECIFIED BENEFIT LEVEL')
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE BENSET(NUM,NV,NF,JNEGSH)
COMMON/BEN/BNFTS
IF(NUM.GT.1)WRITE(6,10)
10 FORMAT(IHO,/,1H ,'IF YOU WANT SAME BENEFITS AS LAST',/,1H
1 'SIMULATION FOR THIS COST STUCTURE',/,1 F
2 'TYPE 1')
WRITE(6, 11)
11 FORMAT(1H ,'IF YOU WANT TO SET A NEW BENEFIT LEVEL',/,1H
1 'TYPE 2')
WRITE (6,12)
12 FORMAT(1H o'IF YOU WANT BENEFIT LEVEL SET BY THE. SCHEME',/,1H
I 'TYPE 3')
READ(5, 13)LPTBEN
13 FORMAT(1)
IF(LPTBEN.NEI.2)GO TO 3
WRITE(6, 14)
14 FORMAT(1H ,/,1H ,'INPUT LEVEL OF BENEFITS')
READ(5, 15)BNFTS
15 FORMAT (F12.2)
3 IF(LPTBEN.NE.3)WRITE(4,16)BNFTS,NUM
16 FORMAT(1H ,/,/,1H ,J BENEFITS=',F12.2,2X,'IN SCHEME',I3)
C CALL CHECK2
JNEGSH=O
IF(LPTBEN.NEI.3)CALL BINSR(NV,NF,JNEGSH)
IF(LPTBEN.EQ.3)CALL SUBBEN(NUM,NV,NF)
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE BINSR (NV,NF,JNEGSH)
COMMON/SUBIND/JSUBV, JSUBF
COMMON/BEN/BNFTS
COMMON/QUANT/Q
COMMON/TOL1 /TOLER
COMMON/PSNQS/PV(5) ,PF(2) ,SHR(5) ,XF(2) ,BFFO(3) ,FQO(2) ,HO(2) ,ZQ
COMMON/CS/BASE,A(5) ,H(2) ,AVV(5,5) ,GVF(5,2) ,BFF(2,2) ,TVQ(5) ,THF'Q(2)
1 ,SMSHEL(2)
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COMMON/BSVL/BY(5),BW(2),BCOST,SCOST,BFXCST
COMMON/SUBPQS/SUBPV(5),SUBXF(2),SW(2),SY(5)
JSUBF=O
WRITE(6,1)
1 FORMAT(UHO,'TYPE INTEGER OF VARIABLE INPUT TO SUBSIDIZE.',/,1H ,
1 'IF SUBSIDIZING FIXED INPUT, TYPE 0')
READ(5,2)JSUBV
2 FORMAT(I1)
IF(JSUBV.GT.O)WRITE(4,3)JSUBV
3 FORMAT(1H ,/IH ,'SCHEME SUBSIDIZES VARIABLE INPUT',I2)
IF(JSUBV.GT.O)GO TO 10
WRITE(6,4)
4 FORMAT(1HO,'TYPE INTEGER OF FIXED INPUT TO SUBSIDIZE')
READ(5,2)JSUBF
WRITE(4,5)JSUBF
5 FORMAT(1I ,/1H ,'SCHEME SUBSIDIZES FIXED INPUT',I2)
IF(BW(JSUBF).GT.O)GO TO 10
WRITE(6,7)JSUBF
WRITE(4,,7)JSUBF
7 FORMAT(lHO,J,IH ,'FIXED INPUT',I2,2X,'HAS A NEGATIVE SHADOW',
1 ' PRICE; INCREMENTS YIELD NO BENEFITS')
JNEGSH=1
RETURN
10 CONTINUE
C SET INITIAL BOUNDS FOR SUBSIDIZED PRICE
C OF VARIABLE INPUT
C ***"** **w*** * ******** ***** ***w* **** *********** ***F* ~** *9* **** * ***** ** *
DO 20 I=1,NV
20 SUBPV(I)=PV(I)
IF(NF.EQ.O)GO TO 31
DO 30 J=-,NF
SUBXF(J)=XF(J)
30 CONTINUE
31 CONTINUE
IQUERY=O
IF(JSUBF.GT.O)GO TO 90
SUBPVL=PV(JSUBV)-BNFTS/BY(JSUBV)
SUBPVH=PV (JSUBV)
IF(SUBPVL.GT.O)GO TO 98
C CHECK IF BENEFITS POTENTIALLY TOO BIG FOR
C THIS VARIABLE INPUT
*  w ****t******************* **** ******** *
SUBPVL= .0001
SUBPV(JSUBV)=.l*SUBPVL+.9*SUBPVH
ICALL=JSUBV
CALL GIFCHK(NV,NF,ICALL,IG,SUBPVL,SUBPVH)
IF(IG.EQ.E1)RETURN
IQUERY=1
GO TO 98
90 CONTINUE
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C SET INITIAL CONDITIONAL BOUNDS FOR SUBSIDIZED
C QUANTITY OF FIXED INPUT
XFMULT=10.
SUBXFL=XF(JSUBF)+BNFTS/BW(JSUBF)
SUBXFH=XF(JSUBF)+(BNFTS-XFMULT*BCOST)/BW(JSUBF)
C CHECK INITIAL UPPER BOUND ON SUBSIDIZED
C FIXED INPUT QUANTITY
C AND REVISE IF NECESSARY
C******4* * ***1 *PP**************e***** ********** **1******* ***w*Q*
XFMLTO=XFMULT
CALL HSBXFC(NV,NF,SUBXFH,JSUBF,XFMULT,JNEGSH)
IF(JNEGSH.EQ.1) RETURN
95 RATIO=XFMULT/XFMLTO
IF(RATIO.LT.5)GO TO 98
SUBXFH=XF(JSUBF)+(BNFTS+XFMULT*BCOST)/BW(JSUBF)
IF(JNEGSH.EQ.1)RETURN
CALL HSBXFC(NV,NF,SUBXFH,JSUBF,XFMULT,JNEGSH)
GO TO 95
C INITIALIZE VARIABLES FOR CHECKING
C INCREASINGNESS OF COST FUNCTION
C IN PRICES AND 1/(FIXED INPUTS)
l* * *******.**w*****w****~*P*******"***************§e*,******,**** *********v
98 ITER=O
SCOSTL=O.
PUP=o.
99 CONTINUE
ITER=ITER+1
IF(IQUERY.EQ.1 .AND.ITER.EQ.1)GO TO 100
Cr***.u** w**** *******************w*************i*****x***w************* **
C GUESS SUBSIDIZED PRICE OR QUANTITY
C AND CHECK FOR GIFFEN EFFECTS
c *.*.******^**....*.*..*. *.***.**.w**.****Z********.****w"**** **X***.
IF(JSUBV.EQ.0)GO TO 1234
SUBPV(JSUBV)= .5*(SUBPVH+SUBPVL)
ICALL=JSUBV
CALL GIFCHK(NV,NF,ICALL,IGDSUBPVL,SUBPVH)
IF(IG.EQ.1)RETURN
1234 IFCJSUBV.EQ.0)iSUBXF(JSUBF)=.5w(SUBXFH+SUBXFL)
C INITIALIZE PARTS OF COST FUNCTION
100 SUMLV1=0.0
SUMLF1=0.O
51114=0 .0
SUM2=0.0
SUM3=0.0
SUM4=0.0
SUM5=0.0
C * *P PR OF CS FUNCTION
C COM4PUTE PARTS OF COST FUNCTION
183
***** *********** *********^*** ****** *** ******** *********** ****** *** * * ****
DO 200 I=1,NV
SUMLV1=SUMLV1+A(I)*LOG(SUBPV (I))
DO 110 J=1,NV
SUM1=SUM1+.5*AVV(I,J)*LOG(SUBPV(I))*LOG(SUBPV(J))
110 CONTINUE
IF(NF.EQ.O)GO TO 151
DO 150 K=1,NF
SUM2=SUM2+GVF (I ,K) *LOG (SUBPV (I)) '*LOG (SUBXF (K))
150 CONTINUE
151 CONTINUE
SUM3=SUM3+TVQ(I)*LOG(SUBPV(I))*LOG(Q)
200 CONTINUE
IF(NF.EQ.O)GO TO 401
DO 400 I=1,NF
SUMLF1=SUMLF1 H (<I) LOG (SUBXF (I) )
DO 300 J=1,NF
300 SUM4=SUM4+.5*BFF(I,J)*LOG(SUBXF(I))*LOG(SUBXE'(J))
SUM5=SUM5i-THFQ(I)*LOG(SUBXF(I))*LOG(Q)
400 CONTINUE
401 CONTINUE
C COMPUTE LOG COST & COST
C AND ASSOCIATED BENEFIT LEVEL
C** ** ** ** ** * *** * * * **** * * *0** ** ** *** ** *** *** *0*** * ** **** * *** ** * *** *
SLGCST=SUM1+SUM2 SUM3 SUM4 SUM5+SUMLV1 SUMLF1+BASE+ZQ'LOG(Q)
SCOST=EXP (SLGCST)
BENGS = BCOST -SCOST
C CHECK INCREASINGNESS OF
C COST FUNCTION
IF(ITER.EQ.1.AND.BENGS. LT.O)WRITE(6,6)ITER
IF(ITER.EQ.1.AND.BENGS.LTc.O)WRITE(4,6) ITER
6 FORMAT(1H ,/1H -'COSTS RISE AS PRICES FALL OR INPUT CANNOT YIELD',
1' BENEFITS',/,1H -'JOB SKIPS SCHEME; ITER=',I8,
2 /,11H ,'TYPE 1 TO ACKNOWLEDGE PROBLEM')
IF(ITER..EQ. 1.AND.BENGS.LT.O)READ(5,83)KKK
83 FORMAT(I1)
IF(ITER.EQ.1 .AND.BENGS.LT.O)JNEGSH°=1
IF(ITER.EQ 11..AND.BENGS.LT.PO) RETURN
DISCR= (ABS (BENGS-BNFTS) ) /BNFTS
CHK= (SCOST-SCOSTL) *PUP
IF(ITER.GT.1.AND.CHK.LT.O)WRITE(6,6)ITER
IF(ITER.GT.1.AND..CHK.LT.O)WRITE(4,6)ITER
IF(ITER.GT.1.AND.CHK.LT.O)READ(5,83)KKK
IF(ITER.GTe.1AND.CHK.LT.O)JNEGSH=l
IF(ITER.GT.1 .AND.CHK.LT.O)RETURN
SCOSTL=SCOST
C** **0*0**00*0 * *0000000*000'000*00000* *P****0***00 *0*00000w0*00*00*00*0*
C CHECK BENEFIT GUESS FOR
C CLOSENESS TO NEEDED LEVEL
C i 0***S**** ***** *0***********S****** 0* ********* 0* **0* ** *0*************#**
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IF(DISCR.LT.TOLER)GO TO 499
IF(JSUBVUEQ.O)GO TO 425
C CHECK IF ZERO PRICE NOT
C ENOUGH TO YIELD NEEEDED LEVEL
C * ******* *******s***.*****.***w******w*****~***w********************* * *
II=o
IF(IQUERY.EQ.1.AND.SUBPV(JSUBV) .LT. .001)IIQ=l
IF(IIQ.EQ. I)WRITE(4,66)
IF(IIQ.EQ.e )WRITE(6,66)
IF(IlQ. EQ. 1) READ(5,83) KKK
IF (II Q.EQ. 1)JNEGSH=1
IF(IIQ.EQ. 1)RETURN
66 FORMAT(1H ,/1H -'ZERO PRICE NOT ENOUGH TC YIELD BENEFIT LEVEL',
1 /,1H -'SKIP TO NEXT SCHEME; TYPE 1 TO ACKNOWLEDGE PROBLEM')
C RESET BOUNDS ON
C SUBSIDIZED PRICE
C~*** * *4o**X**** ****s *******X*********************.,***************** * * *
IF (BENGS . GT .BNFTS)SUBPVL=SUBPV (JSUBV)
IF(BENGS.GT.BNFTS) PUP=1e
IF (BENGS .LE .BNFTS)SUBPVH=SUBPV (JSUBV)
IF(BENGS.LE.BNFTS)PUP=-1.
GO TO 99
425 CONTINUE
C RESET BOUNDS ON
C SUBSIDIZED QUANTITY
IF (BENGS LE . BNFTS) SUBXFL=SUBXF (JSUBF)
IF(BENGS.LEeBNFTS)PUP=-1.
IF (BENGS . GT BNFTS)SUBXFH=SUBXF (JSUBF)
IF(BENGS.GT.BNFTS)PUP=21 .0
GO TO 99
499 CONTINUE
CALL SUBOUT (NV,NF)
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE HSBXFC(NV,NF,SUBXFH,JSUBF,XFMULT,JNEGSH)
COMMON/BEN/BNFTS
COMMON /QUANT/O
COMMON/PSNQS/PV(5) ,PF(2) ,SHR(5) ,XF(2) ,BFFO(3) ,FQO(2) ,HO(2) ,ZQ
COMMON/CS/BASE,A(5) ,H(2) ,AVV(5,5) ,GVF(5,2) ,BFF(2,2) ,TVQ(5) ,THFQ(2)
1 SMSHEL(2)
COMMON/BSVL/BY (5) ,BW(2) ,BCOST,SCOST,rBFXCST
COMMON/SUBPQS/SUBPV(5),SUBXF<2),SW(2),SY(5)
COMMON/SSXFS/SSUBXF (2)
DO 10 I=1,NF
10 SSUBXF(I)=SUBXF(I)
SSUBXF (JSUBF) =SUBXFH
SUMLV1=O. 0
SUMLF1=0.0
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SUM1=0.0
SUM2=0.0
SUM3=0.0
SUM4=0.0
SUM5=0.0
SV=O .
SF=O.
DO 200 I=1,NV
SUMLV1=SUMLV1+A(I)*LOG(SUBPV(I))
SV=SViGVF(I,JSUBF)*LOG(SUBPV(I))
DO 100 J=1,NV
100 SUMI=SUM1+.5*AVV(I,J)*LOG(SUBPV(I))*LOG(SUBPV(J))
DO 150 K=1,NF
150 SUM2=SUM2+GVF(I,K)*LOG(SUBPV(I))*LOG(SSUBXF(K))
SUM3=SUM3*TVQ(I)*LOG(SUBPV(3.))*LOG(Q)
200 CONTINUE
DO 400 I=1,NF
SUMLF1=SUMLFI+H(I)*LOG(SSUBXF(I))
SF=SF+BFF(I,JSUBF)*LOG(SSUBXF(I))
DO 300 J=1,NF
300 SUM4=SUM4+.5*BFF(I,J)*LOG(SSUBXF(I))*LOG(SSUBXF(J))
SUM5=SUM5+THFQ(I)*LOG(SSUBXF(I))*LOG(Q)
400 CONTINUE
SLGCST=SUM1*SUM2+SUM3+SUM4+SUM5+SUMLV1+SUMLFI+BASE+ZQ*LOG ()
SCOST=EXP(SLGCST)
BENGS=BCOST-SCOST
IF(BENGS.GE.BNFTS)GO TO 500
XFMULT=10*XFMULT
SW(JSUBF)=-1.0O*(SCOST/SSUBXF(J5UBF))*(H(JSUBF)+SV+SF
1 +THFQ(JSUBF)*LOG(Q))
IF(SW(JSUBF).GT.O)GO TO 500
WRITE(4,1)JSUBF
I FORMAT(1H ,/,1H ,'FIXED INPUT',I2,' CANNOT YIELD ENOUGH BENEFITS')
JNEGSH=.
500 CONTINUE
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE SUBOUT(NV,NF)
COMMONOBEN/BNFTS
COMMON/QUANT/Q
COMMON/PSNQS/PV(5),PF(2),SHR(5),XF(2);BFF0(3),FQ0(2),H0(2),ZQ
COMMON/CS/BASE,A(5),H(2),AVV(5,5),GVF(5,2),BFF(2.2),TVQ(5),THFQ(2)
1SMSHEL(2)
COMMON/BSVL/BY(5),BW(2),BCOST,SCOST,BFXCST
COMMON/SUBPQS/SUBPV (5),SUBXF(2),SW(2),SY(5)
C*******M********************** ************e*** ****************F******1* **
C COMPUTE SUBSIDIZED DEMANDS
C* * * ** *** ** * *** * * * * **** * ** * ** ** * ** ** * *** * ** ***** * ** ** i f* if* if
DO 900 I=1,NV
SSUM1=0.0
SSUM2=0.0
DO 500 J=1,NV
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500 SSUMI=SSUMl-AVV(I,J)*LOG(SUBPV(J))
IF(NF.EQ.O)GO TO 601
DO 600 K=1,NF
SSUM2=SSUM2+GVF(I,K)*LOG(SUBXF(K))
600 CONTINUE
601 CONTINUE
SY(I)=(SCOST/SUBPV(I))*(A(I)-aSSUM1 +SSUM2+TVQ(I)*LOG(Q))
WRITE(4,602)IpSUBPV(I) ,SY(I)
602 FORMAT(1H ,/I ,'SUBSIDIZED PRICE FOR VARIABLE INPUT',I2,2X,'==,
1 F12.2,/,IH -'SUBSIDIZED QUANTITY OF THAT VARIABLE INPUT =',F12.3)
900 CONTINUE
IF(NF.EQ.O)GO TO 1001
C COMPUTE SUBSIDIZED SHADOW PRICES
DO 1000 I=1,NF
SSSUM1=0.0
SSSUM2=0.0
DO 800 J=1,NV
800 SSSUM1=SSSUM1+GVF(J,I)*LOG(SUBPV(J))
DO 950 K1p,NF
950 SSSUM2=SSSUM2+BFF(I,K) LOG(SUBXF(K))
sw I)=-l. (SCOST/SUBXF(I))*(H(I) SSSUMI w SSSUM2*THFQ(I)*LOG(Q))
WRITE(4,701)I,SW(I) ,SUBXF(I)
701 FORMAT(1H p/1IH p'SUBSIDIZED SHADOW PRICE OF FIXED INPUT',I2,2X,
1'=',F12D3,/,1H ,'SUBSIDIZED QUANTITY OF THAT FIXED INPUT =',FX2.e3)
1000 CONTINUE
1001 CONTINUE
C CHECK FOR UPWARD SLOPING
C FACTOR DEMANDS
C
C *** ** ¢ ***w*** *.* ** **** * * *** **** ******w**** f t t**************** * t t t f * f
DO 2000 I= 1,NV
SHTRM<( SUBPV(I)*SY(I)/SCOST)*( (SUBPV(I)*SY(I)/SCOST)-1)
CHQ=AVV(I, I) SHTRM
IF(CHQ.GT.O. )WRITE(4,2001)I
2001 FORMAT(1H ,/,-VARIABLE INPUT',I2,' IS GIFFEN')
2000 CONTINUE
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE SUBBEN (NUM ,NV, NF)
COMMON/SUBIND/JSUBV, JSUBF
COMMON/BEN/BNFTS
COMMON/QUANT/O
COMMON/PSNQS/PV(5) ,PF(2) ,SHR(5) ,XF(2) ,BFFO(3) ,FQO(2) ,HO(2) .ZQ
COMMON/CS/BASE,A(5) ,H(2) ,AVV(5,5) ,GVF(5,2) ,BFF(2,2) ,TVQ(5) ,THFQ(2)
1 ,SMSHEL(2)
COMMON/BSVL/BY(5) ,BW(2) ,BCOST,SCOST,BFXCST
COMMON/SUBPQS/SUBPV (5),SUBXF (2),SW (2) , SY (5)
COMMON/SSXFS/SSUBXF (2)
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JSUBV=O
JSUBF=O
C SET SUBSIDIZED PRICES AND
C QUANTITIES
C*** * * '*4* * ** *X*** * * ******* **X* * **X* ** ****** *** * * *** ** * ** * * * *
DO 10 I=1,NV
WRITE(6,1)l
1 FORMAT(lHO,/,lH 'IF VARIABLE INPUT',I2,2X,'IS TO BE SUBSIDIZED',
1 /,1H ,' TYPE 1; OTHERWISE TYPE 0')
READ(5,2)INDEX
2 FORMAT(I1)
IF(INDEX.EQ.0)SUBPV(I)=PV(I)
IF(INDEX.EQ.O)GO TO 10
JSUBV=l1
WRITE(6,3)I
3 FORMAT(lHO,/,lH ,'INPUT SUBSIDIZED PRICE FOR VARIABLE INPUT',I2)
READ(5,4)SUBPV(I)
4 FORMAT(F12.2)
10 CONTINUE
IF(NFdEQ.o)GO TO 21
DO 20 I=1,NF
WRITE(6,5)I
5 FORMAT(1HO,/,IH ,'IF FIXED INPUT',I2,2X,'IS TO BE SUBSIDIZED',
1 /,1H ,' TYPE 1; OTHERWISE TYPE 0')
READ(5,6)INDEX
6 FORMAT(I1)
IF(INDEX .EQ.O)SUBXF(I)=XF(I)
IF(INDEX.EQ.eO)GO TO 20
IF(I.EQ.1)JSUBF=l
IF(I eEQa2 *AND. JSUBF.EQ.1)JSUBF=3
IF(I.EQ.2 .AND. JSUBF.EQ.O)JSUBF=2
WRITE(6,7)I
7 FORMAT(lHO,/,lH ,'INPUT SUBSIDIZED QUANTITY FOR FIXED INPUT',I2)
READ(5,8)SUBXF(I)
8 FORMAT(FI2.2)
20 CONTINUE
21 CONTINUE
Cx*************************.* ******w**********P**********~************ie****
C CHECK FOR GIFFEN EFFECTS
C *~*****..**^********w*"*P*P***************P*K*****
ICALL=O
CALL GIFCHK(NV,NF,ICALL,IG,SUBPVL,SUBPVH)
IF(IG.aEQe )RETURN
C *******f**w^ **w*w*******e*******f**t**************w******Z*******~**.e**
C INITIALIZE ELEMENTS OF
C SUBSIDIZED COSTS
C ***~**s*w "***********gw***p**********w**r**********~*********X********** *
SUMLV1=0.0
SUMLF1=0.0
SUMl=O.O
SUM2=0e0
SUM3=0.0
SUM4=0.0
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SUM5=0. 0
C COMPUTE ELEMENTS OF
C SUBSIDIZED COSTS
C ******** ************* *****P*~*** ************X***** ********P*** ** **X*****
DO 200 I=1,NV
SUMLV1=SUMLV1-CA(I)*LOG(SUBPV(I))
DO 100 J=1,NV
100 SUM1=SUM1+.5*AVV(I,J)*LOG(SUBPV(I))*LOG(SUBPV(J))
IF(NF.EQ.O)GO TO 151
DO 150 K=1,NF
SUM2=SUM2+GVF(I,I<)*LOG(SUBPV(I))*LOG(SUBXF(K))
150 CONTINUE
151 CONTINUE
SUM3=SUM3+TVQ(I)*LOG(SUBPV(I) ) LOG(Q)
200 CONTINUE
IF(NF.EQ£O)GO TO 401
DO 400 I=1,NF
SUMLF1=SUMLF1 H(I)) LOG(SUBXF(I))
DO 300 J=1,NF
300 SUM4=SUM4+e5*BFF(I,J)ieLOG(SUBXF(I))'wLOG(SUBXF(J))
SUM5=SUM5iTHFQ(I)*LOG(SUBXF(I))*LOG(O)
400 CONTINUE
401 CONTINUE
C* w* **** ****K?***^*w**************#*************ws*%**P**w****%*§e*****s
C COMPUTE LOG COST, COST, & BENEFITS
C UNDER SUBSIDY
C**X**.**~** ** **** .**X**.************X*****X***********Z*********** **** *
SLGCST=SUM1+SUM2+SUM3+SUM4+SUM5+SUMLV1YSUMLF1*+BASE+ZQ*LOG(Q)
SCOST=EXP(SLGCST)
BENGS=BCOST-SCOST
BNFTS=BENGS
WRITE(4,16)BNFTS,NUM
16 FORMAT(IHO,/,/,/,1H ,' BENEFIT5=',F12.2,2X,'IN SCHEME',13)
WRITE(4,98)
98 FORMAT(1H /,/,/,
1 ' THESE BENEFITS ARE FROM THE',/,1H ,
2 FOLLOWING SUBSIDY SCHEME')
WRITE (4,97)
97 FORMAT(1H 1/)
DO 30 I=1,NV
WRITE(4, 9) XJ,SUBPV(I)
9 FORMAT(1H ,/,1H ,'SUBSIDIZED PRICE FOR VARIABLE INPUT',12,1X,
1 = w ',F12e2)
30 CONTINUE
IF(NF.EQ.O)GO TO 41
DO 40 I=1,NF
WRITE(4,99)I,SUBXF(I)
99 FORMAT(1H ,/,IH ,'SUBSIDIZED QUANTITY FOR FIXED INPUT¾pI2,1X,'=',
1 F12.2)
40 CONTINUE
41 CONTINUE
CALL SUBOUT(NV,NF)
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RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE PQCHGS(NUM,NV,NF)
.COMMON/PSNQS/PV(5),PF(2),SHR(5),XF(2),BFFO(3),FQO(2),HO(2) 
,ZQ
COMMON/BSVL/BY(5),BW(2),BCOST,SCOST,BFXCST
COMMON/SUBPQS/SUBPV(5),SUBXF(2),SW(2),SY<5)
COMMON/CHGS/PVCHG(5),XFCHG(2),SPXCHG(2),QVCHG(5),CSTCHG
CSTCHG=100*(SCOST-BCOST)/BCOST
WRITE(4,1)NUM,CSTCHG
FORMAT(1H ,/,/,/,1H ,'THE PERCENT CHANGE IN COSTS FOR SCHEME',13.
1 2X,'=',F8.3)
WRITE(4,10)
10 FORMAT(1H ,/)
DO 100 I=1,NV
QVCHG(I)=100*(SY(I)-BY(I))/BY(I)
PVCHG(I)=100*(SUBPV(I)-PV(I))/PV(I)
WRITE(4,2)I,PVCHG(I)
2 FORMAT(1H ,/,1H ,-THE PERCENT CHANGE IN VARIABLE TNPUT PRICE',I2,
1 2X,'=',F8.3)
WRITE(4,3)I,QVCHG(I)
3 FORMAT(1H ,'THE PERCENT CHANGE IN VARIABLE INPUT QUANTITY',
1 I2,2X,'=',F9.3)
100 CONTINUE
WRITE(4,10)
IF(NF.EQeO)GO TO 201
DO 200 I=1,NF
XFCHG(I)=100*(SUBXFCI)-XF{I))YXFtI)
IF(BW(I).LT..00001 *AND. BW(I).GT. -.00001)GO TO 150
SPXCHG(I)=100*(SW(I)-BW(I))/BW(I)
WRITE(4,4)I,SPXCHG(I)
4 FORMAT(1H ,/,1H ,'THE PERCENT CHANGE IN FIXED INPUT SHADOW PRICE',
1 12,2X,'=',F8.3)
GO TO 160
150 WRITE(4,6)
6 FORMAT(1H ,l,IH p'PERCENT CHANGE IN FIXED INPUT SHADOW PRICE '
1 'UNDEFINED')
G60 CONTINUE
WRITE(4,5)I,XFCHG(I)
5 FORMAT(1H 'THE PERCENT CHANGE IN FIXED INPUT QUANTITY',
1 I2,2X,'=',F9.3)
200 CONTINUE
201 CONTINUE
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE DWLC(NV,NF)
COMMONISUBIND/JSUBV,JSUBF
COMMON/PSNQS/PV(5),PF(2),SHR(5),XF(2),BFFO(3),FQO(2),HO(2),ZQ
COMMON/BSVL/BY(5),BW(2),BCOST,SCOST,BFXCST
COMMON/SUBPQS/SUBPV(5),SUBXF(2),SW(2),SY(5)
COMMON/DWINF/SVRCST,SFXCST,SOCCST,SUBCST,DWL,DWLPB,DWLPVC,DWLPQ,
1 BFSC
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COMMON/BEN/BNFTS
COMMON/QUANT/Q
C COMPUTE DEADWEIGHT LOSS TOTAL & PERCENTS
C * * *** IP*** ***. ********w* *wœ *******w * .**4*w *? *** ***** Q ** .* *t* **** ***
SVRCST=O.
DO 100 I-1,NV
SVRCST=SVRCST 1PV(I) *SY(I)
100 CONTINUE
SFXCST=O
IF(NFSEQ.O)GO TO 201
DO 200 I=1,NF
SFXCST= SFXCST + PF(I)*SUBXF(I)
200 CONTINUE
201 CONTINUE
SOCCST=SVRCST+SFXCST
SUBCST=SOCCST-BCOST-BFXCST
DWL=SUBCST
BFSC=BNFTS/(BNFTS,DWL)
DWLPB=DWL/BNFTS
DWLPVC=DWL/BCOST
DWLPQ=DWL/Q
CALL DWLOUT
IF(JSUBF.GT.O)CALL DWLFX(JSUBF,NV,NF)
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE DWLOUT
COMMON/DWINF/SVRCST,SFXCST,SOCCST SUBCST,DWL,DWLPB,DWLPVC,DWLPQ,
1 BFSC
COMMON/BEN/BNFTS
WRITE(4,1)DWL,BNFTS,BFSC,DWLPB,DWLPVC,DWLPQ
1 FORMAT(1H ,/,/,/,lH -'DEADWEIGHT LOSS FROM THE SUBSIDY=',F12.2,/,
1 1H ,33HFIRM'S BENEFITS FROM THE SUBSIDY=,F12.2,/,/,
2 1H ,'BENEFITS AS A FRACTION OF SUBSIDY COST:e,F9.3,
3 /,1H ,'DEADWEIGHT LOSS AS FRACTION OF BENEFITS:r,F8.3,
4 /,1H -'DEADWEIGHT LOSS AS FRACTION OF FIRM COSTS:',
5 F6e3,/,1H -'DEADWEIGHT LOSS AS FRACTION OF OUTPUT:
6 F6.3)
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE DWLFX(JSUBF,NV,NF)
COMMON/DWINF/SVRCST,SFXCST,SOCCST,SUBCST,DWL,DWLPB,DWLPVC,DWLPO,
1 BFSC
COMMON/PSNQS/PV(5),PF(2),SHR(5),XF(2),BFFO(3),FQO(2),HO(2),Zo
COMMON/SUBPQS/SUBPV(5),SUBXF(2),SW(2),SY(5)
COMMON/BSVL/BY(5),BW(2),BCOST,SCOST,BFXCST
COMMON/BEN/BNFTS
WRITE(4,1)
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I FORMAT(1H /,1H ,' DEADWEIGHT LOSS RELIES ON INITIAL SOCIAL',
2' PRICES.',/,lH ' SOCIAL PRICES OF FIXED INPUTS CAN BE HARD',
1 ' TO JUDGE.',/,1H ,' ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF DEADWEIGHT ',
2 'LOSS CAN BE USEFUL.',/,IH ,' SOME FOLLOW.')
SHFXV= O
SHSFXV=O
DO 100 I=1,NF
SHFXV=SHFXV BW(I) *XF(I)
SHSFXV=SHSFXV t BW (I) *SUBXF (I)
100 CONTINUE
ADWL SVRCST+SHSFXV-BCOST-SHFXV
WRITE (4,2) BFXCST, SFXCST, SHFXV, SHSFXV
2 FORMAT(1H ,/,/,1H ,'INITIAL FIXED COSTS AT SOCIAL PRICES= ',
1 F12.2,/,1H -'SUBSIDIZED FIXED COSTS AT SOCIAL PRICES=',
2 F9.2,/,/,1H ,'FIXED COSTS AT INITIAL SHADOW PRICES= ',
3 F9.2,/,lH -'SUBSIDIZED FIXED COSTS AT INITIAL SHADOW ',
4 'PRICES =',F9.2)
WRITE(4, 3)ADWL
3 FORMAT(1H ,/,f,1H ,'DEADWEIGHT LOSS IF INITIAL SHADOW PRICES ',
1 'ARE TRUE SOCIAL PRICES=',F9.3)
JF=JSUBF
IF(JF..EQ.3)GO TO 200
FPRT=O
CALL APF(JF,FPRT)
GO TO 250
200 CONTINUE
WRITE(4, 4)
4 FORMAT(lH ,/1H ,i FOLLOWING EACH ASSUME OTHER INITIAL SOCIAL ',
1 'FIXED INPUT PRICE CORRECT')
DO 225 I=1,2
J.=I
JX=ABS (I-3)
FPRT=PF (JX) * (SUBXF (JX) -XF (JX))
CALL APF(JF,FPRT)
225 CONTINUE
250 CONTINUE
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE APF (JF,FPRT)
COMMON/PSNQS/PV(5) ,PF(2) ,SHR(5) ,XF(2) ,BFFO(3) ,FQO(2) ,HO(2) ,ZQ
COMM4ON/SUBPQS/SUBPV(5) ,SUBXF(2) ,SW(2) ,SY(5)
COMMON/DWINF/SVRCST, SFXCST, SOCCST, SUBCST, DWL, DWLPB, DWLPVC, DWLPQ,
1 BFSC
COMMON/BSVL/BY(5),BW(2) ,BCOST,SCOST,BFXCST
COMMON/ BEN/BNFTS
APFX=- (SVRCST+FPRT-BCOST)/ (SUBXF(JF) -XF(J))
WRITE(4,4)JF,APFX
4 FORMAT(1H ,/,1H ,'PRICE OF SUBSIDIZED FIXED INPUT',I2,p THAT',
1 A WOULD YIELD ZERO DWL=',F9.3)
APFXCH=100.* (APFX-PF(JF) )/PF(JF)
WRITE(4, 5) APFXCH
5 FORMAT(lH -'PERCENT CHANGE IN THE INITIAL SOCIAL PRICE TO ',
1 'YIELD ZERO DWL=',F9.3)
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IF(BW(JF).LT. .00001 .AND. BW(JF) cGT. -. 00001)GO TO 10
AWFXCH=100.*(APFX-BW(JF) )BW(JF)
WRITE(4,6) AWFXCH
6 FORMAT(1H -'PERCENT CHANGE IN THE INITIAL SHADOW PRICE TO ',
1 'YIELD ZERO DWL=',F9.3)
10 CONTINUE
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE GIFCHK(NV,NF,ICALL,IG,SUBPVL,SUBPVH)
COMMON/BEN/BNFTS
COMMON /QUANT/Q
COMMON/PSNQS/PV(5) ,PF(2) ,SHR(5) ,XF(2),BFFO(3) ,FQO(2) ,HO(2),ZQ
COMMON/CS/BASE,A(5) ,H(2) ,AVV(5,5) ,GVF(5,2) ,BFF(2,2) ,TVa(5) ,THFQ(2)
1 , SMSHEL(2)
COMMONI/BSVL/BY(5) , BW(2) ,BCOST, SCOST,BFXCST
COMMON/SUBPQS/SUBPV (5) ,SUBXF (2) ,SW (2) ,SY (5)
COMMON/SUBPQ2/SSUBPV(5) ,SSUBXF(2) ,SSW(2) SSY(5)
COMMON/ICHKR/JCHQ (5)
COMMON/CHKR/CHQ (5)
IG=O
c*Z **** * ******w***************************.*Z***w*******w*h* *
C SET PRICE LEVELS TO
C CHECK FOR GIFFEN PROBLEM
C IN BASIC VALUE APPLICATION OR
C SUBSIDY OUTCOME APPLICATION
C **** ** * ******************* ** n*  ** * >  * , * * * *
IF (ICALL.GE.G)GO TO 2900
DO 2000 I=1,NV
SSUBPV(I)=PV(I)
2000 CONTINUE
IF(NF.EQeO)GO TO 2700
DO 2500 I=1,NF
SSUBXF(I)=XF(I)
2500 CONTINUE
2700 CONTINUE
GO TO 3200
2900 DO 3000 I=1,NV
SSUBPV(I)=SUBPV(I)
3000 CONTINUE
IF(NFGEQ.0)GO TO 3200
DO 3100 J=1,NF
SSUBXF (J)=SUBXF (J)
3100 CONTINUE
C EXAMINIE SLOPE OF DEMAND FOR GIFFEN EFFECT
C IMPOSE ZERO SLOPE IF POSITIVE
3200 CALL GIFSET(NV,NF,ICHQ)
IF(I`CHQ.EQ.0)RETURN
IF(ICALL.EQ.O)GO TO 3600
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IF(ICALL.EQ.-1)GO TO 4000
IND= ICALL
IF(JCHQ(IND) .EQ.0)RETURN
SSUBPV(IND)=.25*SUBPV(IND)i.75*SUBPVH
3210 CALL GIFSET(NV,NF,ICHQ)
HALT=CHQ(IND) *SSCOST/ (SSUBPV(IND) **2)
AHALT=ABS (HALT)
IF(AHALT.LT. .0001)GO TO 3250
IF(HALT.LT.O) SSUBPV(IND)=(SSUBPV(IND) +SUBPV(IND) )*.5
IF(HALTI.GT.O) SSUBPV(IND)=(SSUBPV(IND)4- SUBPVH) *.5
GO TO 3210
C*************Z******************** **,*w,.***,**** ******~****
C IF SLOPE POSITIVE ONLY AT PRICES
C LOWER THAN NEEDED FOR BENEFITS
C RESUME BINARY SEARCH;
C OTHERWISE IMPOSE ZERO SLOPE
C AND SET SUBSIDIZED PRICE
C AS NEEDED FOR BENEFITS OR
C CALCULATE BENEFITS AS
C SCHEME REQUIRES
3250 TESTP=PV (IND) -BNFTS/SSY (IND)
IF (TESTP.GTU.SSUBPV(IND)) SUBPV(IND)=SSUBPV(IND)
IF (TESTP .GT .SSUBPV (IND) ) RETURN
SUBPV(IND) =TESTP
DO 3300 I=I,NV
3300 SY(I)=SSY(I)
IF(NFeEQ.O)GO TO 3360
DO 3350 J=1,NF
3350 SW(J)=SSW(J)
3360 CONTINUE
GIFPV=SSUBPV C IND)
CALL GIFOUT(NV,NF,GIFPV)
RETURN
C TREAT CASE OF SCHEME GIVEN BY USER
3600 CONTINUE
IF (ICHQ.GT. 1)RETURN
DO 3700 I=-,NV
IF (JCHQ(I).EQ.1)IND=I
3700 CONTINUE
SSUBPV( IND) = .50*SUBPV < IND) + .50'PV(IND)
3710 CALL GIFSET(NV,Ne-,ICHQ)
HALT=CHQ ( IND) SSCOST/ (SSUBPV (IND) "2)
AHALT=ABS (HALT)
IF(AHALT.LT. .0001)GO TO 3750
IFfHALToLTe0 ) SSUBPVCIND)=(SSUBPV(IND)+SUBPV(IND)) *.S
IF(HALT.GT.0) SSUBPV(IND)=(SSUBPV(IND) PV(IND) )*.5
GO TO 3710
3750 BNFTS=BCOST-SSCOST- (SSUBPV(IND) -SUBPV(IND) ) *SSY (IND)
WRITE(4, 16) BNFTS
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16 FORMAT(IHO,/,/,/,1H , BENEFITS=',F12.2,2X,'IN SCHEME')
WRITE(4,98)
98 FORMAT( 1H ,I/,/,/,
1 ' THESE BENEFITS ARE FROM THE',/,1HH
2 A FOLLOWING SUBSIDY SCHEME')
WRITE(4,97)
97 FORMAT(1H ,/)
DO 30 I=1,NV
WRITE(4, 9) I,SUBPV( I)
9 FORMAT(1H ,/,1H ,'SUBSIDIZED PRICE FOR VARIABLE INPUT',12,.1X,
1 '=',F12.2)
30 CONTINUE
IF(NF.EQI.O)GO TO 41
DO 40 I=1,NF
WRITE(4,99)I,SUBXF(I)
99 FORMAT(1H ,/,1H ,'SUBSIDIZED QUANTITY FOR FIXED INPUT',I2,1X,'=',
1 F12.2)
40 CONTINUE
41 CONTINUE
DO 3800 I=1,NV
3800 SY(I)=SSY(I)
IF(NF.IEQ.O)GO TO 3860
vu O385u J1, NF
3850 SW(J)=SSW(J)
3860 CONTINUE
GIFPV=SSUBPV ( IND)
CALL GIFOUT(NV,NF,GIFPV)
IG=1
RETURN
C TREAT CASE OF BASIC VALUE COMPUTATION
C * .*****S ***w** ****** *** **** *************P**§***Z*** ** "* ***  *****g*** Z****
4000 CONTINUE
IG=l1
IF(ICHQ.GT.1)IG=2
IF(ICHQ.GT. 1) RETURN
DO 4100 I1=,NV
IF (JjCHQ(I).EQ.A)IND=I
4100 CONTINUE
SUBPVH=1000'*PV (IND)
SSUBPV(IND)= 10*PV(I)
4200 CALL GIFSET(NV,NF,ICHQ)
HALT=CHQ(IND) *SSCOST/(SSUBPV(IND) **2)
AHALT=ABS (HALT)
IF(AHALTeLT. .0001)GO TO 4500
IF(HALTeLT.0) SSUBPV(IND)=(SSUBPV(IND))PV(IND) )*.e5
IF(HALT.SGT.0) SSUBPV(IND)=(SSUBPV(IND)*SUBPVH)*.5
GO TO 4200
4500 WRITE(4,5000)IND,SSUBPV(IND)
5000 FORMAT(1H /,1H -'VARIABLE INPUT ',I1D, TURNED GIFFEN AT PRICE=',
1 F12.3)1
DO 5100 I=1,NV
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BY(I)=SSY(I)
5100 CONTINUE
IF(NF.EQ.0)GO TO 5300
DO 5200 J=1,NF
BW(J)=SSW(J)
5200 CO'-,J7.INUE
5300 CONTINUE
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE GIFSET(NV,NF,ICHQ)
COMMON/BEN/BNFTS
COMMON/QUANT/Q
COMMON/PSNQS/PV(5),PF(2),SHR(5),XF(2),BFFO(3),FQO(2),HO(2),ZQ
COMMON/CS/BASE,A(5),H(2),AVV(5,5),GVF(5,2),BFF(2,2),TVQ(5),THFQ(2)
1 ,SMSHEL(2)
COMMON/BSVL/BY(5),BW(2),BCOST,SCOST,BFXCST
COMMON/SUBPQS/SUBPV(5),SUBXF(2),SW(2),SY(5)
COMMON/SUBPQ2/SSUBPV(5),SSUBXF(2),SSW(2),SSY(5),SSCOST
COMMON/ICHKR/JCHQ(5)
COMMON/CHKR/CHQ(5)
C INITIALIZE ELEMENTS OF
C SUBSIDIZED COSTS
C*** ******** ** ****** ********Z****X*** ***0 ** *** *********e******** *Z*** *
SUMLV1=0.0
SUMLF1=0.0
SUMl-O0e0
SUM2=0.O
SUM3=0.0
SUM4=0.0
SUM5=0.0
C **Z************************w*********************************** **** **
C COMPUTE ELEMENTS OF
C SUBSIDIZED COSTS
C****** ** *** ****** *** *** *** ********** * **** * **** * **** ****** ****** *** *** A
DO 200 I=1,NV
SUMLV1=SUMLV1+A(I)*LOG(SSUBPV(I))
DO 100 J=1,NV
100 SUMI=SUM1+.5*AVV(I,J)*LOG(SSUBPV(I))*LOG(SSUBPV(J))
IF(NF.EQ.O)GO TO 151
DO 150 K=1,NF
SUM2=SUM2+GVF(I,K)*LOG(SSUBPV(I))*LOG(5SUBXF(K))
150 CONTINUE
151 CONTINUE
SUM3=SUM3+TVQ(I)*LOG(SSUBPV(I))*LOG(Q)
200 CONTINUE
IF(NF.EQ.O)GO TO 401
DO 400 I=1,NF
SUMLF1=SUMLF1+H(I)*LOG(SSUBXF(I))
DO 300 J=1,NF
300 SUM4=SUM4+.5*BFF(I,J)*LOG(SSUBXF(I))*LOG(SSUBXF(J))
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SUM5=SUM5STHF'Q(I)*LOG(SSUBXF(I))*LOG(Q)
400 CONTINUE
401 CONTINUE
C 0000000000000000000000**o000*0*0****o000000*0000000000*v§*****000*0 * *
C COMPUTE LOG COST & COST
C UNDER SUBSIDY
CO* *** *** * *** * ** * ** * * *** **** **** ** ** * ** 0* *0* * * *0* * 0* ***************0**
SLGCST=STJM1 SUM2+SUM3+SUMN4+SUM5+SUMLV1 +SUMLF1 +BASE+ZQ*LOG (Q)
SSCOST=EXP (SLGCST)
C COMPUTE SUBSIDIZED DEMANDS
4000 DO 900 1=1,NV
SSUMl=O.0
SSUM2=0.0
DO 500 J=1,NV
500 SSUM1=SSUM1+AVV(I,J)'LOG(SSUBPV(J))
IF (NF.EQ.o)GO TO 601
DO 600 K=1,NF
SSUM2=SSUM2+GVF(I,K)oLOG(SSUBXF(K))
600 CONTINUE
601 CONTINUE
SSY(I)=(SSCOST/SSUBPV(I))*(A(I)+SSUM1I+SSUM2+TVQ(I)*LOG(Q))
90;0 CONTI NUE
IF(NFEQ.eO)GO TO 1001
C COMPUTE SUBSIDIZED SHADOW PRICES
Cooo* 0¢*0*0*00*0 0 000000*0****is*00**********0**0000000O00*O0***0*0****
DO 1000 I=1,NF
SSSUMl=O.0
SSSUM2=0.0 
DO 800 J=1,NV
800 SSSUM1=SSSUM1 GVF(J,I)*LOG(SSUBPV(J))
DO 950 K=1,NF
950 SSSUM2=SSSUM2+BFF(I,K)*LOG(SSUBXF(K))
SSW(I)=-1.*(SSCOST/SSUBXF(I))C(H(I) ) SSSUM1ISSSUM2+THFQ(I)*LOG(o))
1000 CONTINUE
1001 CONTINUE
C
C CHECK FOR UPWARD SLOPING
C FACTOR DEMANDS
C
Co ooo@#o*ooooooo*o*ooo*ooo*oo*oo***oooo*oooooo ooo*oo*ooo ooooooo 000 * 000
ICHQ=O
DO 2000 I=1,NV
JCHQ(I) =O
SHTRM=(SSUBPV(I)*SSY(I)/SSCOST)*( (SSUBPV(I)*SSY(I)/SSCOST)-1)
CHQ(I)=AVV(I,I) *SHTRM
IF(CHQ(I) .GT.O)ICI,-Q=ICHQ+1
IF(CHQ(I) .GT.O)JCHQCI) =
2000 CONTINUE
RETURN
END
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SUBROUTINE GIFOUT(NV,NF,GIFPV)
COMMON/BEN/BNFTS
COMMON/QUANT/Q
COMMON/PSNQS/PV(5),PF(2),SHR(5),XF(2),BFFO(3),FQ0(2),H0(2),ZQ
COMMON/SUBPQ2/SSUBPV(5),SSUBXF(2),SSW(2),SSY(5),SSCOST
COMMON/CS/BASE,A<5),H(2),AVV(5,5),GVF(5,2),BFF(2,2),TVQ(5),THFQ(2)
1 ,SMSHEL(2)
COMMON/BSVL/BY(5),BW(2),BCOST,SCOST,BFXCST
COMMON/SUBPQS/SUBPV(5),SUBXF(2),SW(2),SY(5)
WRITE(4,2000)GIFPV
2000 FORMAT(IH /,1H ,' SUBSIDIZED GOOD TURNED',/,1H ,
1 'GIFFEN AT PRICE=',F12.3)
C* * * ****F******************************* ********* **"****9?****e******* * *e?*
C REPORT SUBSIDIZED DEMANDS
DO 900 I=1,NV
WRITE(4,602)I,SUBPV(I),SY(I)
602 FORMAT(1H /lH ,'SUBSIDIZED PRICE FOR VARIABLE INPUT',12,2X,'=',
1 F12.2,/,1H ,'SUBSIDIZED QUANTITY OF THAT VARIABLE INPUT ',
2 F12.3)
900 CONTINUE
IF(NF.EQ.O)GO TO 1001
************ ************************ ***'***"**** ****************** ****
C REPORT SUBSIDIZED SHADOW PRICES
C********** * ******P**********t***************.*****1***********qe 
. ** ***
DO 1000 I=1,NF
WRITE(4,701)I,SW(I),SUBXF(I)
701 FORMAT(1H ,/1H ,'SUBSIDIZED SHADOW PRICE OF FIXED INPUT',I2,2X,
1'=',F12.3,/,1H ,'SUBSIDIZED QUANTITY OF THAT FIXED INPUT =',
2 F12.3)
1000 CONTINUE
1001 CONTINUE
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE TECH
COMMON/PSNQS/PV(5),PF(2),SHR(5),XF(2),BFFO(3),FQO(2),HO(2),ZQ
COMMON/CS/BASE,A(5),H(2),AVV(5,5),GVF(5,2),BFF(2,2),TVQ(5),THFQ(2)
1 ,SMSHEL(2)
WRITE(4,1)BASE,A(1),A(2),A(3),A(4),A(5)
I FORMAT(1H /,/,1H ,'BASE=',F125,/,1H ,'A1=',F8.4,' A2=',F8.3,
1 R A3=',FS.3,' A4=',F8.3,' A5=',F8.3)
WRITE(4,2')ZQ,H(1),H(2)
2 FORMAT(1H ,'QCOEF=',Fll.5,/,lH ,'H1=',F8.4,' H2=',F8.3)
WRITE(4,3)AVV(1,1),AVVC2,2),AVV(3,3),AVV(4,4),AVV(5,5),
1 AVV(1,2),AVV(1,3),AVV(1,4),AVV(1,5),
2 AVV(2,3),AVV(2,4),AVV(2,5),
3 AVV(3,4),AVV(3,5),
4 AVV(4,5)
3 FORMAT(1H ,/,1H ,'AVV11=',F8.3,' AVV22=',F8.3,' AVV33=',F8.3,/,
198
1 1H ,'AVV44=',F8.3,' AVVS5=',F8.3,/,1H
2 'AVV12=',F8.3,' AVV13=',F8.3,' AVV14=',F8.3,' AVV15=',F8.3,
3 /,1H ,'AVV23=',F8o3,' AVV24=',F8.e3,' AVV25=',F8.3,
4 /,1H p'AVV34=',F8.3,' AVV35=',F8.3,
5 /,1H ,'AVV4S-',F8.3)
WRITE(4,4)BFF(1,1),BFF(2,2),
1 BFF(1,2)
4 FORMAT(1H /,IH ,'BFFll=',F8.3,' BFF22=',F8.3,/,
4 /1,H ,'BFF12=',F8.3)
WRITE(4,5)GVF(1,1) ,GVF(1,2),
1 GVF(2,1),GVF(2,2),
2 GVF(3,1),GVF(3,2),
3 GVF(4,I),GVF(4,2),
4 GVF(5,1),GVF(5,2)
5 FORMAT(1H ,1,lH ,'GVF11=',F8.3,' GVF12=',F8.3,/,
1 1H,
2 'GVF21=',F8.3,' GVF22=',F8.3,
3 f,plH 'GVF31=',F8.3,' GVF32=',FS.3,
4 /,IH ,'GVF41=',F8..3,' GVF42=',F8.3,
5 1,1H ,'GVF51=-,F8.3,' GVF52=',F8.3)
WRITE(4,6)TVQ(1) ,TVQ(2) ,TVQ(3) ,TVQ(4) ,TVQ(5)
6 FORMAT(1H ,'T1=',F8.4,' T2=',F8.3,
1 J T3=',F8.3,' T4=',F8.3,' T5='j 2 F8.3)
WRITE(4,7)THFQ(1) ,THFQ(2)
7 FORMAT(1H 'THFQ1= ',F8e4,' THFO2='F8.3,
1 ' THFQ3=',F8.3)
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE TECSET (NV,NF)
COMMON/PSNQS/PV(5) ,PF(2) ,SHR(5) ,XF(2) ,BFFO(3) ,FQO(2) ,HO(2),ZQ
COMMON/ELASS/ESOREL(5,5) ,ELASVV(5,5) 5 ,ELASVF(5,2)
COMMCN/CS/BASE,A(5) ,H(2) ,AVV(5,5) ,GVF(5,2) ,BFF(2,2) ,TVQ(5) ,THFQ (2)
1 , SMSHEL(2)
WRITE (6,10)
10 FORMAT(IHO,/,'TYPE BASE COST AGAIN. REMEMBER TO USE DECIMAL',
1 /,1H ,' INPUTS UNLESS TOLD OTHERWISE')
READ (5, 11) BASE
11 FORMAT(F12.3)
WRITE (6,12)
12 FORMAT(lHO,'IF YOU WANT TO CHANGE VARIABLE FACTOR SHARES TYPE 1;',
1 /1IH -'OTHERWISE TYPE 0')
READ(5, 13)INDEX
13 FORMAT(E1)
IF(INDEX.EQ.Q)GO TO 100
DO 50 I=1,NV
WRITE(6,14)I
14 FORMAT(IHO,/,'IF YOU WANT TO CHANGE THE SHARE OF VARIABLE INPUT,,
1 12,' TYPE 1;',/,1H 'OTHERWISE TYPE 0')
READ(5, 13) INDEX
IF(INDEX. EQO 1) WRITE(6,2) I
IF(INDEX.EQ. 1)WRITE(4,2)I
2 FORMAT(lHO,'TYPE THE FACTOR SHARE OF VARIABLE INPUT',12)
IF(INDEX.EQ. 1)READ(5, 11)SHR(I)
199
5FCINDEX.EQ.l)WRITE(4,11)SHR(I)
50 CONTINUE
100 CONTINUE
WRITE(6,15)
15 FORMAT(IHO,'IF YOU WANT TO CHANCE ELASTICITIES OF SUBSTITUTION',
1 /,1H ,'AMONG VARIABLE INPUTS, TYPE 1; OTHERWISE TYPE 0')
READ(5,13)INDEX
IF(INDEX.EQ.O)GO TO 200
NVhI=NV-1
DO 175 I=1,NVMI
WRITE(6,16)I
16 FORMAT(lHO,IF YOU WANT TO CHANGE AN ELASTICITY',
1 /,1H ,'OF SUBSTITUTION FOR VARIABLE INPUT',I2,' TYPE 1;',
2 /,1H ,'OTHERWISE TYPE O')
READ(5,13)INDEX
IF(INDEX.EQ.0)GO TO 175
K=I.1
DO 150 J=K,NV
WRITE(6417)I,J
WRITE(4,17)I,J
17 FORMAT(lHO,'TYPE THE ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION FOR',
1 /,1H , 'VARIABLE INPUTS', I2,' AND-,I2)
READ(5,11)ELASVV(I,J)
WRITE(4,11)ELASVV(I,J)
150 CONTINUE
175 CONTINUE
200 CONTINUE
WRITE(6,7)
7 FORMAT(lHO,'IF YOU WANT TO CHANGE ELASTICITIES AMONG FIXED',
1 /,1H -'AND VARIABLE INPUTS, TYPE 1; OTHERWISE TYPE 0')
READ(5,13)INDEX
IF(INDEX.EQ.O)GO TO 300
DO 275 I=1,NV
WRITE(6,18)I
18 FORMAT(lHO,'IF YOU WANT TO CHANGE AN ELASTICITY',
1 /,1H ,'OF A FIXED INPUT WITH VARIABLE INPUT',I2,' TYPE 1;',
2 /,1H ,'OTHERWISE TYPE 0')
READ(5, 13)INDEX
IF(INDEX.EQ.O)GO TO 275
DO 250 J=1,NF
WRITE(6,19)1,J
WRITE(4,19)I,J
19 FORMAT(IHO,TYPE THE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND FOR VARIABLE INPUT',12,
1 /,1H , 'WITH RESPECT TO FIXED INPUT', I2)
READ(5,11)ELASVF(I,J)
WRITE<4,ll)ELASVF(I,J)
250 CONTINUE
275 CONTINUE
300 CONTINUE
CALL SETPAR(NV,NF)
RETURN
END
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SUBROUTINE CHECK
COMMON/QUANT/Q
COMMON/PSNQS/PV(5) ,PF(2) ,SHR(5) ,XF(2) ,BFFO(3) ,FQO(2) ,HO(2) 9ZQ
COMMON/ELASS/ESOREL(5,5),ELASVV(5,5) ,ELASVF(5,2)
COMMON/CS/BASE,A(5)I,H(2),AVV(5,5),GVF(5,2),BFF(2,2),TVQ(5),THFQ(2)
1 ,SMSHEL(2)
2 FORMAT(1H ,/,1H ,'I=',1I1,2X,'PV(I)=',F8.2,2X,'SHR(I)=',F5.2,2X,
1 'TVQ(I)=',F8.2,2X,'AI= ,F8.2)
3 FORMAT(1H ,/,1H ,'I=',I1,2X,'J=',I1,2X,'ESOREL(IJ)=',F12.2,2X,
1 'ELASVV(IJ)= ,F12.2,2X,/,5H ,'AVV(IJ)=',F12.2)
4 FORMAT(1H ,/,lH ,'I=',I1,2X,'J=',I1,2X,'GVF(IJ)=',F12.2,2X,
1 'ELASVF(IJ)=',F12.2)
5 FORMAT(lH ,/,1H ,'I=',I1,2X,'BFFO(I)=l,Fl2.2)
6 FORMAT(1H ,l,1H ,'I=',Il,2X,'XF(I)=',F12.2,2X,
1 'FQO(I)=' ,Fl2.2,2X,'THFQ(I)=' ,F12.2)
WRITE(4, 13)ZQ
13 FORMAT(1H ,/,1H ,' ZQ=',F8.3)
DO 400 I=1,5
WRITE(4,2)I,PV(I),SHR(I),TVQ(I),A(I)
DO 44 J=1,5
WRITE(4,3)I,J,ESOREL(I,J),ELASVV(I,J),AVV(I,J)
44 CONTINUE
DO 45 J=1,2
WRITE(4,4)I,J,GVF(I,J),ELASVF(I,J)
IF(I.GE.3) GO TO 45
C WRITE(6,7)I,J,BFF(I,J)
7 FORMAT(1H /,- I=' ,1,2X,'J=' ,I1,2X, 'BFF(IJ)=' ,F12.8)
WRITE(4,7)I,J,BFF(I,J)
45 CONTINUE
IF(IeGEe3)GO TO 400
WRITE(4,5)I,BFFO(I)
WRITE(4,6)I,XF(I),FQO(I),THFQ(I)
WRITE(4,99)I,H(I)
99 FORMAT(1H ,/,1H ,'HI FOR FIXED INPUT',I3,2X,'=',F 12.3)
400 CONTINUE
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE CHECK2
COMMON/BSVL/BY(5),BW(2),BCOST,SCOST,BFXCST
COMMON/BEN/BNFTS
WRITE(4,1)BNFTS,BCOST,SCOST,BFXCST
1 FORMAT(1H ,/IH ,'BENEFITS=-,F12.3,/,1H S'BCOST=',F12.3,/,1H
1 'BFXCST=',F12.3)
DO 100 I=1,5
100 WRITE(4,2)I,BY(I)
2 FORMAT(1H ,/1H ,'INITIAL DEMAND FOR VARIABLE INPUT',I2,2X,'=',
1 F12.3)
DO 200 J=1,2
200 WRITE(4,3)J,BW(J)
20'1
3 FORMAT(1H ,/1H .'INITIAL SHADOW VALUE OF FIXED INPUT',I2,2X,'=',
1 F12.3)
9 RETURN
END
t,
)
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